Anthony Summers - The Eleventh Day

61 “weapons free”/“uncomfortable”:MFR of int. David Wherley, 2/27/04, “General Wherley,” B1, Dana Hyde files, CF, Staff Statement 17, CO, transcript ints. McNutz/​Thompson/​Sasseville, & ints. Thompson & Penney, undated, “Andrews AFB Logs-Timelines,” B4, Dana Hyde files, CF, & see Kara to Hyde & Azzarello, 5/25/04. The general may have had reason to feel uncomfortable. According to NORAD commanding general Eberhart, Wherley “did not have the authority to give a ‘weapons-free’ order.” Wherley said later that he “didn’t feel comfortable until he heard Vice President Cheney’s interview with Tim Russert [on September 16, on Meet the Press ]” (Eberhart: MFR 04018141, 3/1/04; “didn’t feel”: MFR of int. David Wherley, 2/27/04, “General Wherley, Zelikow Notes & MFRs,” B1, Dana Hyde files, CF; “had not been aware”: CR, 44).

62 formal rules:MFR of int. David Wherley, 2/27/04, “General Wherley,” B1, Dana Hyde files, CF, CR, 465n234;

63 made its way/10:31/You need to read:9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF, & Channel 2 audio at B82 & B110, GSA files, CF, Spencer, 240–, Shoot-down references, “Miles Kara and Dana Hyde Work Papers,” B8, T8, CF, CR, 4;

64 Marr/Nasypany unsure:CR, 43;

65 “hostile act”:MFR 0401841, 3/1/04.

66 Any track:Kara to Hyde et al., 5/24/04. It is not clear whether the voice on the tape is that of Nasypany or that of his weapons officer, Major James Fox (CF, DH, B5, “Langley Pilots Interviews Fdr.—email thread re Flight 93—NEADS Tapes,” B5, Dana Hyde files, CF).

67 Wolfowitz/FAA & military versions:see earlier refs in Chapters 12 & 13; Farmer, 245, 251, 255, CR, 31–.

68 referred to inspectors general:The inspectors general of both the Defense Department and the Department of Transportation delivered their reports in 2006. Neither conceded that there was evidence that either department’s officials connived to reconstruct the story on events on 9/11. The Commission’s John Farmer—as a former attorney general of New Jersey a man well used to weighing evidence—challenged that finding. “There is no question,” he has written, “that the official version … served the interest of every institution involved.… It is impossible to conclude honestly, from the two Inspector General reports, that the official version of the events of 9/11 was the result of mere administrative incompetence; too many questions remained unanswered.” The full body of evidence is extremely complex, too complex to be dealt with in this book. The authors suggest that interested readers consult Commission general counsel Marcus’s referral letter to the inspectors general, the resulting IG reports, and Farmer’s 2009 book, Ground Truth (referral: Marcus to Schmitz and Mead & attachments, 7/29/04; IG reports: “Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense of Intelligence,” 9/12/06, “Results of OIG Investigation of 9/11 Commission Staff Referral,” Todd Zinser to Acting Secretary, FAA, 8/31/06; “There is no question”: Farmer, 287–).

69 “in my opinion”:Testimony of Monte Belger, 6/17/04, CO;

70 “In my opinion”:Testimony of Richard Myers, 6/17/04, CO;

71 “were talking mainly”/“leadership was irrelevant”/was not simply wrong:Farmer, 186–, 290, 277, 288–.

Part III: AMERICA RESPONDS

CHAPTER 14

1

garbage can/“Allah will be”:

Chicago to Director, 9/12/01, FBI 265D-NY-280350-CG, INTELWIRE;

2

kept an eye/“Mission failed”:

FBI 302 of int. Grant Besley, 9/16/01, B11, T7, CF, Chronology ADA-30, Operations Center, Terrorist Attacks NYC-DC 9/11/01, “FAA 3 of 3 Chronology ADA Ops Center,” B19, T8, CF;

3

Picciotto/The guy:

Picciotto, 75–.

4

5,000/“remained in custody”:

“The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 6/03. The figure of 5,000 is taken from the study by Professors David Cole and Jules Lobel, which is in turn derived from official U.S. government reports.

The Washington Post

reported that 1,182 “potential terror suspects” had been detained by November 2001. In addition, some 4,000 were detained under two post-9/11 INS initiatives, the Special Registration and Alien Absconder programs. “The vast majority” of the 5,000, Professor Cole told the authors, were detained “on immigration charges, ranging from overstaying a visa to working without a permit or even to failing to file a notice of change of address” (corr. David Cole, 2010,

LAT

, 11/18/07,

WP

, 11/6/01, 6/16/04, Anjana Malhotra, “Overlooking Innocence,”

www.aclu.org

, & see “The September 11 Detainees,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, 4/03, 2–, CR, 327–, 556n17, Philip Heymann, “Muslims in America after 9/11: The Legal Situation,” conference paper, 12/15/06,

www.ces.fas.harvard.edu

).

5

conditions included/abuse:

The abuse occurred especially at the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (“The September 11 Detainees,” 4–).

6

only one convicted:

As of 2009 the only post-9/11 detainee convicted was Ali al-Marri, who had been arrested in December 2001. Marri was sentenced to eight years for plotting with and materially supporting al Qaeda. Zacarias Moussaoui, who is serving life without the possibility of parole for conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and air piracy, had been arrested before 9/11 (Marri: corr. David Cole, 2010, AP, 10/30/09,

LAT

, 5/1/09; Moussaoui: AP, 9/25/09, BBC News, 5/4/06, AFP, 1/4/10, CR, 247);

7

Ziglar/“a moment”:

MFR 04016455, 11/14/03;

8

anti-Arab hostility/Sikh shot:

New Republic

, 9/24/01,

Queens Tribune

, 9/18/01;

9

Egyptian pilot:

DiMarco, 314–.

10 Flight 23/“four young Arab”:Spencer, 102–, MFR 04020009, 4/14/04, CBS News, 9/14/01. The account of the Flight 23 incident is drawn principally from notes of a Commission interview with Ed Ballinger, the United dispatcher in charge of the airline’s transcontinental flights that day, and from Lynn Spencer’s book Touching History . Ballinger cited what he had been told by United’s chief pilot, and Spencer apparently interviewed Flight 23 crew members. There were other, less well documented reports of possible threats to planes on 9/11. Flight attendants told the Commission of Arab passengers having behaved in a way they thought suspicious aboard United Flight 962 from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C. A passenger who flew aboard yet another United plane, Flight 915 from Paris to Washington, D.C., told the Commission there had been a major security alert at Charles de Gaulle Airport before takeoff—and before the attacks began in the United States—and that guards removed a suspect from the terminal. In the States, the FBI reportedly searched for passengers who had been aboard another grounded airliner, American Flight 43. In Canada, authorities detained a Yemeni arrested aboard a U.S.-bound plane that had been diverted to Toronto. He was reportedly carrying several different passports, had papers with Arabic writing sewn into his clothing, and his baggage contained Lufthansa crew uniforms. A U.S. Justice Department spokesman said box cutters, similar to those used as weapons on the hijacked planes, were later found on other aircraft. Though the authors surmise that few if any of these accounts relate to real threats, the incident involving United 23 may indeed have been serious (Ballinger/Spencer: MFR 04020009, 4/14/04, Spencer, 102–; UA962: FBI 302, ints. Elizabeth Anderson & Elizabeth Henley, 9/20/01, “FBI 302s—ACARS,” B11, T7, CF, MFR 03007051, undated, 8/03; AA43: BBC News, 9/18/01; Yemeni: CBS News, 9/14/01, Hamilton Spectator [Canada], 9/26/01; box cutters: CNN, 9/24/01, & see MFR 04017172, 9/29/03, MFR 04019897, 7/29/03, FBI 302, 9/15/01, Chicago Tribune , 9/23/01, Guardian [U.K.], 10/13/01).