Detailed Expert Analysis of the MH17 Downing

Image 8 shows a representation of a course track of 118 degrees passing directly over Horlivka. The debris field remains in approximately the same position but has been realigned with the course track. The white segment represents the free fall trajectory, the Green segment the distance travelled in the 3 minute interval between the reported explosions and the loss of radar contact and the Yellow segment represents the distance travelled during missile flight time. It is clearly impossible for a Buk M-1 located in the Telegraph ’s reported position south of Snizhne to have brought down MH17. This engagement location sits well north of a 50 km distance from the Russian border.

It is noted that the BBC had a team in the Snizhne area and they also searched for a Buk firing position. They found nothing and received no citizen reports of sighting a missile contrail. The Telegraph came along later and did locate a position marked by scorched earth and heavy equipment tracks. Regardless of what the Telegraph claims to have found, it is physically impossible for a missile fired from the Telegraph ’s position to have intercepted MH17.

The next section examines the available data to identify the Buk position that fired the missile that intercepted MH17 and caused the loss of 298 lives.

Any system which emits electromagnetic energy can be tracked and geolocated with great precision. That is how your cellphone is able to determine your location. All militaries have an interest in determining what forces are situated adjacent to their borders. It is a natural and reasonable response for Russia to locate and identify weapons systems operating on its western borders just as it is natural and reasonable for NATO to seek to identify Russian forces.

Image 8-B is based on information publicly released by the Russians. The green shaded area represents the 140 km radar range of a Buk primary search and acquisition radar located in Styla, south of Donetsk. The shaded circles indicate the range of three UAF Buk missile TE LARs located within range of the flightpath of MH17. The range of the primary search radar compared to the 42 km range capability of an individual TELAR is immediately obvious. Despite this extended range, MH17 would have transited the green shaded radar search zone in under 9.5 minutes.

Image 9 presents a detailed close up of three Ukrainian Buk positions within range of MH17’s course. Each position was triangulated by range and bearing from the data supplied by the Russian Federation in its July 21st presentation. The resulting positions were then transferred to the map imagery used in this post. Three Buk TELARs were within range of MH17: a TELAR at Avdiivka (Purple dot), Mayak (Green dot) and Shakhtars’k (Red dot). The Shakhtars’k emplacement is the same one shown in Image 3. All three of these positions were likely networked with the search radar in Styla and would therefore have had the benefit of the extended range and target discrimination offered by that radar.

The Avdiivka position is within range but would have engaged at the limit of its missile range. A missile fired from this position would have engaged in target pursuit and this is not an optimal firing solution. In addition, a missile fired from this position would have approached MH17 near its tail section and this area of the aircraft would have suffered the heaviest damage. The publicly available tail imagery shows the tail to be void of marks made by explosive shrapnel. For this reason the Avdiivka position is discounted.

Image 10 shows Mayak is within range but in this case the missile would approach MH17 from the beam. The midsection would suffer the greatest amount of damage. Since the missile explosion launches white hot shrapnel at the target, and a missile approaching from this bearing would explode over the wing area, it is highly likely that it would have ignited a fuel tank fire. The video imagery of MH17’s descent show no sign of flame until the moment of ground impact at which point a fireball erupts. This fireball likely resulted when the intact fuel tanks, contained within the wing structure, struck the ground, burst open, and sprayed a cloud of fuel which immediately ignited. Images from the debris field show the central section of the aircraft to have burned completely away. If a missile from Mayak brought the aircraft down it would likely have fallen in flames. The Mayak position is therefore ruled out.

This leaves the position south of Shakhtars’k shown in Image 11. This position offers an optimum firing solution as the aircraft will be approaching the launch position rather than moving away from it, thus avoiding pursuit mode. MH17 is clearly within the 35 km missile range. The missile would have approached the aircraft from ahead on the starboard side. Buk missiles are designed to explode approximately 50 feet from the target and from a position slightly above the target. An explosion in this position would obliterate the starboard side of the aircraft cockpit (It is doubtful the starboard side will ever be found) and the shrapnel would have blasted through the cockpit area and exited on the port side. This is consistent with imagery obtained from the debris field.

Image 12 has been used to support the hypothesis of an aircraft firing guns or cannon from the port quarter of MH17. This gunfire is alleged to have caused a graze across the top of the wing. This same image has been rotated to approximate the course track of MH17 which is displayed in red. Additional missile trajectory lines have have been added parallel to the original orange graze line.

It is obvious that this graze across the top of the port wind supports the hypothesis of missile shrapnel coming from a position to starboard and ahead of the cockpit. Some portion of the missile shrapnel, or part of the disintegrating aircraft fuselage, was likely driven back across the top of the wing surface and this created the wing damage that is being interpreted as a bullet graze.

The same image suggests a cloud of missile shrapnel entering from the starboard side and exiting on the port side resulting in the heavy damage observed to the portion of the fuselage below the port cockpit window. The purported 30mm cannon holes are larger than would be expected of 30mm cannon fire. It is believed that UAF SU-25 aircraft carry a mixed load of explosive and incendiary rounds. The explosive 30mm rounds would have burst on contact and completely disintegrated the fuselage. What is thought to be 30mm projectile entrance damage is more likely to be exit damage associated with missile shrapnel exiting the airframe after having passed through the cockpit area. The larger voids likely represent cockpit equipment that was blown out the port side due to the missile blast.