Jon McGregor - This Isn't the Sort of Thing That Happens to Someone Like You

N — mid 60s, minimal relationship ties (has alluded to ex-partner & children, but no known contact with them to date; whereabouts unknown). Expert in food production, crop management, storage, etc. Prime source of expertise within group in this field. Often in poor health, w/ tendency to unusual diet & supplement regimes to combat this. Strictly vegan. Also has pronounced pacifist tendencies; has referred to surrender as a viable option in the face of armed assault, has also argued in favour of close links with local community and other resilient groups. Dangerously influential, altho presents as soft-spoken/passive etc etc. Will need to be kept completely unaware of PDTFG.

Children — ages 5, 8, 13. Also possible 10-month-old baby joining group. 13 y/o and 8 y/o should be able to contribute useful labour at time of crisis & in preparation for it. 5 y/o obv. less use & req. more resources (also reduces available labour from parents). Admittance of baby wd be v. poor choice by group: extra resource demand + v. reduced labour from that parent; also significant burden in event of siege/tunnel/escape procedure; also at high risk of ill-health and resultant emotional strain. (Also, parentage situation in this case will presumably cause sig. probs w/ relationship dynamics, tensions & conflict etc, at cost to effective co-operation and shared labour.)

Re 13 y/o girl, note that presence is useful in terms of long-term breeding reqs. of group.

Group Analysis Summary:

Good mix of skills and experience. Mostly good health. V. young and v. old members of group remain a concern; continue to slant discussions towards options for leaving site and being replaced by members of more appropriate age; when sourcing replacement members suggest addressing current gender imbalance with view to long-term breeding reqs. of group.

Majority of group are engaged w/ problem of crisis & preparation for it, altho small maj. opposed to armed defence. However, small minority not always serious in their discussion of issue; provocative/sarcastic/unhelpful. Recent remarks to effect that sexual activity/attachment wd reduce attention to detail as re crisis preparation were particularly unhelpful. Predict this minority won’t always consider subject worthy of humour.

Assessment of External Threats:

Working down from top:

Assume, at crisis, central & local authorities will withdraw to defendable spaces with existing supplies/stocks, & not form any threat to resilient groups across the periphery of their territory.

Police/military will be primarily focused on maintaining order in larger population centres and/or protecting significant infrastructure. (Certainly on protecting any remaining supply chain, eg any food production & distribution centres which are able to continue functioning.) Threat from police/military therefore likely to be limited: however police/military also unlikely to prevent threats from other parties such as eg:

Immediate neighbours. Early stages of crisis likely to see requests for assistance from local residents, followed by unpleasant coercion/emotional blackmail etc, followed by covert attacks (attempted night-theft) or co-ordinated overt attacks (direct armed assault, eg by mob w/ handtools or by pseudo-militia w/ weapons). Covert attacks shd be prevented by perimeter defences & by good surveillance. Overt attacks will need to be repelled by direct display of superior force, deadly force if req. (See Defence, below.) Since a large & co-ordinated overt attack will have a numerical advantage it will be important to prevent one arising. Careful surveillance & intelligence (perhaps by false negotiation) could assist in this; a pre-emptive strike or strikes may become necessary.13

Mobile groups. As the crisis matures, mobile groups may well develop, poss. from major population centres; these will be small groups and majority young/male. Likely to be physically weak due to fatigue of travel + unreliable nutrition; but prob. well armed (esp. if from major pop. centres) & experienced/uninhibited in use of deadly force. These groups will be the prime threat as crisis matures: careful surveillance will be essential, as will avoiding unnecessary awareness of site. Research plan for decoy vulnerable site (eg lit, smoke from chimney, obvious food supply) which can be booby-trapped.14 Prepare others in group, esp. members of Primary Defence Task Force Group, for use of deadly/overwhelming force. (Again, utilise reference to poss. impact on children in event of defence failure as motivating tactic.)

Rogue loners. Individuals unlikely to survive crisis, as limited amount of co-operation will be req. However some are likely to appear, esp. in early stages, and will have advantage of low profile. Reminder that sustained & effective surveillance, with appropriate follow-up action, will be essential throughout period of crisis.

Defence:15

Refer to notes on perimeter, above. Also camouflage, discretion, etc. These grouped as Passive Defence. Surveillance also part of this.

Need for force is likely to arise however.v Training in unarmed combat already in progress among some members of group; bring recommendation that all undertake this training to the next meeting, and that ‘unarmed’ be gradually redefined to inc. use of sticks, staves, shields, handtools, knives, etc, up to and including deadly force. (May need to be careful about phrasing of this; may need to introduce tools/knives etc at later date. But good training & preparedness is essential asap.)

Use of weaponry will be inevitable in crisis situation: many members of group not yet reconciled to this, and alarmed by talk of it. Need to work discreetly with others (B , R , J ) to make progress in obtaining items+ammo, & training. Shotgun, rifle, handguns in first instance. But also need low-tech/low-maintenance solutions; prepare construction & use of crossbows and/or traditional bows. Sourcing weapons will be primary difficulty. B 16 has referred to connections in major population centre which may be of use — expensive and poss. dangerous, but prob. only option. Of prime concern wd be to avoid alerting sources of weaponry to our existence and/or whereabouts; these wd by definition be groups we’d want to avoid knowing about us in the crisis time.

Ideally, a range of weapons wd be obtained. A silenced sniper-style rifle wd be preferred option; allows for early strike without attracting attention and without risk to operative. Concealed handguns useful for surprise element, eg within a false negotiation situation. Wide blast-radius shotgun useful for close confrontation. Obv. selection will be limited by availability. (It may be a useful precaution to also source 1 or more automatic weapons, to be reserved for defence against a large-scale assault, eg by a mobile group.) (However, note that in this situation it may be more prudent to opt for a siege+tunnel strategy.)