Jon McGregor - This Isn't the Sort of Thing That Happens to Someone Like You

Training in the use of these weapons will be almost as difficult as the obtaining of them, particularly while an element of secrecy within the group is required. (Altho clearly an element of secrecy from the wider community will always be required.) Options include trekking to sites such as beaches, woodland, etc. Abandoned quarry or railway tunnel wd be ideal. Further research req.

Exit Strategies:

Above plans notwithstanding, crisis may reach point of severity/duration where managed exit becomes preferred option. Group have so far been unwilling to discuss this when raised, but vital to prepare options on their behalf. (Alts. wd be poss. capture by eg mobile groups, immediate neighbours, active authority figures, etc. Poss. scenarios include but not limited to: forced labour, forced extraction of resource information, rape (female and male), captive human food source, use of violence as local entertainment, etc).

Options inc:

Medical (eg morphine, cyanide, v. large quantity of eg ibuprofen)

Mechanical (hanging in roof space w/ prepared ropes, primed tunnel collapse, primed demolition of property, crushing w/ rocks/timber/metal objects)

Environmental (exposure on high open ground, starvation, self-harm + deliberate wound-infection, weighted entry into watercourse to effect drowning)

Weapons (self-administered gunfire (or co-administered in case of weak/unwilling/young), knives and other tools to effect rapid bleeding, confrontation w/ armed groups in such manner as to effect death by gunfire)

Any proposed method must be a) quick, b) low-pain/distress where possible, c) non-rescindable, d) enforceable/enactable by others if req.)vi

Notes to Self:

Keep no further records. Discuss only with members of group relevant to completion of specific tasks. Maintain personal morale. Liaise with M 17 on more controversial aspects; he has similar perspective on chances of crisis, likely impacts & req. steps etc, and has been helpful esp. in group meetings; is also able to listen to detail and discuss wide range of topics without recourse to humour/sarcasm, and is in general terms a v. useful ally!

Destroy these notes.

1 Aerial photographs of site are available from departmental archives, crossr-eferenced to SRN 0010–5586. Note that the notion of a ‘realistically defendable space’ is, at best, a relative one.

2 At time of writing, this ditch and hedging project is at very early stages. It’s difficult to see the group achieving the stated depth/width while restricting themselves to the use of handtools, and with the limited labour on site. The proposed hedging would, I have been advised, take approx 10–15 years to reach the desired maturity.

3 Tunnel project likely to pose risk to participants: the stated ‘expertise’ appears limited to much shorter and shallower excavations. Recommend preventative measures, to include legal steps if necessary. Risk to less-willing members of group would appear to be unreasonable.

4 Names and locations have been redacted throughout this recovered document in order to protect ongoing operation. — MK.

5 Perimeter Working Group. Presumably refers to use of fine flour in Improvised Explosive Device. Subject not known to have training or expertise in preparation or use of explosives. — MK.

6 Presumably refers to fuel shortage restricting flights of any kind. Subject seems not to have considered fuel stockpiling by authority. — MK.

7 Photovoltaic, aka ‘solar panels’. — MK.

8 Typical misunderstanding of authority plans for Emergency Mass Medication, common among groups of this type.

9 ‘self-sufficient’. — MK.

10 Primary Defence Task Force Group. — MK.

11 Author of this document. — MK.

12 Reference to this officer. — MK.

13 Serious cause for concern here. Potentially substantial risk of subject misperceiving environmental factors and moving into ‘crisis’ mode, with the results clearly detailed here. Recommend continued surveillance of subject. — MK.

14 Again, potential use of explosives and/or ‘traps’ is cause for concern. — MK.

15 Note this entire section with High Concern. Recommend that this section of recovered document be highlighted and forwarded to Command. Plans to obtain this level of hardware — although of limited practicality — would if carried through put this group into a High Risk category. Recommend continuing surveillance, with mobile team assigned. — DC (MK’s Supervising Officer).

16 Secondary target subject, with pre-assigned Subject Reference Number 0010–5622. Already known. Recommend renewed surveillance with reference to possibility of making contact with known criminal gangs in attempt to source weapons.

17 Again, reference to this officer. — MK.

[Endnotes follow. General remarks on viability of group and practical outlook for their programme of activities. Comments on individual subject. Recommendations for ongoing strategy (includes collated recommendations from footnotes). — MK]

i This document comprises a photographic reproduction of an original document authored by surveillance subject in question (SRN 0010–5586). Photographic record was covertly obtained during conversation with subject; the original document is believed to have now been destroyed.

ii Summary of defence measures adopted by group: weak. Perimeter easily breachable by tracked vehicle, and likely to remain so in future. Main entry breachable by non-tracked vehicle in conjunction with minimal necessary force.

iii These are all standard policies and procedures for a group of this nature, and pose no risk to wider community. (Withdrawn: non-required personal opinion. — DC, MK’s Supervising Officer)

iv Subject’s assessment of group is reasonably accurate, although it is this officer’s observation that he overestimates the engagement of other group members with what he terms ‘crisis preparation’. Secondary observation: subject is at times isolated within the group, very preoccupied with the issues and plans documented here, and vulnerable to criticism or light humour being made of this fact. As such, subject has been well-exposed to this officer’s approach, and appears to have responded to minor praise and encouragement with a trusting and open outlook towards this officer. This appears likely to continue, especially given little prospect of subject attaining romantic or sexual ties within the group.

v See footnotes within main document for response to this section. General observation that while desire to obtain weaponry is genuine and forcefully expressed, this officer retains doubts about viability of plans to do so and limited capacity to utilise any such obtained weaponry. Close surveillance will focus on this issue, however, as instructed by DC.

vi This emphasis on suicide methods being ‘non-rescindable’ and ‘enforceable by others’ is alarming, and raises the prospect, as discussed in Footnote 6, of subject misperceiving a given situation and potentially ‘enforcing’ one of these methods on other members of the group. Surveillance will need to focus on any steps taken to prepare these methods, and subject may need to be referred for covert psychiatric assessment.

Summary of Recommendations — DC:

• Continued surveillance of subject, with additional resource of mobile surveillance unit as required.

• Renewed surveillance of SRN 0010–5622, focusing on contacts with known criminal gangs and/or attempts to source weaponry and ammunition.

• Periodic aerial reconnaissance.