Albert Beveridge - The Life of John Marshall (Volume 2 of 4)

"We have some letters from Philadelphia that wear a very ugly aspect," he writes Archibald Stuart. "It is said that Simcoe, the Governor of Upper Canada, has entered the territory of the United States at the head of about 500 men and has possessed himself of Presque Isle." But Marshall cannot restrain his humor, notwithstanding the gravity of the report: "As this is in Pennsylvania," he observes, "I hope the democratic society of Philadelphia will at once demolish him and if they should fail I still trust that some of our upper brothers [Virginia Republicans] will at one stride place themselves by him and prostrate his post. But seriously," continues Marshall, "if this be true we must bid adieu to all hope of peace and prepare for serious war. My only hope is that it is a mere speculating story." 316 316 Marshall to Stuart, May 28, 1794; MS., Va. Hist. Soc.

Powerless to obtain our rights by force or to prevent their violation by being prepared to assert them with arms, Washington had no recourse but to diplomacy. At all hazards and at any cost, war must be avoided for the time being. It was one of Great Britain's critical mistakes that she consented to treat instead of forcing a conflict with us; for had she taken the latter course it is not improbable that, at the end of the war, the southern boundary of British dominion in America would have been the Ohio River, and it is not impossible that New York and New England would have fallen into her hands. At the very least, there can be little doubt that the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence would have become exclusively British waters. 317 317 It must not be forgotten that we were not so well prepared for war in 1794 as the colonies had been in 1776, or as we were a few years after Jay was sent on his mission. And on the traditional policy of Great Britain when intending to make war on any country, see J. Q. Adams to his father, June 24, 1796; Writings, J. Q. A. : Ford, i, 499-500. Also, see same to same, The Hague, June 9, 1796; ib. , 493, predicting dissolution of the Union in case of war with Great Britain. "I confess it made me doubly desirous to quit a country where the malevolence that is so common against America was exulting in triumph." ( Ib. ) "The truth is that the American Government … have not upon earth more rancorous enemies, than the springs which move the machine of this Country [England] … Between Great Britain and the United States no cordiality can exist." (Same to same, London, Feb. 10, 1796; ib. , 477; also, March 24, 1794; ib. , 18, 183, 187.)

Amid a confusion of counsels, Washington determined to try for a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Great Britain, a decision, the outcome of which was to bring Marshall even more conspicuously into politics than he ever had been before. Indeed, the result of the President's policy, and Marshall's activity in support of it, was to become one of the important stepping-stones in the latter's career.

Chief Justice Jay was selected for the infinitely delicate task of negotiation. Even the news of such a plan was received with stinging criticism. What! Kiss the hand that smote us! It was "a degrading insult to the American people; a pusillanimous surrender of their honor; and an insidious injury to France." 318 318 Marshall, ii, 363. And our envoy to carry out this shameful programme! – was it not that same Jay who once tried to barter away the Mississippi? 319 319 American Remembrancer , i, 9.

It was bad enough to turn our backs on France; but to treat with the British Government was infamous. So spoke the voice of the people. The democratic societies were especially virulent; "Let us unite with France and stand or fall together" 320 320 Resolution of Wythe County (Va.) Democratic Society, quoted in Anderson, 32. was their heroic sentiment. But abhorrence of the mission did not blind the Republicans to the advantages of political craft. While the negotiations were in progress they said that, after all, everything would be gained that America desired, knowing that they could say afterward, as they did and with just cause, that everything had been lost. 321 321 Ames to Dwight, Feb. 3, 1795; Works : Ames, i, 166.

At last Jay secured from Great Britain the famous treaty that bears his name. It is perhaps the most humiliating compact into which America ever entered. He was expected to secure the restriction of contraband – it was enlarged; payment for the slaves – it was refused; recognition of the principle that "free ships make free goods" – it was denied; equality with France as to belligerent rights – it was not granted; opening of the West Indian trade – it was conceded upon hard and unjust conditions; payment for British spoliation of American commerce – it was promised at some future time, but even then only on the award of a commission; immediate surrender of the posts – their evacuation was agreed to, but not until a year and a half after the treaty was signed.

On the other hand, the British secured from us free navigation and trading rights on the Mississippi – never contemplated; agreement that the United States would pay all debts due from American citizens to British creditors – a claim never admitted hitherto; prohibition of any future sequestration of British debts; freedom of all American ports to British vessels, with a pledge to lay no further restrictions on British commerce – never before proposed; liberty of Indians and British subjects to pass our frontiers, trade on our soil, retain lands occupied without becoming American citizens, but privileged to become such at pleasure – an odious provision, which, formerly, had never occurred to anybody.

Thus, by the Treaty of 1794, we yielded everything and gained little not already ours. But we secured peace; we were saved from war. That supreme end was worth the sacrifice and that, alone, justified it. It more than demonstrated the wisdom of the Jay Treaty.

While the Senate was considering the bitter terms which Great Britain, with unsheathed sword, had forced upon us, Senator Stephen T. Mason of Virginia, in violation of the Senate rules, gave a copy of the treaty to the press. 322 322 Marshall, ii, 362-64. Instantly the whole land shook with a tornado of passionate protest. 323 323 Ib. , 366. From one end of the country to the other, public meetings were held. Boston led off. 324 324 The Boston men, it appears, had not even read the treaty, as was the case with other meetings which adopted resolutions of protest. (Marshall, ii, 365 et seq. ) Thereupon the Boston satirists lampooned the hasty denunciators of the treaty as follows: — "I've never read it, but I say 'tis bad. If it goes down, I'll bet my ears and eyes, It will the people all unpopularize; Boobies may hear it read ere they decide, I move it quickly be unratified." On Dr. Jarvis's speech at Faneuil Hall against the Jay Treaty; Loring: Hundred Boston Orators , 232. The Republicans were equally sarcastic: "I say the treaty is a good one … for I do not think about it… What did we choose the Senate for … but to think for us… Let the people remember that it is their sacred right to submit and obey; and that all those who would persuade them that they have a right to think and speak on the sublime, mysterious, and to them incomprehensible affairs of government are factious Democrats and outrageous Jacobins." (Essay on Jacobinical Thinkers: American Remembrancer , i, 141.) Washington was smothered with violent petitions that poured in upon him from every quarter praying, demanding, that he withhold his assent. 325 325 See Marshall's vivid description of the popular reception of the treaty; Marshall, ii, 365-66. As in the struggle for the Constitution and in the violent attacks on Neutrality, so now the strongest advocates of the Jay Treaty were the commercial interests. "The common opinion among men of business of all descriptions is," declares Hamilton, "that a disagreement would greatly shock and stagnate pecuniary plans and operations in general." 326 326 Hamilton to King, June 20, 1795; Works : Lodge, x, 103.