Albert Beveridge - The Life of John Marshall (Volume 2 of 4)

Thus, in the campaign, the Republicans made the French cause their own. Everything that Washington's Administration had accomplished was wrong, said the Republicans, but Neutrality was the work of the Evil One. The same National power which had dared to issue this "edict" against American support of French "liberty" had foisted on the people Assumption, National Courts, and taxes on whiskey. This identical Nationalist crew had, said the Republicans, by Funding and National Banks, fostered, nay, created, stock-jobbing and speculation by which the few "monocrats" were made rich, while the many remained poor. Thus every Republican candidate for Congress became a knight of the flaming sword, warring upon all evil, but especially and for the moment against the dragon of Neutrality that the National Government had uncaged to help the monarchs of Europe destroy free government in France. 297 297 Marshall, ii, 293. Chiefly on that question the Republicans won the National House of Representatives.

But if Neutrality lit the flames of public wrath, Washington's next act in foreign affairs was powder and oil cast upon fires already fiercely burning. Great Britain, by her war measures against France, did not spare America. She seized hundreds of American vessels trading with her enemy and even with neutrals; in order to starve France 298 298 Ib. , 285. she lifted cargoes from American bottoms; to man her warships she forcibly took sailors from American ships, "often leaving scarcely hands enough to navigate the vessel into port"; 299 299 Ib. , 285. she conducted herself as if she were not only mistress of the seas, but their sole proprietor. And the British depredations were committed in a manner harsh, brutal, and insulting.

Even Marshall was aroused and wrote to his friend Stuart: "We fear, not without reason, a war. The man does not live who wishes for peace more than I do; but the outrages committed upon us are beyond human bearing. Farewell – pray Heaven we may weather the storm." 300 300 Marshall to Stuart, March 27, 1794; MS., Va. Hist. Soc. If the self-contained and cautious Marshall felt a just resentment of British outrage, we may, by that measure, accurately judge of the inflamed and dangerous condition of the general sentiment.

Thus it came about that the deeply rooted hatred of the people for their former master 301 301 "The idea that Great Britain was the natural enemy of America had become habitual" long before this time. (Marshall, ii, 154.) was heated to the point of reckless defiance. This was the same Monarchy, they truly said, that still kept the military and trading posts on American soil which, more than a decade before, it had, by the Treaty of Peace, solemnly promised to surrender. 302 302 One reason for Great Britain's unlawful retention of these posts was her purpose to maintain her monopoly of the fur trade. ( Ib. , 194. And see Beard: Econ. O. J. D. , 279.) The Government that was committing these savage outrages was the same faithless Power, declared the general voice, that had pledged compensation for the slaves its armies had carried away, but not one shilling of which had been paid.

If ever a country had good cause for war, Great Britain then furnished it to America; and, had we been prepared, it is impossible to believe that we should not have taken up arms to defend our ravaged interests and vindicate our insulted honor. In Congress various methods of justifiable retaliation were urged with intense earnestness, marred by loud and extravagant declamation. 303 303 Marshall, ii, 320-21; and see Annals , 3d Cong., 1st Sess., 1793, 274-90; also Anderson, 29; and see prior war-inviting resolves and speeches in Annals , 3d Cong., supra , 21, 30, 544 et seq. ; also Marshall, ii, 324 et seq. "The noise of debate was more deafening than a mill… We sleep upon our arms," wrote a member of the National House. 304 304 Ames to Dwight, Dec. 12, 1794; Works : Ames, i, 154. But these bellicose measures were rejected because any one of them would have meant immediate hostilities.

For we were not prepared. War was the one thing America could not then afford. Our Government was still tottering on the unstable legs of infancy. Orderly society was only beginning and the spirit of unrest and upheaval was strong and active. In case of war, wrote Ames, expressing the conservative fears, "I dread anarchy more than great guns." 305 305 Ames to Gore, March 26, 1794; Works : Ames, i, 140. And see Marshall, ii, 324 et seq. Our resources had been bled white by the Revolution and the desolating years that followed. We had no real army, no adequate arsenals, 306 306 See Washington to Ball, Aug. 10, 1794; Writings : Ford, xii, 449. no efficient ships of war; and the French Republic, surrounded by hostile bayonets and guns and battling for very existence, could not send us armies, fleets, munitions, and money as the French Monarchy had done.

Spain was on our south eager for more territory on the Mississippi, the mouth of which she controlled; and ready to attack us in case we came to blows with Great Britain. The latter Power was on our north, the expelled Loyalists in Canada burning with that natural resentment 307 307 See Van Tyne, chap. xi. which has never cooled; British soldiers held strategic posts within our territory; hordes of Indians, controlled and their leaders paid by Great Britain, 308 308 Marshall, ii, 286, 287. and hostile to the United States, were upon our borders anxious to avenge themselves for the defeats we had inflicted on them and their kinsmen in the savage wars incited by their British employers. 309 309 Ib. Worst of all, British warships covered the oceans and patrolled every mile of our shores just beyond American waters. Our coast defenses, few, poor, and feeble in their best estate, had been utterly neglected for more than ten years and every American port was at the mercy of British guns. 310 310 John Quincy Adams, who was in London and who was intensely irritated by British conduct, concluded that: "A war at present with Great Britain must be total destruction to the commerce of our country; for there is no maritime power on earth that can contend with the existing naval British force." (J. Q. Adams to Sargent, The Hague, Oct. 12, 1795; Writings, J. Q. A. : Ford, i, 419.)

Evidence was not wanting that Great Britain courted war. 311 311 "I believe the intention is to draw the United States into it [war] merely to make tools of them… The conduct of the British government is so well adapted to increasing our danger of war, that I cannot but suppose they are secretly inclined to produce it." (J. Q. Adams to his father, The Hague, Sept. 12, 1795; ib. , 409.) She had been cold and unresponsive to every approach for a better understanding with us. She had not even sent a Minister to our Government until eight years after the Treaty of Peace had been signed. 312 312 Marshall, ii, 194. She not only held our posts, but established a new one fifty miles south of Detroit; and her entire conduct indicated, and Washington believed, that she meant to draw a new boundary line which would give her exclusive possession of the Great Lakes. 313 313 Marshall, ii, 337. She had the monopoly of the fur trade 314 314 Ib. , 195; and see Beard: Econ. O. J. D. , 279. and plainly meant to keep it.

Lord Dorchester, supreme representative of the British Crown in Canada, had made an ominous speech to the Indians predicting hostilities against the United States within a year and declaring that a new boundary line would then be drawn "by the warriors." 315 315 See this speech in Rives, iii, footnote to 418-19. It is curious that Marshall, in his Life of Washington , makes the error of asserting that the account of Dorchester's speech was "not authentic." It is one of the very few mistakes in Marshall's careful book. (Marshall, ii, 320.) Rumors flew and gained volume and color in their flight. Even the poised and steady Marshall was disturbed.