Paul Preston - Franco

When Faldella was received by Franco at 8 p.m. on 13 February, the usually polite Generalísimo ostentatiously failed to thank him for the Italian action at Málaga and said ‘the note has surprised me, because it is a real imposition’. The expected success in the Jarama gave the Caudillo the confidence to speak in stronger terms than previously to Faldella, who was after all the acting military representative of Mussolini. ‘When all is said and done’, Franco told Faldella, ‘Italian troops have been sent here without requesting my authorization. First I was told that companies of volunteers were coming to be incorporated into Spanish battalions. Then I was asked for them to be formed into independent battalions on their own and I agreed. Next senior officers and generals arrived to command them, and finally already-formed units began to arrive. Now you want to oblige me to allow these troops to fight together under General Roatta’s orders, when my plans were altogether different.’ Faldella replied that the reasoning behind all this was simply that Mussolini was trying to make good the failure of the Germans to supply troops to which Franco responded: ‘This is a war of a special kind, that has to be fought with exceptional methods so that such a numerous mass cannot be used all at once, but spread out over several fronts it would be more useful.’ 112 These remarks revealed not just Franco’s resentments about Italian aid, but also the limitations of his strategic vision. His preference for piecemeal actions over a wide area reflected both his own practical military experiences in a small-scale colonial war and his desire to conquer Spain slowly and so consolidate his political supremacy. 113

Faldella tried to make him see the opportunity for a decisive victory offered by the determined use of the Italian CTV. Franco would not be shaken from his preference for the gradual and systematic occupation of Republican territory: ‘In a civil war, a systematic occupation of territory accompanied by the necessary purge ( limpieza ) is preferable to a rapid rout of the enemy armies which leaves the country still infested with enemies.’ Faldella pointed out that a rapid defeat of the Republic at Valencia would make it easier for him to root out the Left in Spain. At this point, Barroso interrupted and, as his master’s voice, said ‘you must take into account that the Generalísimo’s prestige is the most important thing in this war, and that it is absolutely unacceptable that Valencia, the seat of the Republican government, should be occupied by foreign troops.’ 114

On the following day, Franco sent a written reply to Faldella, in which he grudgingly accepted his offer of an attack from Sigüenza to Guadalajara. He claimed that he had never wanted Italian troops used en masse for fear of international complications and because it was damaging for ‘decisive actions against objectives of the highest political importance to be carried out other than by the joint action of Spanish and Italian units’. 115 Cantalupo believed that the Caudillo had been had brought around by an Italian promise to ensure that Spanish troops entered Madrid as the victors. 116 In fact, he was responding to sticks as well as carrots. The potential conflict between Franco and the commanders of the CTV was such that Roatta flew to Rome to discuss the problem with Mussolini. The Duce reacted firmly in support of Roatta, threatening to withdraw his forces if Franco continued to respond as he had to Faldella. To show that he meant business, twenty fighter aircraft promised to Franco were redirected to the Italian command in Spain which was given control over the Air Force units which had previously flown under the Generalísimo’s orders. 117

Mussolini’s threat drew additional effect because it came as the Nationalist attack in the Jarama ground to a halt. The Jarama valley was defended fiercely by Republican troops reinforced by the International Brigades and the battle saw the most vicious fighting of the entire Civil War. As in the battle for the La Coruña road, the Nationalist front advanced a few miles, but no major strategic gain was made. Once again Madrid was saved, albeit at a high cost in blood. The Republicans lost more than ten thousand including some of the best British and American members of the Brigades, and the Nationalists about seven thousand. 118

Franco’s earlier defiance turned to desperation. Now, only six days after his churlish treatment of Faldella on 13 February, he sent Barroso to beg him to begin the offensive as soon as possible. Faldella refused, on the grounds that his planned initiative could not be rushed and so, on the following day, Millán Astray asked Faldella to see him. They dined together at CTV headquarters on 21 February and Millán spoke in ‘pathetic terms’ about the Nationalists’ difficulties around Madrid and begged for a rapid Italian intervention. Faldella was convinced that Millán Astray had come at Franco’s behest. In the event, Franco had to wait until Faldella and Roatta were ready. After all, moving the Italian Army from Málaga to central Spain was no easy task.

The Generalísimo’s desire to use the Italians as reinforcements within his Jarama campaign was coldly brushed aside. A seething Franco was having to bend to what the Italians wanted. The general plan of operations which he sent to Mola on 23 February exactly followed the strategy outlined in Faldella’s note of 13 February. One week later, the Italians were still not ready and, on 1 March, Barroso again pleaded with Faldella to persuade Roatta to begin an immediate action. 119 Although Orgaz and Varela had managed to hold the line at the Jarama, the Generalísimo was desperate for a diversion to relieve his exhausted forces. For Franco, an Italian attack on Guadalajara, forty miles north-east of Madrid, would be an ideal distraction. That was not what the Italians had in mind at all. A major disaster was in the making.

* Yagüe wanted to penetrate along a line through the poorly defended north-eastern suburbs of Puerta de Hierro, Dehesa de la Villa and Cuatro Caminos while Varela favoured a similar thrust through the south-eastern suburbs of Vallecas and Vicálvaro.

* Formally directed by Conte Luca Pietromarchi, the Ufficio Spagna was under the authority of Ciano, and enjoyed virtual autonomy in military decisions.

* The only explicit evidence of a request by Franco is Faupel’s telegram to the Baron von Neurath, which was reported in the French press at the time and not denied. Moreover, the alleged request closely coincides with the decision by Mussolini on 6 December to send substantial reinforcements. Mussolini’s appreciation of Franco’s needs was made on the basis of reports from various agents in Spain including Anfuso and General Roatta. Given the close contact between Franco and Roatta since September, it is improbable that Roatta would have made recommendations likely to be disowned by the Generalísimo.

* Göring’s visit to Rome was a symbolic affirmation of the growing warmth between the Nazi and Fascist regimes. During a packed programme, he visited the Fencing Academy at the Forum where he challenged Mussolini to a sabre duel. To the delight of the senior Nazis and Fascists present, they slugged it out for twenty minutes, showing remarkable agility given their respective sizes – with Mussolini the eventual victor (Ramón Garriga, Guadalajara y sus consecuencias (Madrid, 1974) pp. 42–3).

* The Anglo-French policy of Non-Intervention, adopted in August 1936, was a farce which favoured the Nationalists at the expense of the Republic and appeased the fascist dictators. It was described by a Foreign Office official as ‘an extremely useful piece of humbug’. It is clear that a more resolute attitude by London would have inhibited the Germans and Italians in their assistance to Franco. (Enrique Moradiellos, Neutralidad benévola: el Gobierno británico y la insurrección militar española de 1936 (Oviedo, 1990) pp. 117–88; Douglas Little, Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War (Ithaca, 1985) pp. 221–65.)