Paul Preston - Franco

Franco’s Army was paralysed by the problem of transport to the mainland. The conspirators had taken for granted that the fleet would be with them but their hopes had been dashed by a below-decks mutiny. In facing the daunting problem of being blockaded in Morocco, Franco displayed a glacial sang froid. His apparent lack of nerves prevented his being dismayed by the numerous reverses that the rebels had encountered in the first forty-eight hours. Even the worst news never disturbed his sleep. 30 Franco’s optimism and his determination to win was the dominant theme of an interview which he gave to the American reporter Jay Allen in Tetuán on 27 July. When Allen asked him how long the killing would continue now that the coup had failed, Franco replied ‘there can be no compromise, no truce. I shall go on preparing my advance to Madrid. I shall advance. I shall take the capital. I shall save Spain from Marxism at whatever cost.’ Denying that there was a stalemate, Franco declared ‘I have had setbacks, the defection of the Fleet was a blow, but I shall continue to advance. Shortly, very shortly, my troops will have pacified the country and all of this will soon seem like a nightmare.’ Allen responded ‘that means that you will have to shoot half Spain?’, at which a smiling Franco said ‘I repeat, at whatever cost.’ 31

Before Franco had arrived in Tetuán, on 18 July, the destroyer Churruca and two merchant steamers, the Cabo Espartel and the Lázaro and a ferry boat had managed to get 220 men to Cádiz. However, within a matter of hours the crew of the Churruca , like those of many other Spanish naval vessels, mutinied against their rebel officers. On 19 July, the gunboat Dato and another ferry got a further 170 to Algeciras. In the following days, only a few more troops were able to cross in Moroccan lateen-rigged feluccas ( faluchos ). 32 These men were to have a crucial impact on the success of the rising in Cádiz, Algeciras and La Línea. Within hours of arriving in Tetuán, Franco had discussed with his cousin Pacón and Colonel Yagüe the urgent problem of getting the Legion across the Straits of Gibraltar. The Moroccan Army was effectively immobilized. However, Franco did have two major strokes of luck in this regard. The first was the sympathy for his cause of the authorities on the Rock who refused facilities for the Republican fleet. The second was that the tall, incorruptible General Alfredo Kindelán, the founder of the Spanish Air Force and a prominent monarchist conspirator, happened to be in Cádiz as Mola’s liaison with senior naval officers. In the confusion, and with his contact with Mola broken, Kindelán linked up with the troops recently arrived from Morocco. From Algeciras, he spoke by telephone with Franco who made him head of his Air Force. 33 Kindelán was to be a useful asset in organizing the crossing of the Straits.

Cut off by sea from mainland Spain, Franco, advised by Kindelán, began to toy with the then revolutionary idea of getting his Army across the Straits by air and to seek a way of breaking through the blockade by sea. 34 The few aircraft available at Tetuán had been damaged by the sabotage efforts of Major de la Puente Bahamonde. Those units and others at Seville were soon repaired and in service. A few Legionarios able to cross the Straits by air landed at Tablada Aerodrome at Seville and helped consolidate Queipo de Llano’s hold on the city. 35 Thereafter, from dawn to late in the evening each day, a constant shuttle was maintained by three Fokker F.VIIb3m trimotor transports and one Dornier DoJ Wal flying boat. Each aircraft did four trips per day; the Fokkers carrying sixteen to twenty soldiers and equipment every time, the Dornier able to carry only twelve and having to land in Algeciras Bay. From 25 July, the original four aircraft were joined by a Douglas DC-2 capable of carrying twenty-five men and, from the end of the month, by another Dornier DoJ Wal flying boat. 36

The airlift was as yet far too slow. Ironically, the main worry of Franco and his cousin was that Mola might get to Madrid before them. At one point, Franco commented ‘in September, I’ll be back in the Canary Islands, happy and contented, after obtaining a rapid triumph over Communism’. 37 Even before German and Italian assistance arrived, Franco was fortunate that Kindelán, the energetic Major Julio García de Cáceres and the Air Force pilots who had joined the uprising worked miracles, both repairing the flying boats which had been out of action and putting eight aged Breguet XIX biplane light bombers and two Nieuport 52 fighters at his disposal. These would provide the escorts whose harassment of the Republican navy would sow panic among the inexperienced left-wing crews when Franco decided to risk sea crossings. 38 Franco recognized the importance of the contribution that was being made by Kindelán, by naming him on 18 August, General Jefe del Aire. 39

Even before the early limited airlift was properly under way, Franco was seeking a way of breaking through the sea blockade. On the evening of 20 July, he called a meeting of his staff, attended by Yagüe, Beigbeder, Saenz de Buruaga and Kindelán, as well as naval and Air Force officers. Assured by Kindelán that the aircraft available could deal with any hostile vessels, Franco decided to send a troop convoy by sea from Ceuta at the earliest opportunity. He overruled strong expressions of doubt, particularly from Yagüe and the naval officers present, who were concerned at the threat posed by the Republican navy. Franco, however, convinced as always of the importance of moral factors in deciding battles, believed that the Republican crews, without trained officers to navigate, oversee the engine rooms or direct the guns, would present little danger. He acknowledged the validity of the objections, but simply brushed them aside. ‘I have to get across and I will get across’. It would be one of the few times that Franco the cautious and meticulous planner would take an audacious risk. He decided against a night crossing because his one major advantage, the Republican naval crews’ fear of air attack would be neutralized. The precise date of the convoy would be left until the Nationalists had better air cover and more intelligence of Republican fleet movements. 40 It would eventually take place on 5 August.

Ultimately, the conversion of the rising into a long drawn-out war of attrition was to favour Franco’s political position and the establishment of a personal dictatorship. At first, however, Franco’s isolation in Africa left the political leadership of the coup in the hands of Mola. Nevertheless, although Franco’s every thought may have been on winning the war, he still took for granted that he was the leading rebel once Sanjurjo was dead, informing both the Germans and the Italians of this. His ambitions were, however, pre-empted by events in the north.

On 19 July, having made his declaration of martial law in Pamplona, Mola had sketched out an amplified version of his earlier document on the military directory and its corporative policies. 41 On 23 July, he set up a seven-man Junta de Defensa Nacional in Burgos under the nominal presidency of General Cabanellas, the most senior Major-General in the Nationalist camp after the death of Sanjurjo. It consisted of Generals Mola, Miguel Ponte, Fidel Dávila and Andrés Saliquet and two colonels from the general staff, Federico Montaner and Fernando Moreno Calderón. Mola also sought some civilian input from the Renovación Española group. 42 Having been a deputy for Jaén in Lerroux’s Radical Party between 1933 and 1935, Cabanellas was regarded by his fellow members as dangerously liberal. His elevation to preside the Junta reflected not simply his seniority but Mola’s anxiety to get him away from active command in Zaragoza. Mola himself had visited Zaragoza on 21 July and had been appalled to find Cabanellas exercising restraint in crushing opposition to the rising and contemplating using ex-members of the Radical Party to create a municipal government. 43 On 24 July, the Junta named Franco head of its forces on the southern front. On 1 August, Captain Francisco Moreno Fernández, was named Admiral in command of the section of the navy which had not remained loyal to the Republic, and was added to the Junta. 44