Winston Ma - The Hunt for Unicorns

The third example is Chinaand its endeavor to reduce its semiconductor dependency on US technology. According to the Wall Street Journal, even after the creation in 2014 of its initial fund specifically targeted at fostering its domestic semiconductor industry, in 2018 alone China imported $312.1 billion in semiconductors well more than the year's $240.3 billion in oil imports. China has stepped up the effort to bolster its own chip industry through various means, including the acquisition of foreign technology companies, but the effort encountered push back by the US Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the agency that screens foreign direct investment for national security risks.

With an eye to further constraining foreign incursions in the sensitive tech sector, in 2018 (effective from early 2020) the Trump administration developed new CFIUS rules to scrutinize Chinese and other foreign investments more carefully, especially in high-tech fields. The new rule emphasizes national security review of transactions involving “TID” technologies – critical technology, critical infrastructure, and sensitive personal data (see Figure 1.6 ). While the rules would apply to any foreign investment, the effort is likely aimed at preventing China from gaining access to sensitive American technology and other valuable assets – after years of Chinese sovereign capital's activities in the Silicon Valley.

Figure 1.6 The TID Focus of CFIUS

Still, China is not deterred from its determination to become more independent from US technology and keep pursuing global technology leadership. In October 2019, China set up a new national semiconductor fund (its second in less than five years) with 204 billion yuan ($28.9 billion) – its predecessor was capitalized with $20 billion in 2014. The fund's registered capital comes mainly from state organizations, according to company registration information, which include China's Ministry of Finance (22.5 billion yuan) and the policy bank China Development Bank (22 billion yuan), as well as state-owned enterprises such as China Tobacco Co. The new fund has an ambitious goal to cultivate China's complete semiconductor supply chain, from chip design to manufacturing, from processors to storage chips.

What's next for the US? Its own sovereign funds to develop 5G network technology (see Figure 1.7 ), a field in which Chinese company Huawei is the global leader. Whereas Europe's Ericsson and Nokia companies are close competitors to Huawei, the US has no 5G champions. In January 2020, a bipartisan group of US senators introduced legislation that the Federal Communications Commission ( FCC) would create a research and development fund for Western alternatives to Huawei. Further, the newly created US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), with $60 billion in funding, would also invest in the development of mobile networks. More recently, one US government official suggested that the US may consider a fund to take controlling stakes in the two European telecoms firms.

Figure 1.7 New US SIFs for 5G

Meanwhile, the investment power of US federal, state, and local pension funds has not gone unnoticed in the corridors of the US Congress. Like their sovereign wealth fund cousins, cross-border tech investments are for them both attractive and politically charged. No longer passive allocators, they, too, live with the heightened scrutiny their profile and investment choices now attract.

In November 2019, a bill was introduced, notably with joint Republican and Democratic sponsors, that would limit the ability of the $600 billion federal Thrift Savings Planto pivot its index investing to include Chinese equities, a reflection of the ongoing US–China battle over determining the future of technology. And there were reports of the White House contemplating a general ban on US pension funds (federal, state, and local) investing in technology plays in China. As US–China tensions continue, there is mounting talk of restricting the ability of US domestic pension funds to invest in Chinese tech companies. In fact, in August, 2020, the US State Department asked university endowments to divest Chinese equities, warning of more burdensome measures to come.

In summary, sovereign investors are throwing their considerable heft and influence into keenly investing in digital technology in domestic and foreign markets. Along with rising SIF activities, there is a sharp rise in global tensions, because the power of innovation is now viewed by all nations not only as an economic growth engine, but also as the key to future geopolitical dominance.

As a result, more countries are building up regulatory barriers around tech know-how and data resources as if they are “national treasures.” The following chapters will follow the SIFs into their global unicorn hunting, and the hope that through the economic independence created by the SIFs of different nations, the world may find a new equilibrium and collectively develop a shared digital future.

As you step out from the bustling, air-conditioned comfort of the ADIA tower into the Gulf heat, it strikes you that you are far from the financial centers of traditional finance or the tech hubs of the digital economy. But you will see, as you continue your journey through this book, that you have come to the doorstep of a force that will help determine their position in the post-pandemic world order. Next stop: the global village .

Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».

Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, на ЛитРес.

Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.