U.S. Department of Defense - The German Campaign in Russia - 1940-1942

U.S. Department of Defense

WWII: Strategic & Operational Planning: From Directive Barbarossa to the Battle for Stalingrad

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musaicumbooks@okpublishing.info2018 OK Publishing No claim to original U.S. Government Works ISBN 978-80-272-3985-6

Table of Contents

FOREWORD FOREWORD Table of Contents Clausewitz observed of Russia that "it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Russia would have to be agitated at the very center." In reading this study, the military student will realize how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz's advice. The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign against Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. A subsequent volume will depict the course of events from the Russian counteroffensive in November 1942 to the capture of Berlin in April 1945. The material for this study was obtained from German military records now in the custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army. Monographs by former German general officers who had an active part in the planning and operations provided additional information. The authors of these monographs, prepared for the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, include Generaloberst (Gen.) Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army from 1938-42; Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, a former corps, army, and army group commander on the Russian front: and several others. The study was written by Mr. George E. Blau of the Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. In his presentation, the author made every effort to give an objective account of Germany's initial efforts to conquer Soviet Russia in World War II.

PART ONE PLANNING PART ONE PLANNING Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Strategic Planning Chapter 1 Strategic Planning Table of Contents

Initial Discussions (July 1940)

The Marcks Plan (5 August 1940)

Staff Work (August-September 1940)

Admiral Raeder's Suggestions (26 September 1940)

Strategic Survey (October 1940)

The Preliminary Plan (November-5 December 1940)

General Staff and Command Post Exercises (November-December 1940)

Economic Survey

Directive BARBAROSSA (18 December 1940)

Chapter 2 Operational Planning

The Army's Operation Order (3 February 1941)

Initiation of Subordinate Staffs (February-March 1941)

Changes in Plans (March-April 1941)

Army Group South

Far North

Delay in the Start

The Draft of Directive No. 32 (11 June 1947)

Strategic Concentration (21 June 1941)

Air Support

Other Factors

Estimate of Soviet Strength (June 1941)

Sources of Information

Estimate of Red Army Dispositions

Estimate of Soviet Air Force Strength

PART TWO OPERATIONS IN 1941

Chapter 3 The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941)

D Day

The Situation on 30 June 1941

Developments in Early July 1941

The Mid-July Estimate

Directive No. 33 (19 July 1941)

The Army's Letter to the Armed Forces High Command

The Situation Toward the End of July 1947

Chapter 4 Planning for Future Operations

The Army's Order of 28 July 1941

Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941)

Hitler's Vacillation Over Strategy

The Supplement to Directive No. 34 (12 August 1941)

Developments to Mid-August 1941

The Army Memorandum of 18 August 1941

Hitler's Decision (20 August 1941)

Chapter 5 The Diversion and Reassembly

The Personnel Situation (End of August 1941)

Increasing Logistical Difficulties (Early September 1941)

POL

Track-Laying and Wheeled Vehicles

Developments to Mid-September 1947

Directive No. 35 (6 September 1941)

The Situation at the End of September 1941

Military-Economic Survey (2 October 1941)

The Muddy Period and Its Effect on Operations (October 1941)

Hitler's Plan for the Seizure of Moscow (12 October 1941)

Chapter 6 The German Attack on Moscow

Strategic Factors

Last-Minute Planning and Operations to 13 November 1941

The Course of the Offensive (14 November-5 December 1941)

The Personnel Situation (End of November 1941)

Critique

PART THREE 1942 — THE YEAR OF INDECISION

Chapter 7 The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941 - February 1942)

The First German Reverses

Hitler's Directive No. 39 (8 December 1941)

The Army High Command Order of 8 December 1941

Intelligence Estimate

Plans

The Mission of the Army Groups

Conduct of Operations

Organization

The Red Army Seizes the Initiative

Developments to 25 December 1941

The German Crisis in Mid-January 1942

The Crisis Reaches Its Climax (Beginning of February 1942)

The Russian Offensive Is Halted (20 February 1942)

Critique

Chapter 8 Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942

Exploratory Steps (July 1940-September 1941)

The First Plan for a Caucasus Operation (October 1941)

Caucasus Planning in November 1941

Effects of the Moscow Setback (January 1942)

The First Preparatory Orders (February 1942)

The Navy's Role (February 1942)

Intelligence Estimate (20 February 1942)

Hitler's Preoccupations in Early March 1942

The Situation at the End of March 1942

Chapter 9 Preparations for the German Summer Offensive

Directive No. 41 (5 April 1942)

Estimates, Delays, and Disappointments in April 1942

Intelligence Estimate

Delay in the Preliminary Operations

The Situation at Army Group Center

Chain of Command

Transportation

Turkey Remains Neutral

Logistical Preparations

Timing

Chain of Command

Supplies

Motor Vehicles

Rail Transportation

Summary

Organizational Problems

Rehabilitation of Units

Shortage of Technicians

Construction of Fortifications

Oil Brigade Caucasus

Casualties and Replacements

The Participation of Germany's Allies

Rear Area Security

Army Group South's Defense Line

The Role of Army Group A

Feint and Counerfeint

Warning Notes (May 1942)

The Armed Forces Potential in the Spring of 1942

The Preliminary Operations (May-June 1942)

Last-Minute Incidents and Impressions (June 1942)

Chapter 10 Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942)

The First Phase (28 June-6 July 1942)

The Second Phase (30 June -7 July 1942)

Changes in the German Order of Battle (July 1942)

The Army Group A Offensive

The Operation Plan

The Army Group A Attack

German and Russian Weaknesses

Directive No. 43

The Continuation of Operations

The Situation of the Other Army Groups by 20 July 1942

Directive No. 44 (21 July 1942)

Directive No. 45 (23 July 1942)

German Shortages

Tanks

Gasoline

Stalingrad Takes Priority Over the Caucasus (End of July 1942)