Simone Höhn - One Great Family - Domestic Relationships in Samuel Richardson's Novels

The sociologist Alvin GouldnerGouldner, Alvin W. provides the vocabulary to problematize the system of reciprocity underlying AllestreeAllestree, Richard’s and DelanyDelany, Patrick, correspondent of Richardson’s as well as Richardson’s works. In his classic article “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement” (1960), he distinguishes between complementarity and reciprocity. A little confusingly, he first enumerates four types of “complementarity”, before specifying that “[p]roperly speaking, complementarity refers only to the first two meanings”, while the last two “involve true instances of reciprocity ” (57). I quote his definitions and examples in some detail because their relevance to Richardson’s works (as well as to Allestree’sAllestree, Richard and Delany’sDelany, Patrick, correspondent of Richardson) becomes thus immediately apparent:

Complementarity 1 may mean that a right (x) of Ego against Alter implies a duty (- x) of Alter to Ego. […] The interesting sociological questions, however, arise only when issues of empirical substance rather than logical implication are raised. For example, where a group shares a belief that some status occupant has a certain right, say the right of a wife to receive support from her husband, does the group in fact also share a belief that the husband has an obligation to support the wife? Furthermore, even though rights may logically or empirically imply duties, it need not follow that the reverse is true.

Complementarity 2 may mean that what is a duty (- x) of Alter to Ego implies a right ( x ) of Ego against Alter. On the empirical level, while this is often true, of course, it is also sometimes false. For example, what may be regarded as a duty of charity or forbearance […] need not be socially defined as the right of the recipient. (56)

Intriguingly, GouldnerGouldner, Alvin W.’s two examples concern cases very much at the heart of Richardson’s work. Indeed, it is of vital importance to differentiate between ‘right’ and ‘duty’. Although, as Gouldner implies, there are many cases when the right of one party and the duty of the other amount to the same thing, such a connection is by no means inevitable.

Adam SmithSmith, Adam notes the distinction in The Theory of Moral Sentiments , using the “trite example” of “a highwayman” who, “by the fear of death, obliges a traveller to promise him a certain sum of money. Whether such a promise, extorted in this manner by unjust force, ought to be regarded as obligatory, is a question that has been very much debated” (330; VII.iv.9). One of those who has “debated” it is Lovelace. Beginning to suspect Clarissa of a lie, he complains to Belford that “it is a sad thing for good people to break their word when it is in their power to keep it”. Belford, of course, may have an obvious reply to this, so Lovelace continues: “You perhaps will ask: What honest man is obliged to keep his promise with a highwayman? for well I know your unmannerly way of making comparisons: but I say, every honest man is” (1269). This convenient conclusion – which binds the “honest” Clarissa but not the “profligate wretch Lovelace” (1270) – is, once more, enforced by the concept of reciprocal duty: “can my not doing my duty, warrant another for not doing his ? Thou wilt not say it can” (1270). As long as Lovelace can demand that Clarissa exercise GouldnerGouldner, Alvin W.’s “forbearance”, it does not matter that he does not deserve it.

Even in cases where “a right (x) of Ego against Alter implies a duty (- x) of Alter to Ego” and vice versa, the emphasis is often on only one of these terms. The “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, for example, implies, by listing the essential rights of each individual, a corresponding duty of each individual (as well as institutions) to respect and guarantee such rights (evidenced, on the linguistic level, by the frequent appearance of the word “shall”). However, the choice of the term ‘right’ rather than ‘duty’ emphasizes the inalienability of these rights and, potentially, the privilege to enforce them. In contrast, AllestreeAllestree, Richard’s and DelanyDelany, Patrick, correspondent of Richardson’s emphasis on duty not only highlights the individual’s responsibility, but frequently and explicitly comments on the fact that such duty must not be knit to any corresponding rights. In The Whole Duty of Man , for example, unconditional obedience to rulers is enforced by the following comment: “And ’tis observable that these precepts were given at a time, when those powers were Heathens, and cruel persecutors of Christianity; to shew us that no pretence of the wickedness of our Rulers can free us from this duty” (2[90]; Sunday XIV). The (non-)enforcement of reciprocity is clearly linked to issues of hierarchy and equality, as well. The pressure not to recognise another’s duty as one’s own right is particularly strong on those who hold an inferior position.

GouldnerGouldner, Alvin W.’s third and fourth types of “complementarity” are two formulations of virtually the same thing: one party’s right towards another also implies a duty towards that other. These are the types which he goes on to call “reciprocity” and which are concerned with notions of fairness and balance, although he stresses that reciprocity does not automatically mean equal returns. “In short, complementarity connotes that one’s rights are another’s obligations, and vice versa. Reciprocity, however, connotes that each party has rights and duties” (57).

Applying these two concepts to The Whole Duty of Man and Fifteen Sermons , one can make several interesting observations. First, as indicated above, complementarity is suppressed. Although a parent, for example, is bound in duty to support his11 children in a style suitable to his fortune and position, there is no corresponding right of the children to enforce such provision: indeed, Clarissa is “determined not to litigate with my papa” (134) even for an estate that is already hers by law. The young Charles Grandison goes even further, representing the allowance his father grants him as a gift rather than something owed him. Therefore, when Sir Thomas is forced to ask his son to “join in the security” for a debt, the latter can reply: “Why, Sir, did you condescend to write to me on the occasion, as if for my consent? […] That I am , under God, is owing to you. That I am what I am , to your indulgence. Leave me not any-thing!” (1:329–330).

However, although both AllestreeAllestree, Richard and DelanyDelany, Patrick, correspondent of Richardson emphasize the unconditional nature of duty, their strictures against enforcing another’s duty are directed exclusively at the subordinate party. Allestree, in particular, specifies both in the case of children and of wives that no fault of father or husband can excuse their own lack of obedience (304, 325; Sundays XIV, XV). He makes no similar point with regard to husbands’ or fathers’ duties to wives and children. Although he is always ready to remind his readers of the dangers of hell, and although he warns parents and others that enticing anyone to sin will lead to damnation, the condemnation of every kind of ‘rebellion’ leaves subjects, children, wives and servants at the mercy of their superiors. The duty of the superior party, meanwhile, is described in more conflicting terms. Despite general injunctions that all duties must be performed as coming from God (and are thus due to His mercy, rather than to benefits conferred by humans), the duties of leaders spiritual and political, as well as of fathers, husbands and masters, explicitly include responsibility for their subordinates’ behaviour. They are thus, to some extent, compelled to enforce the other party’s duty.