William Atkinson - The Complete Works of William Walker Atkinson

The importance of forming clear and distinct concepts and of grouping, classifying and generalizing these into larger and broader concepts and terms is recognized by all authorities and is generally regarded as forming the real basis of all constructive thought. As Brooks says: "Generalization lies at the basis of language: only as man can form general conceptions is it possible for him to form a language.... Nearly all the ordinary words in our language are general rather than particular.... This power of generalization lies also at the basis of science. Had we no power of forming general ideas, each particular object would be a study by itself, and we should thus never pass beyond the very alphabet of knowledge. Judgments, except in the simplest form, would be impossible; and it is difficult to see how even the simplest form of the syllogism could be constructed. No general conclusion could be drawn from particulars, nor particular conclusions from generals; and thus neither inductive nor deductive reasoning would be possible. The classifications of science could not be made; and knowledge would end at the very threshold of science."

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Every term has its meaning , or content , as some authorities prefer to call it. The word or words of which the term is composed are merely vocal sounds, serving as a symbol for the real meaning of the term, which meaning exists only in the mind of the person understanding it. To one not understanding the meaning of the term, the latter is but as a meaningless sound, but to one understanding it the sound awakens mental associations and representation and thus serves its purpose as a symbol of thought.

Each concrete general term has two meanings , (1) the actual concrete thing, person or object to which the term is applied; and (2) the qualities, attributes or properties of those objects, persons or things in consequence of which the term is applied. For instance, in the case of the concrete term book , the first meaning consists of the general idea of the thing which we think of as a book , and the second meaning consists of the various qualities which go to make that thing a book, as the printed pages, the binding, the form, the cover, etc. Not only is that particular thing a book , but every other thing having the same or similar properties also must be a book . And so, whenever I call a thing a book it must possess the said qualities. And, whenever I combine the ideas of these qualities in thought, I must think of a book . As Jevons says: "In reality, every ordinary general term has a double meaning: it means the things to which it is applied, ... it also means, in a totally different way, the qualities and peculiarities implied as being in the things. Logicians say that the number of things to which a term applies is the extension of the term; while the number of qualities or peculiarities implied is the intension ."

The extension and intension of terms has been referred to in the previous chapter. The general classification of the degrees of extension of a general term is expressed by the two terms, Genus and Species , respectively. The classification of the character of the intension of a term is expressed by the term, Difference , Property and Accident , respectively.

Genus is a term indicating: "a class of objects containing several species; a class more extensive than a species; a universal which is predicable of several things of different species."

Species is a term denoting: "a smaller class of objects than a genus, and of two or more of which a genus is composed; a predicable that expresses the whole essence of its subject in so far as any common term can express it."

An authority says: "The names species and genus are merely relative and the same common term may, in one case, be the species which is predicated of an individual, and in another case the individual of which a species is predicated. Thus the individual, George, belongs to the logical species Man, while Man is an individual of the logical species Animal." Jevons says: "It is desirable to have names by which to show that one class is contained in another, and accordingly we call the class which is divided into two or more smaller ones, the genus , and the smaller ones into which it is divided, the species ." Animal is a genus of which man is a species ; while man , in turn, is a genus of which Caucasian is a species ; and Caucasian , in turn, becomes a genus of which Socrates becomes a species. The student must avoid confusing the logical meaning of the terms genus and species with the use of the same terms in Natural History. Each class is a "genus" to the class below it in extension; and each class is a "species" to the class above it in extension. At the lowest extreme of the scale we reach what is called the infima species , which cannot be further subdivided, as for instance "Socrates"—this lowest species must always be an individual object, person or thing. At the highest extreme of the scale we reach what is summum genus , or highest genus, which is never a species of anything, for there is no class higher than it, as for instance, "being, existence, reality, truth, the absolute, the infinite, the ultimate," etc. Hyslop says: "In reality there is but one summum genus , while there may be an indefinite number of infimae species . All intermediate terms between these extremes are sometimes called subalterns , as being either genera or species, according to the relation in which they are viewed."

Passing on to the classification of the character of the intension of terms, we find:

Difference , a term denoting: "The mark or marks by which the species is distinguished from the rest of the genus; the specific characteristic." Thus the color of the skin is a difference between the Negro and the Caucasian; the number of feet the difference between the biped and the quadruped; the form and shape of leaves the difference between the oak and the elm trees, etc. Hyslop says: "Whatever distinguishes one object from another can be called the differentia . It is some characteristic in addition to the common qualities and determines the species or individual under the genus."

Property , a term denoting: "A peculiar quality of anything; that which is inherent in or naturally essential to anything." Thus a property is a distinguishing mark of a class. Thus black skin is a property of the Negro race; four feet a property of quadrupeds; a certain form of leaf a property of the oak tree. Thus a difference between two species may be a property of one of the species.

Accident , a term denoting: "Any quality or circumstance which may or may not belong to a class, accidentally as it were; or, whatever does not really constitute an essential part of an object, person or thing." As, for instance, the redness of a rose, for a rose might part with its redness and still be a rose—the color is the accident of the rose. Or, a brick may be white and still be a brick, although the majority of bricks are red—the redness or whiteness of the brick are its accidents and not its essential properties . Whately says: " Accidents in Logic are of two kinds—separable and inseparable. If walking be the accident of a particular man, it is a separable one, for he would not cease to be that man though he stood still; while, on the contrary, if Spaniard is the accident connected with him, it is an inseparable one, since he never can cease to be, ethnologically considered, what he was born."