Carl Clausewitz - The Art of Strategy - Napoleon's Maxims of War + Clausewitz's On War

Chapter III. Relation of Power

Chapter IV. Relation of the Three Arms

Chapter V. Order of Battle of an Army

Chapter VI. General Disposition of an Army

Chapter VII. Advanced Guard and Out-Posts

Chapter VIII. Mode of Action of Advanced Corps

Chapter IX. Camps

Chapter X. Marches

Chapter XI. Marches (Continued)

Chapter XII. Marches (continued)

Chapter XIII. Cantonments

Chapter XIV. Subsistence

Chapter XV. Base of Operations

Chapter XVI. Lines of Communication

Chapter XVII. On Country and Ground

Chapter XVIII. Command of Ground

Book VI. Defence

Chapter I. Offence and Defence

Chapter II. The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Tactics

Chapter III. The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Strategy

Chapter IV. Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defence

Chapter V. Character of the Strategic Defensive

Chapter VI. Extent of the Means of Defence

Chapter VII. Mutual Action and Reaction of Attack and Defence

Chapter VIII. Methods of Resistance

Chapter IX. Defensive Battle

Chapter X. Fortresses

Chapter XI. Fortresses (Continued)

Chapter XII. Defensive Position

Chapter XIII. Strong Positions and Entrenched Camps

Chapter XIV. Flank Positions

Chapter XV. Defence of Mountains

Chapter XVI. Defence of Mountains (Continued)

Chapter XVII. Defence of Mountains (continued)

Chapter XVIII. Defence of Streams and Rivers

Chapter XIX. Defence of Streams and Rivers (continued)

Chapter XX. A. Defence of Swamps

B. Inundations

Chapter XXI. Defence of Forests

Chapter XX. The Cordon

Chapter XXIII. Key to the Country

Chapter XXIV. Operating Against a Flank

Chapter XXV. Retreat into the Interior of the Country

Chapter XXVI. Arming the Nation

Chapter XXVII. Defence of a Theatre of War

Chapter XXVIII. Defence of a Theatre of War—(continued)

Chapter XXIX. Defence of a Theatre of War (continued) Successive Resistance.

Chapter XXX. Defence of a Theatre of War (continued) When no Decision is Sought for.

Sketches for Book VII. The Attack

Chapter I. The Attack in Relation to the Defence

Chapter II. Nature of the Strategical Attack

Chapter III. Of the Objects of Strategical Attack

Chapter IV. Decreasing Force of the Attack

Chapter V. Culminating Point of the Attack

Chapter VI. Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies

Chapter VII. The Offensive Battle

Chapter VIII. Passage of Rivers

Chapter IX. Attack on Defensive Positions

Chapter X. Attack on an Entrenched Camp

Chapter XI. Attack on a Mountain

Chapter XII. Attack on Cordon Lines

Chapter XIII. Manœuvring

Chapter XIV. Attack on Morasses, Inundations, Woods

Chapter XV. Attack on a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision

Chapter XVI. Attack on a Theatre of War without the View to a Great Decision

Chapter XVII. Attack on Fortresses

Chapter XVIII. Attack on Convoys

Chapter XIX. Attack on the Enemy’s Army in its Cantonments

Chapter XX. Diversion

Chapter XXI. Invasion

Chapter XXII. On the Culminating Point of Victory

Sketches for Book VIII. Plan of War

Chapter I. Introduction

Chapter II. Absolute and Real War

Chapter III. A. Interdependence of the Parts in War

B. On the Magnitude of the Object of the War, and the Efforts to be Made.

Chapter IV. Ends in War More Precisely Defined Overthrow of the Enemy

Chapter V. Ends in War More Precisely Defined (continued) Limited Object

Chapter VI. A. Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object

B. War as an Instrument of Policy

Chapter VII. Limited Object—Offensive War

Chapter VIII. Limited Object—Defence

Chapter IX. Plan of War when the Destruction of the Enemy is the Object

Table of Contents

The Germans interpret their new national colours—black, red, and white—by the saying, “Durch Nacht und Blut zur licht.” (“Through night and blood to light”), and no work yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical analysis of “War” by Clausewitz.

It reveals “War,” stripped of all accessories, as the exercise of force for the attainment of a political object, unrestrained by any law save that of expediency, and thus gives the key to the interpretation of German political aims, past, present, and future, which is unconditionally necessary for every student of the modern conditions of Europe. Step by step, every event since Waterloo follows with logical consistency from the teachings of Napoleon, formulated for the first time, some twenty years afterwards, by this remarkable thinker.

What Darwin accomplished for Biology generally Clausewitz did for the Life-History of Nations nearly half a century before him, for both have proved the existence of the same law in each case, viz., “The survival of the fittest”—the “fittest,” as Huxley long since pointed out, not being necessarily synonymous with the ethically “best.” Neither of these thinkers was concerned with the ethics of the struggle which each studied so exhaustively, but to both men the phase or condition presented itself neither as moral nor immoral, any more than are famine, disease, or other natural phenomena, but as emanating from a force inherent in all living organisms which can only be mastered by understanding its nature. It is in that spirit that, one after the other, all the Nations of the Continent, taught by such drastic lessons as Königgrätz and Sedan, have accepted the lesson, with the result that to-day Europe is an armed camp, and peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces, and will continue just as long as this equilibrium exists, and no longer.

Whether this state of equilibrium is in itself a good or desirable thing may be open to argument. I have discussed it at length in my “War and the World’s Life”; but I venture to suggest that to no one would a renewal of the era of warfare be a change for the better, as far as existing humanity is concerned. Meanwhile, however, with every year that elapses the forces at present in equilibrium are changing in magnitude—the pressure of populations which have to be fed is rising, and an explosion along the line of least resistance is, sooner or later, inevitable.

As I read the teaching of the recent Hague Conference, no responsible Government on the Continent is anxious to form in themselves that line of least resistance; they know only too well what War would mean; and we alone, absolutely unconscious of the trend of the dominant thought of Europe, are pulling down the dam which may at any moment let in on us the flood of invasion.

Now no responsible man in Europe, perhaps least of all in Germany, thanks us for this voluntary destruction of our defences, for all who are of any importance would very much rather end their days in peace than incur the burden of responsibility which War would entail. But they realise that the gradual dissemination of the principles taught by Clausewitz has created a condition of molecular tension in the minds of the Nations they govern analogous to the “critical temperature of water heated above boiling-point under pressure,” which may at any moment bring about an explosion which they will be powerless to control.

The case is identical with that of an ordinary steam boiler, delivering so and so many pounds of steam to its engines as long as the envelope can contain the pressure; but let a breach in its continuity arise—relieving the boiling water of all restraint—and in a moment the whole mass flashes into vapour, developing a power no work of man can oppose.