Lucius Seneca - Yale Required Reading - Collected Works (Vol. 2)

"Here we must notice a serious error in those masters to whom we send our children; not that it has much to do with speaking, but that you may see how stupid and unpolished a set of men they are who imagine themselves learned. For, in distinguishing the different kinds of speaking, they make two types of cases. One they call, 'that in which the question is about a general proposition, without reference to persons and times;' the other, 'that which is confined to certain persons and times;' being ignorant that all controversies must be related to the force and nature of the general position; for in that very case which I mentioned, the person of Opimius or Decius has nothing to do with the common arguments of the orator; since the inquiry has unrestricted reference to the question in general, 'whether he seems deserving of punishment who has slain a citizen under a decree of the senate for the preservation of his country, when such a deed was not permitted by the laws." There is indeed no case in which the point that falls under dispute is considered with reference to the parties to the suit, and not from arguments relating to such questions in general. But even in those very cases where the dispute is about a fact, as 'whether Publius Decius 22has taken money contrary to law,' the arguments both for the accusation and for the defence must have reference to the general question, and the general nature of the case; as, to show that the defendant is extravagant, the arguments must refer to luxury; that he is covetous of another's property, to avarice; that he is seditious, to turbulent and ill-designing citizens in general; that he is convicted by many proofs, to the general nature of evidence: and, on the other side, whatever is said for the defendant, must of necessity be abstracted from the occasion and individual, and referred to the general notions of things and questions of the kind. These, perhaps, to a man who cannot readily comprehend in his mind all that is in the nature of things, may seem extremely numerous to come under consideration when the question is about a single fact; but it is the number of charges, and not of modes of defence, or topics for them, that is infinite. 23

"But when there is no contest about facts, the questions on the nature of facts, if you reckon them from the number of the parties accused, are innumerable and intricate; if from the facts themselves, very few and clear. For if we consider the case of Mancinus 24so as referring to Mancinus alone, then, whenever a person whom the chief herald has surrendered to the enemy is not re-admitted into his country, a new case will arise. But if what gives rise to the controversy be the general question, 'whether to him whom the chief herald has surrendered, if he has not been re-admitted into his country, there seems to be a right of return,' the name of Mancinus has nothing to do with the mode of speaking upon it, or the arguments for the defence. And if the merit or demerit of the person give rise to any discussion, it is wholly beside the question; and the part of the speech referring to the question must, of necessity, be adapted to such arguments in general. I do not reason upon these subjects for the purpose of confuting learned teachers: although those merit reproof, who, in their general definition, describe this sort of cases as relating to persons and times. For, although times and persons are pertinent to them, yet it should be understood, that the cases depend not upon them, but upon the general question. But this is not my business; for we ought to have no contest with that sort of people; it is sufficient that this only should be known, that they have not even attained a point which they might have achieved amid so much leisure, even without any experience in affairs of the forum; that is, they might have distinguished the general natures of cases, and explained them a little more accurately. But this, as I said, is not my business; it is mine, and much more yours, my friends Cotta and Sulpicius, to know, that as their artificial rules now stand, the multitude of cases is to be dreaded; for it is infinite, if they are referred to persons; so many men, so many cases; but, it they are referred to general questions, they are so limited and few, that studious orators of good memory and judgment ought to have absorbed them in their minds, and, I may almost say, learned them by heart; unless perhaps you imagine that Lucius Crassus took his notion of that famous case 25from Manius Curius personally; and thus brought many arguments to show why, though no posthumous son was born, yet Curius ought to be the heir of Coponius. The name of Coponius, or of Curius, had no influence at all on the array of arguments advanced, or on the force and nature of the question; the whole controversy had regard to all affairs and events of that kind in general, not to particular occasions or names; since the writing was thus, If a son is born to me, and he die before, etc., then let him be my heir; and if a son was not born, the question was whether he ought to be heir who was appointed heir on the death of the son.

"A question regarding a fixed point of law, and of a general nature, requires no names of persons, but merely skill in speaking, and sources of proper argument. In this respect even the lawyers themselves are an impediment to us, and hinder us from learning; for I perceive it to be generally reported in the books of Cato and of Brutus, what answers they gave on points of law to any particular man or woman by name; that we might imagine, I suppose, some cause for consultation or doubt to have arisen from the persons, not from the thing; so that, since persons are innumerable, we might be deterred from the study of the law, and lay aside all inclination to learn it, at the same time with all hope of ever attaining a thorough knowledge of it.

"But Crassus will some day make all these points clear to us, and set them forth arranged under general heads; for you must know, Catulus, that he promised us yesterday, that he would reduce the civil law, which is now in a state of confusion and dispersion, under certain general heads, and digest it into an easy system." "And indeed," said Catulus, "that is by no means a difficult undertaking for Crassus, who has grasped all of law that can be learned, and he will supply that which was lacking in those who taught him; for he will be able to define exactly, and to illustrate eloquently, every point comprehended in the law." "We shall then," said Antonius, "learn all these things from Crassus, when he shall have removed himself, as he intends, from the tumult of public business and the benches of the forum, to a quiet retreat, and to his throne." 26"I have indeed often," observed Catulus, "heard him say that he was resolved to retire from pleading and the courts of justice; but, as I frequently tell him, it will never be in his power; for neither will he permit his assistance to be repeatedly implored in vain by persons of character, nor will the public endure his retirement patiently, as they will think that if they lose the eloquence of Lucius Crassus, they will lose one of the principal ornaments of the city." "Indeed then," remarked Antonius, "if what Catulus says is true, Crassus, you must still live on in the same workshop with me, and we must give up that yawning and sleepy science to the tranquillity of the Scaevolae and other such happy people." Here Crassus smiled a little, and said, "Finish weaving, Antonius, the web which you have begun; yet that yawning science, as you term it, when I have sheltered myself under it, will vindicate my right to liberty."

FOOTNOTES

1 Reorum . This reading is very properly adopted by Oreliius and Ellendt, in place of the old rerum. Ellendt refers to c. 43 and 79 for the sense of reus.

2Cato defined an orator vir bonus dicendi peritus. Cicero in this passage, under the character of Antonius, and in his own person, De Inv. i. 3, 4, signifies that though he thinks a good character of great importance in an orator, he does not deny that much eloquence may at times be found in a man of bad character. Cato and Cicero spoke each according to the character of his own age. Quintilian, xii. 1, goes back to the opinion of Cato. Aristotle had previously required good morals in an orator, Rhet. i. 2, 4; ii. 1. 6i5. Ellendt.