George Ritzer - Globalization

We have grown accustomed to a language of global “flows” in thinking about “globalization,” but flow is a particularly poor metaphor for the point-to-point connectivity and networking of enclaves … as the contemporary African material shows so vividly, the “global” does not “flow,” thereby connecting and watering contiguous spaces; it hops instead , efficiently connecting the enclaved points in the network while excluding (with equal efficiency) the spaces that lie between the points. (Ferguson 2006: 47, italics added)

The idea that globalization hops, rather than flows, at least in some parts of the world (such as Africa), implies that while some areas are strongly, often positively, affected by it, others are not.

This relates to the “enclaves” discussed by Ferguson. While some areas – enclaves in Africa (and elsewhere) – are deeply implicated in global processes, those processes simply hop over most other areas of that continent. Among those enclaves are the national parks that are such highly desirable destinations for well-heeled tourists from the North. (Note: throughout this book the terms “North” and “South” will be used to refer the two major parts of world – the highly developed North [especially the US and the EU] and the less developed South [especially Africa, South America, and some parts of Southeast Asia]). Highly desirable locales have been partitioned off so that Northern tourists can “hop” into them, experience a highly sanitized bit of Africa, and then hop out. In doing so, the areas may be cordoned off (perhaps with barbed wire) and patrolled by the military or private guards who may operate with “shoot-to-kill” orders if any “poachers” are found in the enclaves. The problem is that many of the so-called “poachers” are, in fact, locals who have been excluded from areas that may be, for example, their traditional hunting grounds. The more general point here is that globalization hops into these enclaves (in the form of tourists and their money) but it jumps over most other areas in Africa, including those in which the “poachers” now live. Not only are the latter not helped by global flows, but they are adversely affected by the barriers that exclude them from areas that were once part of their domain.

This all points to a very different image of globalization than the one we are accustomed to:

The “global” we see … in Africa has sharp, jagged edges; rich and dangerous traffic amid zones of generalized abjection; razor-wired enclaves next to abandoned hinterlands. It features entire countries with estimated life expectancies in the mid-thirties and dropping; warfare seemingly without end; and the steepest economic inequalities seen in human history to date. It is a global where capital flows are at once lightning fast and patchy and incomplete; where the globally networked enclave sits right beside the ungovernable humanitarian disaster zone. It is a global not of planetary communion, but of disconnection, segmentation and segregation – not a seamless world without borders, but a patchwork of discontinuous and hierarchically ranked spaces, whose edges are carefully delimited, guarded, and enforced. (Ferguson 2006: 48–9)

It may well be that we need to think of globalization both in terms of flows and in terms of processes that hop from place to place. As a general rule, globalization flows more easily through the developed world (although even there it flows around many areas inhabited by the poor), whereas it bypasses many locales in the less developed world, or even skirts them completely. The metaphors of “flows” and “hops” obviously exist uncomfortably with one another; it is difficult to think of flows as hopping. Rather, to be consistent with the idea of flows, we need to think in terms of some of the “heavy structures,” that block or redirect those flows, especially in less developed parts of the world. That is, because of those barriers many positive flows are forced to bypass less developed areas.

Assuming there is such a thing as globalization, is its further development and expansion inevitable? The inevitability of globalization is a view that is widespread both in academic work and especially in more popular sources. It is, for example, the view of Thomas Friedman (1999, 2005, 2012) who, in The World is Flat , argues that globalization is expanding in various ways and directions. Daniel Altman (2007: x) contends that “the forces often labeled ‘globalization’ … are here to stay.” Nayan Chanda (2007: 320) argues that “[c]alls to shut down globalization are pointless.”

Globalization does seem inexorable as it encompasses more and more areas of the social world. However, ideas like inexorability and inevitability are always problematic from the point of view of the social sciences. It is certainly the case that there are quite strong social trends here and a very strong likelihood that they will continue, and even accelerate, in the years to come. Yet, that is not the same as saying that such changes are inevitable. Indeed, the social sciences in general point to the view that there are never any inevitabilities and this applies in particular to such a wide-ranging and globe-straddling process as globalization.

The current counter-reactions to globalization suggests globalization is not inexorable. For example, reactions in the US, Europe, and South Africa to widespread immigration, especially unauthorized immigration from less developed nations (in South Africa’s case, Zimbabwe), is leading, or at least could lead, to less rather than more globalization, at least in terms of flows of these types of people. Thus, the counter-reactions (e.g. violence against Zimbabweans in South Africa, the vote for Brexit) against globalization constitute an important check on its seemingly inevitable expansion. As noted above, COVID-19 has also stopped or slowed a variety of global flows. To prevent new cases from spreading, states closed their borders and prevented planes from various “hot spots” from entering. For the first time, travelers from the US found themselves on a list of countries barred from entering the EU and Canada. Countries were unable to access equipment and supplies (such as personal protective equipment, PPE) because supply chains were disrupted. Political leaders started questioning the reliance on global supply chains, especially those in China, and demands for domestically produced essentials became an increasingly important security issue.

The recent counter-reactions to globalization and COVID-19 have indeed led to processes of de-globalization(Link 2018). The reversal of these global flows have led many pundits and policy elites to argue that globalization, as a whole, is suffering a significant setback. For example, French President Emmanuel Macron said at the 2018 World Economic Forum: “Let us not be naive, globalization is going through a major crisis.” The Forum’s 2018 report further warned about “the death of trade.” The global slowdown from COVID-19 has led many to predict the “end of globalization.”

As noted in the sections above, the world has been through cycles or phases of globalization and de-globalization before. Arguably, the most intense de-globalizing phase came in 1914 when “the first great era of world integration in trade, cross-border investment, and migration came to an end” (Link 2018: 343). Is it possible that we are witnessing the next great phase of de-globalization?

By examining the past major phase of de-globalization and comparing it to trends today, Stefan Link (2018) argues that we are indeed witnessing a major backlash to globalization. However, he believes that we are not likely to see the depth of de-globalization that the world experienced in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite increasing political fragmentation and the return of economic barriers, Link argues that it was the Great Depression that exacerbated de-globalizing forces in the previous phase. Current economic signs do not suggest that we will see an economic collapse of that scale in the coming years, but he does not rule out the possibility. However, Link was writing before COVID-19 dramatically slowed the global economy. Nonetheless, there is not (or at least not yet) evidence of an economic collapse on the magnitude of the Great Depression.