Shaping Future 6G Networks

However, it is worth noting that spectrum allocation for 5G has already proven to be disruptive, with new entrants in some countries (e.g. United Kingdom, United States, and Germany) being able to access spectrum for highly localized deployments. It is possible that further disruption to classic spectrum allocation models will also take place, which may change the radio access requirements that are at the heart of any mobile system, and thus lead to further divergence from 3GPP activities.

In conclusion, by asking questions about future standardization, we are really asking whether we need a single set of standards – as we have today – to fulfil the requirements of the next IMT. The fact is that we do not need such a single standard; we happened to have one for 5G, but the answer must be “not necessarily” for 6G – provided that any standard meets the requirements of IMT‐2030 and provided there is sufficient political and industry support to ensure that alternative approaches gain commercial momentum.

Whether we will see true fragmentation remains moot. That depends on willingness to assume the burden of creating a solution to the challenge of realizing IMT‐2030, but the effort required to do so will be assisted by the new openness of the network and the sheer power of both governments and new industrial players, which have not previously been considered as factors. They are now, which the industry, analysts, and media clearly recognize. 3GPP will provide a solution for 6G, but it is increasingly likely that there will be multiple efforts to achieve the same goals. As a result, all stakeholders must consider this deviation – and whether they want to support existing bodies or to form new coalitions for the realization of 6G.

1 1 GSMA (2019). Annual Review 2019. GSMA.

2 2 ITU‐R (2020). FAQ on IMT. April ed.

3 3 ITU (2018). https://www.itu.int/en/ITU‐T/focusgroups/net2030/Pages/default.aspx

4 4 Wikipedia (2020). IMT Advanced. Wikipedia.

5 5 3GPP (1998). Third Generation Partnership Project Agreement. Sophia Antipolis: 3GPP.

6 6 3GPP (2020). Sophia Antipolis: 3GPP. https://www.3gpp.org/about‐3gpp/membership.

7 7 Kim, C. (2019). 5G and Massive IoT: Legacy Technologies will Bridge the Gap for Now. London: Informa Omdia.

8 8 Melanie, N., Maximilian, S., and Karim, T. (2020). Is Your City Ready to Go Digital? Luxembourg SA: Arthur D Little https://www.adlittle.com/en/insights/viewpoints/your‐city‐ready‐go‐digital.

9 9 TechUK (2020). London. https://www.techuk.org/resource/atomico‐s‐state‐of‐european‐tech‐report‐lifts‐the‐lid‐on‐a‐turbulent‐year‐for‐the‐sector.html.

10 10 Chris Adams (2019). IMT‐2030 starts today… (and don’t call it 6G). AccessPartnership. https://www.accesspartnership.com/imt‐2030‐starts‐today‐and‐dont‐call‐it‐6g/.

11 11 ITU Focus Group on Technologies for Network 2030 (2020). FG NET‐2030 Technical Specification on Network2030 Architectural Framework. NET2030‐I‐132, ITU Sub‐G3.

12 12 Whitehouse Briefings Statements (2019). https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings‐statements/remarks‐president‐trump‐united‐states‐5g‐deployment/

13 13 South China Morning Post (2019). https://www.scmp.com/tech/big‐tech/article/2187190/donald‐trump‐says‐he‐wants‐us‐lead‐5g‐and‐even‐6g‐wireless‐technology.

14 14 The Atlantic Council (2020). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new‐atlanticist/the‐battle‐for‐5g‐leadership‐is‐global‐and‐the‐us‐is‐behind‐the‐white‐houses‐new‐strategy‐aims‐to‐correct‐that/.

15 15 The Financial Times (2020). UK review of Huawei eyes impact of US sanctions. https://www.ft.com/content/9e581ace‐69ec‐4a42‐81c3‐c28d2bb40aa1.

16 16 NCSC (2020). Advice on the Use of Equipment from High Risk Vendors in UK Telecoms Networks, 1.0e. London: NCSC https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/ncsc‐advice‐on‐the‐use‐of‐equipment‐from‐high‐risk‐vendors‐in‐uk‐telecoms‐networks.

17 17 Donkin, C. (2020). EC demands urgent action on 5G supply chains. Mobile World Live.

18 18 The Economist (2020). The fight with Huawei means America can’t shape tech rules. https://www.economist.com/united‐states/2020/04/23/the‐fight‐with‐huawei‐means‐america‐cant‐shape‐tech‐rules

19 19 Chappell, E.A. (2020). Accelerating Innovation in the Telecommunications Arena, 1e. London: Telecom TV.

20 20 O‐RAN Alliance (2018), cited in “https://www.gruppotim.it/tit/it/technology/standards‐focus/dicembre‐2018/looking‐around.html”

21 21 Mobile Europe and European Communications (2020). Keys to the Kingdon: OpenRAN Seeks to Break Open Vendor Lock‐In, Q2e. SJP Business Media.

22 22 Open RAN (2020). Policy Coalition. https://www.openranpolicy.org/open‐ran‐a‐year‐in‐review/.

23 23 Jordan, E. (2020). Open RAN 101–A Timeline of Open RAN Journey in the Industry: Why, What, When, How? (Reader Forum). Austin: RCR Wireless https://www.rcrwireless.com/20200715/opinion/readerforum/open‐ran‐101‐a‐timeline‐of‐open‐ran‐journey‐in‐the‐industry‐reader‐forum.

24 24 ABI Research (2020). Open RAN: market reality and misconceptions. White paper at https://go.abiresearch.com/lp‐open‐ran‐market‐reality‐and‐misconceptions.

25 25 Mayer, G. (2018). Restful APIs for the 5G Service Based Architecture. Journal of ICT Standardization 6 Combined Special Issue 1 & 2 ed.

26 26 Jan Friman, M.E.P.C.J.M.J.S. (2019). Service Exposure: A Critical Capability in a 5G World, 4e. Ericsson Technology Review.

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