Carl Clausewitz - The Strategy of Warfare – Boxed Set

When local men carry on an intrigue with local men, the king should employ necessary strategic means to put it down. He may employ the policy of conciliation with regard to those who keep the appearance of contentment, or who are naturally discontented or otherwise. Gifts may be given under the pretext of having been satisfied with a favoured man's steadfastness in maintaining the purity of his character, or under the plea of anxious care about his weal or woe. A spy under the garb of a friend may tell the local persons: ‘Your king is attempting to find your heart; you should tell him the truth." Or local men may be separated from each other, by telling them: "This man carries such a tale to the king against you." And coercive measures may be employed as described in the Chapter on "Awards of Punishments."

Of these four kinds of danger, internal danger should first be got rid of; for it has been already stated that internal troubles like the fear from a lurking snake are more serious than external troubles.

One must consider that of these four kinds of danger, that which is mentioned first is less grave than the one subsequently mentioned, whether or not it is caused by powerful persons; otherwise (i.e., when the danger is caused by insignificant persons), simple means may be used to get rid of it.

[Thus ends Chapter V, "External and Internal Dangers" in Book IX, "The Work of an Invader,” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and twenty-sixth chapter from the beginning.]

Table of Contents

THERE are two kinds of innocent persons, those who have disassociated themselves from traitors and those who have kept themselves away from enemies.

In order to separate citizens and country-people from traitors, the king should employ all the strategic means, except coercion. It is very difficult to inflict punishment on an assembly of influential men; and if inflicted at all, it may not produce the desired effect, but may give rise to undesirable consequences. He may, however, take steps against the leaders of the seditious as shown in the chapter on "Awards of Punishments."

In order to separate his people from an enemy, he should employ conciliation and other strategic means to frustrate the attempt of those who are the enemy's principal agents or by whom the enemy's work is to be carried out.

Success in securing the services of capable agents depends upon the king; success of efforts depends upon ministers; and success to be achieved through capable agents is, therefore, dependent both upon the king and his ministers.

When, in spite of the combination of traitors and loyal persons, success is achieved, it is mixed success; when people are thus mixed, success is to be achieved through the agency of loyal persons; for in the absence of a support, nothing that requires a support for its existence can exist. When success is involved in the union of friends and enemies it is termed a success contaminated by an enemy; when success is contaminated by an enemy, it is to be achieved through the agency of a friend; for it is easy to attain success through a friend, but not through an enemy.

When a friend does not come to terms, intrigue should be frequently resorted to. Through the agency of spies, the friend should be won over after separating him from the enemy. Or attempts may be made to win him over who is the last among combined friends; for when he who is the last among combined friends is secured, those who occupy the middle rank will be separated from each other; or attempts may be made to win over a friend who occupies middle rank; for when a friend occupying middle rank among combined kings is secured, friends, occupying the extreme ranks cannot keep the union. (In brief) all those measures which tend to break their combination should be employed.

A virtuous king may be conciliated by praising his birth, family, learning and character, and by pointing out the relationship which his ancestors had (with the proposer of peace), or by describing the benefits and absence of enmity shown to him.

Or a king who is of good intentions, or who has lost his enthusiastic spirits, or whose strategic means are all exhausted and thwarted in a number of wars, or who has lost his men and wealth, or who has suffered from sojourning abroad, or who is desirous of gaining a friend in good faith, or who is apprehensive of danger from another, or who cares more for friendship than anything else, may be won over by conciliation.

Or a king who is greedy or who has lost his men may be won over by giving gifts through the medium of ascetics and chiefs who have been previously kept with him for the purpose.

Gifts are of five kinds: abandonment of what is to be paid; continuance of what is being given; repayment of what is received; payment of one's own wealth; and help for a voluntary raid on the property of others.

When any two kings are apprehensive of enmity and seizure of land from each other, seeds of dissension may be sown between them. The timid of the two may be threatened with destruction and may be told: "Having made peace with you, this king works against you; the friend of this other king is permitted to make an open peace."

When from one's own country or from another's country merchandise or commodities for manufacture in a manufactory are going to an enemy's country, spies may spread the information that those commodities are obtained from one whom the enemy wanted to march against. When commodities are thus gathered in abundance (the owner of the articles) may send a message to the enemy: "These commodities and merchandise are sent by me to you; please declare war against the combined kings or desert them; you will then get the rest of the tribute." Then spies may inform the other kings of the combination; "These articles are given to him by your enemy."

The conqueror may gather some merchandise peculiar to his enemy's country and unknown elsewhere. Spies, under the garb of merchants, may sell that merchandise to other important enemies and tell them that that merchandise was given (to the conqueror) by the enemy (whose country's product it is).

Or having pleased with wealth and honour those who are highly treacherous (among an enemy's people), the conqueror may cause them to live with the enemy, armed with weapons, poison and fire. One of the ministers of the enemy may be killed. His sons and wife may be induced to say that the minister was killed at night (by such and such a person). Then the enemy's minister may ask every one of the family of the murdered minister (as to the cause of the death). If they say in reply as they are told, they may be caused to be set free; if they do not do so, they may be caused to be caught hold of. Whoever has gained the confidence of the king may tell the king (the enemy) that he (the enemy) has to guard his own person from such and such a minister. Then the recipient of salaries from the two states (the conqueror's and the enemy's state) may inform the suspected minister to destroy (the king).

Or such kings as are possessed of enthusiasm and power may be told: "Seize the country of this king, our treaty of peace standing as before." Then spies should inform the particular king of the attempt of these kings and cause the destruction of the commissariat and of the followers of one of these kings. Other spies, pretending to be friends, should inform these kings of the necessity of destroying the particular king.

When an enemy's brave soldier, elephant, or horse dies, or is killed, or carried off by spies, other spies may tell the enemy that the death is due to mutual conflict among his followers. The man who is employed to commit such murders may be asked to repeat his work again on the condition of his receiving the balance due to him. He should receive the amount from the recipient of salaries from two states; when the king's party is thus divided, some may be won over (to the side of the conqueror).