Анджела Стент - Putin's World - Russia Against the West and with the Rest

Russia’s intervention in Syria has created conditions in which Iran has become an even closer partner for the Kremlin. Iran had long backed Assad, partly because Syria has given it access to Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist party and militant group based in Lebanon that Iran strongly supports. Once Russia intervened militarily to bolster Assad, Iran and Russia were allied. Russia’s intervention also strengthened the role of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fighting there. Iran controls up to 70,000 men on the ground in Syria. 73In an unprecedented and domestically controversial move, Iran allowed Russia to use its Shahid Nojeh air base to launch air strikes into Syria. Both countries support Assad remaining in power to prevent the breakup of the country. While Russia is willing to contemplate a future federal structure in Syria, Iran favors a centralized country, but these differences are much less important than both countries’ determination to keep the current regime in power.

Iran’s strengthened relationship with Russia is a product both of the war in Syria and of Donald Trump’s election. His criticism of the Islamic Republic and withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA have reinforced Tehran’s decision to draw closer to Moscow. During Putin’s November 2017 visit to Tehran, both Russia and Iran criticized the United States for questioning the deal, saying that it was working well. 74

On other issues, however, Russia and Iran differ. For nearly three decades they were unable to agree on the demarcation of the Caspian Sea. The USSR and Iran had an understanding, but after the Soviet collapse, there were five littoral states: Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. They were unable to agree whether to divide the sea equally among all five states, which Iran favors, or according to the size of each country’s coastline, favored by the others. They finally came to an understanding about delimitation in August 2018. 75And Iran is wary of Russia’s ties to Saudi Arabia and, above all, to Israel, especially the constant Russian-Israeli coordination over air operations in Syria. Iranians remain divided on how far they should align with Russia, with some groups warning of excessive dependence on Russia and favoring a more concerted opening to the West. 76

Russia’s relations with Iran are, therefore, on one level close but also complex. The fact that the Kremlin supports Iran on a number of issues has enhanced its international leverage, because most of Iran’s neighbors view it with suspicion and believe that if they want to contain Iranian power, they need to seek out Moscow’s support. Whether Russia really has the power to influence what Iran does is unclear. Once the Syrian Civil War is over, Russia might well seek to limit Iran’s presence in Syria, although Assad has become dependent on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards for the survival of his regime. Israel and Saudi Arabia will continue to seek Russia’s help with Iran as long as they view the Islamic republic as an existential threat.

How did Russia achieve this spectacular and rapid return to the Middle East? Putin’s success is a product of shrewd tactics, determination, and skillful use of opportunities provided by uncertain US policy. The US may remain the most important player in the region for some time to come, but Russia’s advantage is that it talks to virtually all the parties arrayed on different sides of conflicting issues in this difficult neighborhood. Its appeal as an opponent of regime change and supporter of existing governments endears it to all governments in the area, authoritarian and democratic. It has largely succeeded in neutralizing external threats to its own Muslim population, although IS and Islamic extremism remain a major challenge. Russia also has succeeded in breaking the US monopoly of influence in the region and has earned the respect of all the major regional players. Nevertheless, Putin has focused much more on increasing Russia’s presence in the region rather than contributing toward the solution of any of the Middle East’s most pressing problems. The United States has chosen sides in the Middle East, while Putin’s Russia has not, which gives it leverage. Many of the regional players have an instrumental view of Russia, yet they understand that it will not replace the United States for a long time. Russia can be a useful balance against the US, but it will continue to behave opportunistically in the region.

Putin’s new status as a Middle East power broker was on display in a marathon of diplomatic activity just before he met with President Trump for their Helsinki summit. Netanyahu once again flew to Moscow to impress on his Russian interlocutor the need to restrain Hezbollah’s and Iran’s activities near the Golan Heights, after Israel had responded to Iranian military provocations. Putin subsequently suggested that Iranian forces withdraw 100 kilometers from the Golan Heights, a proposal Israel rejected. 77As soon as Netanyahu had left, Putin welcomed Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior Iranian adviser, seeking to persuade Iran to withdraw from the border with Israel and Jordan in return for economic incentives. With the US retreating from the Middle East, all eyes are on Moscow.

Putin has become the chief shuttle diplomat in the Middle East. One difference to past shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East is that, in addition to Putin’s own travels, many of the region’s leaders flock to see him in Moscow. Russia is back in the Middle East in a way the Soviet Union never was and is there to stay.

In February 2007, Putin attended his first Munich Security Conference in the stately Bayerischer Hof hotel. The conference is an annual gathering of European and US foreign and defense ministers and other international officials and experts who meet to discuss the world’s most pressing security issues. It is the most influential of the many security conferences held around the world. Putin’s address was eagerly anticipated. Less than a year before, Vice President Dick Cheney had delivered a blistering attack on Russia in Vilnius, Lithuania, criticizing Russia’s domestic system and its treatment of its neighbors, and the US-Russia relationship had become increasingly contentious. 3There was standing room only in the Munich conference room, with Chancellor Merkel and her colleagues in the front row sitting next to leading US Congress members. Putin, looking stern, walked up to the lectern and began by warning that his speech might be “unduly polemical.” 4Indeed it was. He had only one target in his speech: the United States.

Putin began by criticizing the idea of unipolarity: “It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within. And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy…. Incidentally, in Russia we are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.” Putin then went on to lambast the United States for its aggressive and destabilizing foreign policy and concluded with a plea for multipolarity and a greater role for the United Nations. 5