Анджела Стент - Putin's World - Russia Against the West and with the Rest

Given the strained political relationship between Moscow and London, Russian officials welcomed the British vote to leave the European Union in June 2016. It weakened the EU and divided Britain. Prime Minister David Cameron accused Putin personally of backing the no vote: “It is worth asking the question: who would be happy if we left? Putin might be happy. I suspect [ISIS leader] al-Baghdadi would be happy.” To which Putin replied: “This is nothing more than a demonstration of the low level of political culture.” 50Brexit was viewed positively in Russia for several reasons. The UK leaving the EU could lead to other countries following suit in the longer run. Moreover, there was the hope that a Britain weakened by leaving the EU might be more amenable to improving economic and political ties with Russia. On the other hand, there was also an acknowledgment that the European and global economic fallout from Brexit could adversely affect the Russian economy. Theresa May, who succeeded Cameron as prime minister, and her foreign minister, Boris Johnson, had initially committed themselves to improving ties with Putin’s Russia.

And then came the poisonings in the medieval cathedral city of Salisbury in southern England. Sergei Skripal is a former GRU double agent who had spied for the British, was arrested in Russia in 2004, and then became part of the 2010 spy exchange involving ten sleeper agents in the United States. Normally, when spies are exchanged, the countries involved in the swap agree to leave the former agents alone. But a few days before the 2018 Russian presidential election, Skripal and his daughter—who was visiting him from Moscow—were found slumped over on a park bench. It subsequently emerged that they had been poisoned with the military-grade highly toxic nerve agent Novichok, which was developed in the Soviet Union. The Skripals survived, as did the policeman who discovered them and was also contaminated. The British government accused the Russian state of poisoning the Skripals. “It is clear that Russia is, I am afraid, in many respects now a malign and disruptive force,” said Foreign Minister Boris Johnson. Adding that Russia was launching cyberattacks against British infrastructure, he concluded, “I increasingly think that we have to categorize [these] as acts of war.” 51Britain expelled twenty-three Russian diplomatic personnel, and the United States followed suit, as did most EU countries. Whatever message was sent to future double agents by this poisoning failed to take into account its cost to Russia through new rounds of sanctions.

Russia vigorously denied that it had anything to do with the poisonings. State-run media outlets came up with a series of increasingly more fanciful alternative explanations at a frenzied pace. But they all stressed one theme: the UK and their allies—especially the United States—poisoned the Skripals to make Russia look bad and to disrupt the presidential election and discourage people from attending the World Cup in Russia. 52The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons sent inspectors to analyze the nerve agent, and they confirmed that it was Novichok but were unable to pinpoint in which laboratory it had been produced. The Russian media’s response—echoed by skeptical Western journalists—was to challenge the premise that the nerve agent had come from Russia. Then there was the question of motivation and timing, about which there was considerable speculation. The consensus among those who saw a Russian hand in the assassination attempt was that Moscow was sending the same message that it had with the Litvinenko poisoning: traitors are never safe, wherever they are. And from the Kremlin’s point of view, there were many more of them in the West.

But that was not the last Novichok poisoning. Halfway through the World Cup games, two British citizens from Amesbury, eight miles from Salisbury, collapsed from poisoning with a more concentrated dose of Novichok. One of them died. The British defense secretary was clear about who was responsible. “The simple reality,” he said, “is that Russia has committed an attack on British soil which has seen the death of a British citizen.” 53Apparently whoever poisoned the Skripals had not disposed properly of the vial containing the poison, and the victim believed that she was in possession of a bottle of perfume plucked from a trash can. 54The UK subsequently identified the two GRU agents who, using false names, had entered Britain and carried out the poisonings, releasing detailed film footage of their movements. 55Needless to say, Putin claimed that the men were “civilians” and in a subsequent interview on RT they claimed that they had just wanted to see Salisbury Cathedral. 56

Russian-British relations are unlikely to recover from the Skripal poisonings for some time as the UK reappraises its relationship with Putin’s Russia.

Europe à la Carte

Germany, France, and the UK are Russia’s most important European interlocutors, but Putin has cultivated ties with a variety of European leaders since he came to power. Probably one of his favorite leaders was Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, with whom he enjoyed a close personal relationship. Indeed, when Berlusconi was forced to resign after a series of financial and sexual scandals, Putin praised him and publicly regretted that he had to leave office. 57He also developed good ties with former Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, who was the only European leader to appear on a platform with Putin at the 2016 Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, saying, “We need Europe and Russia to become wonderful neighbors again.” 58Renzi also called for sanctions to be lifted, as did his populist successor Giuseppe Conte, who has praised Putin and called for closer ties. Similar sentiments have come from Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras. Putin has courted Greece since its difficult relations with Brussels and Berlin over its economic bailout began, highlighting the two countries’ common Orthodox heritage. Add to this the newly improved ties with Hungary, Slovakia, and other Central European countries, and the outlook for the Kremlin looks quite promising. In a Europe sharply divided over how to respond to the migrant crisis, economic problems, and the specter of terrorism, the possibilities for increasing Russian influence are certainly there. But Russia’s ability to benefit from the shifting European landscape is limited by its own economic difficulties. Until 2008, Russia’s role as an energy superpower gave it considerable leverage over the EU. How real is that today?

In 2006, when Vladimir Putin was asked whether Russia was an energy superpower, he replied: “I have never referred to Russia as an energy superpower. But we do have greater possibilities than almost any country in the world. This is an obvious fact. Everyone should understand that, above all, these are our national resources, and should not start looking at them as their own.” 59

For the first eight years of Putin’s time in the Kremlin, as oil prices rose from $12 a barrel to $147, Russia did indeed act as an energy superpower in Europe, using its gas and (to a lesser extent) oil supplies both to fill its state coffers and to solidify its influence in Europe. Russia is the most important external supplier of energy to the EU, and the energy trade has created strong interdependencies between Russia and Europe. Of Europe’s imported gas, 37 percent comes from Russia, but some countries receive nearly all their gas from Russia. Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia import 100 percent of their gas from Russia. Lithuania has built its own liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal to reduce its dependence on Russia and now imports only half of its gas from Russia. Germany imports 40 percent of its gas from Russia; Italy, 20 percent; and France, 18 percent. Ironically, Russian gas exports to Europe were a key element promoting détente with Western Europe during the Cold War. In fact, during the Cold War, the USSR was a reliable supplier of gas to Western Europe, and the fluctuations in supply that occurred were attributed to climate conditions. Moscow did sometimes manipulate oil and gas supplies to pressure its “fraternal” Eastern European allies, but it scrupulously adhered to its agreements with Western Europe.