P. Rose - The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence

In 1997 the CIA opened its new Liaison Conference Center, consisting of three newly refurbished meeting rooms for hosting foreign liaison visitors. Agency officials decided to name the rooms after past practitioners of three key elements of the intelligence discipline—collection of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action. Historical research resulted in the selection of three Revolutionary War leaders—all of whom are much more famous for their other exploits and achievements during the revolutionary period than for their impressive intelligence accomplishments.

• George Washington was theobvious choice for acquisition of foreign intelligence.The Father of our Country was an adroit spymaster. Over the course of his long military career, he directed numerous agent networks, provided comprehensive guidance in intelligence tradecraft to his agents, and used their intelligence effectively when planning and conducting military operations.

• John Jay —who later became Chief Justice of the United States—is consideredthe FoundingFather of American counterintelligence.Jay is seldom cited for his achievements in this arena; his historical reputation stems largely from his political and judicial accomplishments. But he clearly deserved to be considered the first national-level American counterintelligence chief.

• Benjamin Franklin was the American icon after whom the remaining room was named. His efforts in what is known today as covert actionwere wide-ranging and usually successful. During the Revolutionary War period, Franklin engaged in propaganda operations and agent-of-influence activities and directed paramilitary operations against British property.

George Washington's role as the first American intelligence chief has received far less attention than his numerous exploits as a military and political leader. Yet, without his skillful management of American intelligence activities, the course of the Revolutionary War could have been quite different.

Washington's first experience in intelligence collection came in 1753, when he was 21 years old. The British colonial government sent him to the Ohio Territory to gather information about French military capabilities. He was instructed to observe French forts, determine troop strengths, and try to ascertain French intentions and plans for responding to the expansion of British colonization into the region. During this mission, Washington showed himself to be a skillful elicitor. One of the things he did particularly well was to exploit the social environment of drinking sessions and meals with French officers to acquire useful intelligence.

In 1755, at the battle of Fort Duquesne during the French and Indian War (1754-1763), Washington learned a harsh lesson. His British commander, General Edward Braddock, did not bother to have his men collect intelligence on the enemy. As a result, Braddock's forces stumbled into aFrenchambush along the Monongahela River. They fought for more than three hours trying to extricate themselves from the trap, suffering a major military defeat. No doubt with this experience in mind, Washington wrote, "There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate a designing enemy, & nothing that requires greater pains to obtain." [1]

During the Revolutionary War, Washington spent more than 10 percent of his military funds on intelligence activities. Two weeks after taking command of the Continental Army on 2 July 1775, he recorded his first expenditure for intelligence collection—$333 to an unidentified officer to travel to Boston and establish a network of agents to gather intelligence on enemy movements and intentions.

A year later, Washington established a unit known as Knowlton's Rangers, under the command of Lt. Col. Thomas Knowlton, to carry out reconnaissance and raids against British facilities. This unit was the first American military intelligence organization; the US Army has characterized it as a historical parent of the modern-day Army Rangers, Special Forces, and Delta Force. The ill-fated American spy Nathan Hale was recruited from this early Ranger force.

But it was Washington's adroitness as a manager of agents and his skillful use of their reporting that best commend him as the Founding Father of American collection of foreign intelligence. In addition to managing countless spies around British forces' locations, he ran numerous agent networks inside British-controlled New York City and Philadelphia. His operatives provided daily reporting on British troop movements and often were able to report on the plans and intentions of enemy commanders.

After the British seized control of New York City in autumn 1776, Washington directed the activities of numerous spies there. Of particular note was the Culper spy ring, which comprised about 20 people. This network, established in the summer of 1778, was managed by Major Benjamin Tallmadge of the 2nd Connecticut Light Dragoons, who operated from an outpost on the Hudson River above the city. The Culper ring was the most professional of Washington's agent networks. It used code names, secret writing, enciphered communications, couriers, dead drops, signal sites, and specific collection requirements.

The most important piece of intelligence obtained through the Culper ring came in July 1780. A network member known to this day only as "Lady" reported that British General Sir Henry Clinton had decided to send British troops by sea from New York City to Newport, Rhode Island, to attack newly arrived French forces under General Rochambeau. The French troops had been at sea for two months, and Clinton wanted to attack them before they recovered from the trip.

Washington received this intelligence on the afternoon of 21 July and immediately drew up plans for a fictitious attack on New York City. He then had the "plans" delivered to a British outpost by a local farmer, who claimed to have found them on a nearby road. In the meantime, Washington also marched his army toward New York City to provide further "evidence" that he was preparing to launch an attack there. Faced with what he thought were Washington's attack plans—which were even signed by the American leader—and the readily discernible American Army movement, Clinton concluded that an attack was imminent and recalled troops then at sea to strengthen the city's defenses. "Lady's" intelligence and Washington's deception scheme thus saved the ailing French troops from probable defeat and enabled them subsequently to join with the understrength American Army.

In addition to the Culper ring, Washington had numerous other agents reporting on enemy activities in New York City. Among them were James Rivington, a prominent Tory newspaper publisher; Joshua Mersereau, his son John, and another relative; Hercules Mulligan and his brother Hugh; Army Captains (and brothers) John and Baker Hendricks; and two former counterintelligence agents—Nathaniel Sackett and retired Army Capt. Elijah Hunter. The latter became close to both General Clinton and Royal Governor William Tryon.

Another American spy, 1st Lt. Lewis J. Castigin, operated in a manner that was similar in some ways to the modus operandi of modern-day defense attaches. The British captured Castigan in January 1777 and subsequently paroled him. He then went to New York City, where he was permitted to move around freely. Castigan reported to Washington and other American military leaders on what he observed concerning British military strength and positions. Through social activities with British officers, he was able to glean advance information on their campaign plans. Washington spoke highly of Castigin's reporting.