Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

95. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

96. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 17.

97. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 59-61. Cf. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1.

98. vol. 6, ch. 6. In March 1943 Kurchatov sent similar reports to M. G. Pervukhin, Deputy Prime Minister and commissar of the chemical industry. The text, first published in Voprossi Istorii Estestvoznania i Tekhniki (1992), no. 3, is reprinted in translation in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2, pp. 446-53.

99. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s notes do not reveal the identity of MAR.

100. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 1-4.

101. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin’s note does not identify the recipient of Kurchatov’s top secret report. Given its importance, however, it was probably addressed, like his report of March 7 (also quoted in vol. 6, ch. 6), to Beria. Cf. Kurchatov’s report to Pervukhin of July 3, 1943 in Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, appendix 2, pp. 454-6.

102. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 104.

103. vol. 6, ch. 6.

104. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, p. 5. Cf. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 103.

105. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 103.

106. There is some indication that later in 1944 FOGEL/PERS was providing intelligence from the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, laboratory of the MANHATTAN project. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 10, 29. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 190-1; Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 319.

107. Suggestions to the contrary derive chiefly from two sources: a fabricated version of the career of PERS (renamed PERSEUS), apparently devised by the SVR for purposes of mystification, perhaps to protect Theodore Hall (cf. Albright and Kunstel, Bombshell, p. 271; Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, pp. 190-1 n. ); and the fallible memory of Pavel Sudoplatov, far less reliable on atomic espionage than on the “special actions” to which he devoted most of his career (cf. Holloway, “Sources for Stalin and the Bomb ”). The New York residency was dismayed to learn early in 1945 that FOGEL/PERS had declined an offer of employment as a construction engineer at Los Alamos, probably owing to a mixture of family pressures and fear of exposure. Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, p. 192.

108. vol. 6, ch. 6.

109. vol. 8, ch. 12, para. 1.

110. vol. 6, ch. 6.

111. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

112. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 4

113. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 313-14. Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. Early in the war, Philby had tried and failed to enter Bletchley Park.

114. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 3.

115. Haslam, “Stalin’s Fears of a Separate Peace 1942,” pp. 97-9.

116. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 273-4, 305; Schmidt, “Der Hess-Flug und das Kabinet Churchill”; Schmidt, “The Marketing of Rudolf Hess.”

117. Record of dinner conversation at the Kremlin, October 18, 1944, FO 800/414, PRO.

118. Some of the Hess conspiracy theories were examined in the BBC2 documentary, Hess: An Edge of Conspiracy (presenter: Christopher Andrew; producer: Roy Davies), first broadcast January 17, 1990.

119. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 216-18.

120. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-7.

121. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 216.

122. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 217 n.

123. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 154. At a meeting with Christopher Andrew in August 1990, Cairncross admitted that he did supply intelligence from Bletchley Park to the NKGB before the battle of Kursk but declined to give details.

124. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 314; Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. 125. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 218.

126. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 1.

1. As late as 1990 Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which was largely responsible for determining foreign intelligence requirements, claimed that intelligence reports in 1943 showed that some in Washington as well as in London were considering “the possibility of terminating the coalition with the Soviet Union and reaching an accord with Nazi Germany, or with the Nazi Generals, on the question of waging a joint war against the Soviet Union”:

Therefore when we talk about Stalin’s distrust with regard to Churchill, at a certain stage towards those surrounding Roosevelt, not so much towards Roosevelt himself, we should pay attention to the fact that he based this mistrust on a very precise knowledge of specific facts.

The “facts” produced by the Center were, in all probability, mere conspiracy theories of the kind which, in greater or lesser degree, distorted Soviet intelligence assessment throughout, and even beyond, the Stalinist era. (Interview by Christopher Andrew with Valentin Falin in Moscow for BBC2, December 12, 1990.)

2. On CPUSA operations against Trotskyists and heretics, see Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism; quotation from p. 89.

3. vol. 6, ch. 12. On the FBI bugging of Nelson, see also Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism, pp. 216-17. The disappointingly discreet account of Nelson’s career, Steve Nelson, American Radical, by Nelson, Barrett and Ruck, makes a brief reference to his work on the secret Party control commission (p. 242).

4. vol. 6, ch. 12. On Hopkins, see above, chapter 7.

5. See above, chapter 7.

6. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, p. xviii, n. 30 and document 10. The authors suggest the author of the letter to Hoover “might have been” Mironov. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin makes Mironov’s authorship virtually certain. While imprisoned by the NKVD in 1945, Mironov tried to smuggle to the American embassy in Moscow information about the massacre of the Polish officer corps similar to that contained in the letter to Hoover in 1943 (vol. 5, section 11). A study of the letter by Ben Fischer, written without access to Mitrokhin’s notes on KGB files, seeks to make sense of Mironov’s bizarre claim that Zarubin and his wife were working for, respectively, Japanese and German intelligence, as a way “to grab FBI attention” and ensure that Hoover acted against them. But Mr. Fischer also acknowledges evidence that Mironov “may have been mentally disturbed” (Fischer, “‘Mr. Guver,’” pp. 10-11.). KGB files suggest both an obsessional hostility to Zarubin from Mironov and a determination that the West should learn the truth about the massacre of the Polish officer corps. In the letter to Hoover, Mironov claimed that his real name was Markov; Mitrokhin’s notes, however, refer to him as Mironov.

7. Zarubin to Center, June 3, 1943: VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 157-8. Zarubin moved to Washington during June.

8. Following the corrupt governorships of Huey and Earl Long, Sam Jones established a reputation for scrupulous honesty. On his term as governor, see Dawson, The Louisiana Governors, pp. 255-9.

9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. The US “military intelligence officer” may have had knowledge of the information on Zarubin’s involvement in the massacre of Polish officers contained in Mironov’s letter to Hoover.

10. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

11. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 196-7.

12. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

13. Samolis (ed.) Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 53-5. This SVR hagiography predictably makes no mention of Zarubin’s various misadventures in the United States.

14. vol. 5, sec. 11. Sudoplatov wrongly claims that Mironov was simply “hospitalized and discharged from the service” on the grounds of schizophrenia; Special Tasks, p. 197.