Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

41. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 130. After the German invasion, Sudoplatov’s Directorate for Special Tasks and Guerrilla Warfare (officially entitled Diversionary Intelligence), the successor of the pre-war Administration for Special Tasks, was officially removed from the NKVD First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate as a new Fourth Directorate. Though the two directorates remained formally independent until April 1943, there was a constant interchange of personnel between them. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 28-9.

42. The official Soviet guide to the Museum of Partisan Glory is Balatsky, Museum in the Catacombs. At the time of writing, the Museum is still open daily with guided tours in Russian and Ukrainian catacombs.

43. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 101.

44. For details of the reconstruction, see Balatsky, Museum in the Catacombs.

45. vol. 5, sec. 13.

46. Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 102-3. This account of Molodtsov’s capture and execution is neither confirmed nor contradicted by Mitrokhin’s notes on the Odessa file.

47. vol. 5, sec. 13.

48. vol. 5, sec. 13.

49. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1.

50. Dear and Foot (eds.), The Oxford Companion to the Second World War, pp. 1240-1.

51. Dear and Foot (eds.), The Oxford Companion to the Second World War, p. 1240. Probably the best study of the eastern front, by Professor Richard Overy, concludes that, “…Where the NKVD did intervene the effect was to wound the war effort, not to invigorate it.” One part of the complex explanation for increasing success of the Red Army was the demotion, under the pressure of war, of the political apparatchiks at the front in the autumn of 1942 and the new freedom given to officers to take decisions without being constantly checked for political correctness. Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 329-30.

52. There was no legal residency in Argentina. At the outbreak of war no Latin American state had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In October 1942 Cuba established diplomatic relations with the USSR. By the beginning of 1945 another eight Latin American republics had followed suit. Argentina did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until 1946.

53. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. Mitrokhin’s notes, which identify ARTUR as Grigulevich, provide the solution to a major unsolved problem in the VENONA decrypts. Though the decrypts contain frequent references to ARTUR, his identity was never discovered by NSA or the FBI (Benson, VENONA Historical Monograph #5, p. 5).

54. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, vol. 1, pp. 154-6.

55. Macdonald, “The Politics of Intervention”; Newton, “Disorderly Succession.”

56. Wartime Soviet agents with access to US policy documents on Argentina included Laurence Duggan, a Latin American expert in the State Department, and Maurice Halperin, chief of the Latin American division in the OSS RA branch (Peake, “OSS and the Venona Decrypts,” pp. 22, 25-6).

57. k-16,477.

58. k-13,370.

59. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1; k-16,477.

60. Argentina did not declare war on Germany until March 1945.

61. Grigulevich’s couriers to New York included the Chilean Communist Eduardo Pecchio and a member of the Latin American section of the Columbian Broadcasting Service, Ricardo Setaro (GONETS). VENONA decrypt, 2nd release, p. 26; 3rd release, part 2, p. 101.

62. VENONA decrypts, 5th release, pp. 11-12, 14-17, 20-1, 24-6, 31-2.

63. k-16,477.

64. See below, chapter 22.

65. The Center instructed the Montevideo residency on February 4, 1956:

Do not re-establish contact [with Verzhbitksy]. Arrangements for his entry to the USSR must be made under MFA auspices in the usual way; do not get involved in the process and make no promises, including financial ones. Make a one-time payment of 1,500 pesos and we will then make no further monetary payments.

(k-16,477)

66. k-16,477.

67. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 259-64.

68. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 259-64; Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 232-3.

69. Volkogonov, Stalin, pp. 444-7.

70. k-4,204. The total number of sources was substantially greater than those accorded agent status by the Center. According to KGB files, the nationality of the agents was: 55 Germans; 14 French; 5 Belgians; 13 Austrians, Czechs and Hungarians; 6 Russians; and 16 others. The principal leaders, according to the same files, were: Belgian section: Leopold Trepper; German section: Harro Schulze-Boysen; French section (except Lyon): Henry Robinson; Lyon: Isidor Springer; Dutch section: Anton Winterinck; Swiss section: Sandor Rado.

71. Central Intelligence Agency, The Rote Kapelle; Milligan, “Spies, Ciphers and ‘Zitadelle’”; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 285-9.

72. Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War; Jukes, “The Soviets and ‘Ultra’”; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 289.

73. Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 166-75, 201.

74. Under lend-lease agreements with Britain and the United States in 1941, the Soviet Union was supplied with 35,000 radio stations, 380,000 field telephones and 956,000 miles of telephone cable. Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 193-4.

75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 315-20; Milligan, “Spies, Ciphers and ‘Zitadelle.’”

76. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 14.

1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 241-2. At least in the early 1930s, the Fourth Department was probably primarily interested in the United States as a base from which to collect intelligence on Germany and Japan. Mitrokhin did not have access to Fourth Department files on its American agents and did not note references to these agents in KGB files. The case against Hiss, which has been strong but controversial ever since his conviction for perjury in 1951, is now overwhelming as a result of new evidence revealed during the 1990s from the VENONA decrypts, KGB files made available to Weinstein and Vassiliev which refer to his work for military intelligence, and Hungarian interrogation records of Hiss’s fellow agent Noel Field. These sources also do much to vindicate the credibility of Hiss’s principal public accuser, the former Fourth Department courier Whittaker Chambers. The best accounts of the Hiss case are the 1997 updated edition of Weinstein, Perjury, and Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, chs. 2, 12.

2. Wadleigh, “Why I Spied for the Communists,” part 7, New York Post (July 19, 1949).

3. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1, n. 2.

4. Massing, This Deception, p. 155. The fact that Massing defected from the NKVD in 1938 makes her tribute to Bazarov all the more impressive.

5. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

6. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

7. The details in Mitrokhin’s notes on “19” (date of birth, work in the Latin American division of the State Department, later transfer to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) clearly identify him as Duggan; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. By 1943, at the latest, however, Duggan’s codename had been changed to FRENK (or FRANK); VENONA, 2nd release, pp. 278-9.

8. Weinstein, Perjury, pp. 182-3.

9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

10. See above, p. 84.

11. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 110, 122-3, 129-36; Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, pp. 20-2.

12. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 240-3, 290. On Whittaker Chambers, see his memoir, Witness, and the biography by Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers.