Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

68. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 37.

69. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 17.

70. Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 417.

71. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 36.

72. Dates of dismissal and arrest from KGB file cited by Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 459, n. 63.

73. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 36.

74. vol. 7, ch. 9, para. 37.

75. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 207. Mitrokhin’s notes mention SAM but do not record the month of his arrival in London.

76. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 2.

77. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 208-10.

78. Foreign Office to Sir Eric Phipps (March 11, 1938), Phipps papers PHPP 2/21, Churchill College Archives Center, Cambridge.

79. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 209. Cairncross claimed in his memoirs ( The Enigma Spy, p. 69) that, after Deutsch’s recall to Moscow, he “provided no further data until after the Germans invaded Russia”—one of numerous falsehoods comprehensively demolished by his KGB file which Cairncross must have supposed would never be revealed.

80. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 79-80.

81. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 23.

82. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 23. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 210.

83. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 15. ADA remained in Paris until Maclean departed with the rest of the British embassy in the summer of 1940, just before the arrival of the victorious German army.

84. vol. 7, ch. 10, paras. 15, 20. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 216-17.

85. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 301-2. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 239-40. Cf. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 8.

86. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 16.

87. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 135.

88. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 15.

89. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 131.

90. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 132-3.

91. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 8. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 241-2.

92. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 9. Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 242.

93. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 4. On Smollett’s wartime career, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-7.

94. Rees, Looking for Mr. Nobody, pp. 273-7.

95. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 7.

96. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents, p. 191.

97. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 140-1.

98. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 16.

99. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 149.

100. Mitrokhin notes that “In 1940, when there was no contact with Burgess, he handed over material for the CPGB through MARY [Litzi Philby] and EDITH [Tudor Hart]”; vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 4. He appears to have had little success. During a visit to the United States in the summer of 1940 he sought Straight’s help in re-establishing contact, telling him, “I’ve been out of touch with our friends for several months” (Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 142-3).

101. Sudoplatos, Special Tasks, pp. 58-9. Though sentenced to death, Serebryanksy escaped execution. He was reinstated by the NKVD after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and given the job of recruiting German POWs. He was re-arrested in 1953 as an alleged co-conspirator with Beria and died in prison in 1956.

102. Sudoplatos, Special Tasks, pp. 21-8, 68. Sudoplatov himself narrowly escaped arrest in the winter of 1938-9. His formal appointment as head of the Administration of Special Tasks occurred only in 1941. On the complicated administrative history of “special tasks” during the Second World War, see Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 126-9.

103. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, pp. 65-9. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 181-3. The somewhat confused account of the assassination in Volkogonov, Trotsky, bizarrely suggests “the possibility that the American special services were following, and perhaps in some sense influencing, events” (p. 454). On the gaps in the KGB files on operation UTKA, see Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 8.

104. Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, p. 221. Though acknowledging Eitingon’s “deserved reputation as a man of many affairs with women,” Sudoplatov argues unconvincingly that his “close” relationship with Caridad Mercader did not involve sex, since this would have been a breach of regulations; Special Tasks, p. 70, n. 2.

105. On the codenames of Caridad and Ramón Mercader, see Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, ch. 8. After his arrest, Ramón’s codename was changed to GNOM; there are a number of references to him under this codename in the VENONA decrypts.

106. Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, chs. 1-4. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, ch. 4.

107. k-2,369; k-16,518.

108. k-4,206; t-7,12; k-16,518. A sanitized account of Grigulevich’s career in the Spanish Civil War appears in the 1997 SVR official history of pre-war intelligence operations. No reference, however, is made to his role in the first major attempt to assassinate Trotsky, doubtless for fear of tarnishing his heroic image. Though the chapter on Trotsky’s assassination refers to FELIPE, it gives no indication that FELIPE and Grigulevich were one and the same. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, chs. 8, 12.

109. t-7,12.

110. See below, chapter 10.

111. k-16,518.

112. k-2,354.

113. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 100-1.

114. k-2,369. The head of the Mexican secret police, General Leandro Sánchez Salazar, later reached the same conclusion. Though able to identify Grigulevich only as FELIPE (his codename within the assault group), Sánchez Salazar described him as “the real instigator of the attack.” Sánchez Salazar believed the multilingual Grigulevich to be “a French Jew,” partly as a result of discovering some of his underwear, which had been purchased in Paris on the Boulevard Saint Michel. Sánchez Salazar, Murder in Mexico, pp. 48-9.

115. Sánchez Salazar, Murder in Mexico, p. 45.

116. k-2,369.

117. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 74. Cf. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, p. 488.

118. Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 487-9.

119. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 101.

120. Released on bail, Siqueiros escaped from Mexico with the help of the Chilean Communist poet Pablo Neruda. Sánchez Salazar, Murder in Mexico, pp. 211-14.

121. k-2,369,354; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1.

122. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 183-5.

123. Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, chs. 5-9; Deutscher, Trotsky, vol. 3, ch. 5.

124. Note by Enrique Castro Delgado, the Spanish Communist Party representative at Comintern headquarters, on a conversation with Caridad Mercader, in Levine, The Mind of an Assassin, pp. 216-22.

125. See below, chs. 22, 23.

1. k-27,app.

2. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 247.

3. The visiting lecturers included Academicians I. M. Maisky, A. M. Deborin and A. A. Guber, and ambassadors A. A. Troyanovsky, B. Ye. Shteyn and Shenburg. k-27,appendix.

4. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, p. 248.

5. On June 5, 1943 SHON was reorganized as the Intelligence School (RASH) of the NKVD First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, and the training course extended to two years. By the end of the war about 200 foreign intelligence officers had graduated from it (k-27,appendix). During the Cold War it was known successively as the Higher Intelligence School (codenamed School no. 101), the Red Banner Institute and the Andropov Institute. In October 1994 it became the Foreign Intelligence Academy of the Russian Federation (Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 23).