Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

31. West and Tsarev ( The Crown Jewels, pp. 103ff) give greater emphasis to Deutsch’s role by companion with Orlov’s than Costello and Tsarev, Dangerous Illusions. Their analysis, however, does not take account of the published material on Deutsch derived from the Vienna University Archives, the Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes, the work of Wilhelm Reich published by Deutsch and the information obtained by Oleg Gordievsky during his career in the KGB (see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, ch. 5).

There is a considerable overlap between the KGB documents on Deutsch noted by Mitrokhin and those cited in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. Each set of documents, however, contains material missing from the other. West and Tsarev do not, for example, appear to have seen Deutsch’s important memorandum on the recruitment of student Communists. However, Mitrokhin did not note the interesting documents on Deutsch following his recall to Moscow late in 1937 which are cited by West and Tsarev.

32. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 8.

33. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 223-6.

34. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 186-8.

35. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 206-8.

36. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 224.

37. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 225.

38. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 216-19.

39. In this, as in other instances in this chapter, Mitrokhin’s notes confirm the codename given by Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions.

40. vol. 7, ch. 10.

41. Boyle, The Climate of Treason, p. 114.

42. Rees, A Chapter of Accidents, pp. 122-3; Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 94-5, 142.

43. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 144-5, 159.

44. vol. 7, ch. 10, paras. 8, 9.

45. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6. The only foreigners to achieve officer rank were some central European interwar illegals, such as Deutsch, who were used as agent controllers and recruiters.

46. Philby, My Silent War, p. 13. Emphasis added.

47. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 24.

48. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., para. 2. On the misleading references to Klugmann in Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, see above, note 29.

49. Blunt, “From Bloomsbury to Marxism.”

50. Boyle, The Climate of Treason, p. 72.

51. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., para. 2.

52. The first reference to Klugmann’s recruitment based on material made available by the SVR is in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 206, 294.

53. See below, chapter 17.

54. Deutsch, who was a decade younger than both Orlov and Maly and had joined the OGPU only in 1932, was evidently considered too junior for the post of resident.

55. Though some of his agents believed Maly had been a Catholic priest, his operational file shows that he had only deacon’s orders when he volunteered for the army. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 113-14.

56. Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 214-15; Cornelissen, De GPOe op de Overtoom, ch. 11.

57. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 211-13, 229-30. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 199ff.

58. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 3.

59. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 6.

60. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 101-3, 120-1. The NKVD officer who met Straight did not identify himself, but Straight’s description of him as stocky and dark-haired identifies him as Deutsch rather than the tall Maly, whose height earned him the nickname “ der Lange. ”

61. Details of Cairncross’s academic career are in the archives of Glasgow University, Trinity College, Cambridge, and Cambridge University.

62. Trinity Magazine, Easter Term 1935 and Easter Term 1936.

63. Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, p. 42.

64. Colville, The Fringes of Power, p. 30 n.

65. vol. 7, ch. 10, item 1.

66. vol. 7, ch. 10, item 23.

67. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 214. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 207.

68. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 23.

69. Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, pp. 61-2. Cairncross’s account of the sequence of his initiation into the NKVD in successive meetings with Burgess, Klugmann and Deutsch agrees with KGB records both as noted by Mitrokhin and in the documents cited in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. The Enigma Spy is, none the less, a textbook case of psychological denial. At almost every stage of his career as a Soviet agent (save for a heroic year at Bletchley Park in 1942-3, when he claims that the intelligence he provided on the eastern front was instrumental in “changing the course of World War Two”), Cairncross seeks to diminish or deny the significance of his role. His version of his career as a Soviet agent, save for the year at Bletchley Park, is comprehensively contradicted by the evidence of the KGB files.

70. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 208.

71. Minute by Cairncross, March 23, 1937, PRO FO371/21287 W7016. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 230-1.

72. There are very few references to such documents either in Mitrokhin’s notes or in the material from KGB archives made available by the SVR for West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels.

73. Though there is no positive evidence that this document was provided by Cairncross or Maclean, other sources can be excluded. The Center had recently broken contact with the two other agents who provided it with Foreign Office documents, Francesco Constantini and Captain John King. Since Halifax’s record of his meeting with Hitler was not apparently sent as a telegram, the NKVD copy of it cannot have been obtained by SIGINT. The text of Halifax’s record, together with details of its despatch to the Foreign Office, is published in Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 19, pp. 540-8.

74. Roberts, “ The Holy Fox, ” p. 70.

75. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 6, 162.

76. Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 19, pp. 540-8; Roberts, “ The Holy Fox,” pp. 70-5; Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 98-100.

77. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 216, 232-3.

78. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 233. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 80.

79. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 4.

80. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 90-2.

81. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 234.

1. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901-1941, p. 259.

2. For the text of the “Ryutin platform,” see Izvestia (1989), no. 6; Ogonek (1989), no. 15.

3. Volkogonov, Stalin, p. 212.

4. k-4,198.

5. Volkogonov, Trotsky, p. 343.

6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, ch. 4.

7. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 171-2; Volkogonov, Trotsky, pp. 334-6. Remarkably, a 1997 SVR official history makes a partial attempt to justify the anti-Trotskyist witch-hunt:

[Trotskyist] criticism, though apparently aimed at Stalin personally, was essentially defamatory of everything Soviet. Largely thanks to the Trotskyists, a phenomenon developed abroad which became known as anti-Sovietism, which for many years hurt the USSR’s domestic and foreign policy pursued at that time, as well as the international workers’ and communists’ movement… The Trotskyists were a fruitful agent base for the [Western] intelligence services.