Christopher Andrew - The Sword and the Shield

18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 237.

19. Leggett, The Cheka, p. 417 n. 21. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 325-7.

20. vol. 7, ch. 1, para. 5. Buikis subsequently wrote two brief memoirs of his early experiences in the Cheka in Rozvadovskaya et al. (eds.), Rytsar Revoliutsii, and Lyalin et al. (eds.), Osoboie Zadanie.

21. See, for example, Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, ch. 1.

22. For the text of the official document certifying Ulyanov’s “rights to hereditary nobility” (suppressed during the Soviet era), see Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, p. 19.

23. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. 3-5, 138-9.

24. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 11-12.

25. vol. 1, app. 3. Cf. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 12-14.

26. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 77-9. It is possible that Stalin’s determination about changing the day of the month as well as the year of his birth in official records may have reflected the fear that Okhrana records contained some reference which had been overlooked to an agent, otherwise identified only by codename, who had his date of birth.

27. On June 11, 1919 the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party stated: “[ We] have noted Comrade Dzerzhinsky’s announcement concerning the necessity of leaving illegal political workers in the areas occupied by the enemy… It is proposed that: (a) An Illegals Operations Department be created in the organizational office…” (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 1).

28. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1 and n. 1; vol. 7, ch. 1.

29. k-27,305.

30. Leggett, The Cheka, appendix C.

31. There is little doubt that The State and Revolution represented Lenin’s innermost convictions. Had it been otherwise, he would scarcely have chosen to publish it in February 1918, at a time when the Cheka was already in existence and it was only too easy for Lenin’s opponents to point to the contradictions between his words and his deeds. Its publication at such a difficult time was an act of faith that the regime’s difficulties were only temporary and that he would live to see the fulfillment of his revolutionary dream.

32. Report from the Cheka of the town and district of Morshansk in the first issue of the Cheka weekly, dated September 22, 1918 (k-9,212).

33. Mitrokhin noted the following report (k-9,210) of an inspection by Cheka headquarters of Cheka operations in Dmitrov in 1918:

Kurenkov, aged 18, operates as the chairman of the Dmitrov town Cheka of Moscow province. All his colleagues are young people, but young people who are competent, battle-tested and who work with energy.

However, the work of the Cheka was carried out in a primitive manner. Searches were carried out without elected observers and without representatives of housing committees being present. Confiscated food stuffs were not handed over to the food department, and inventories were not drawn up.

34. Melgounov, The Red Terror in Russia. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, pp. 646-9. The files for the period noted by Mitrokhin (mostly on foreign intelligence) make only indirect references to the atrocities of the civil war.

35. Speech by Lenin, December 23, 1921; text in Tsvigun et al., V.I. Lenin i VChK, pp. 534f.

36. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War, p. 424. The Dzerzhinsky Archive is Fond 76 in the All-Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern History in Moscow.

37. Volkogonov, Lenin, p. 239.

38. Tsvigun et al (eds.), V.I. Lenin i VChK, no. 198. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 69.

39. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. 127-9.

40. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1, n. 1.

41. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, pp. 416-19.

42. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 99-100; Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 142-3; West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 5.

43. Tsvigun et al (eds.), Lenin i VChK, no. 390. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 91-4.

44. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 5.

45. Tsvigun et al. (eds.), V.I. Lenin i VChK, no. 437.

46. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War, pp. 334-56. Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 334-8, 464-6.

47. k-9,87.

48. The first of five foreign intelligence priorities set out in INO instructions of November 28, 1922 was “The exposure on the territory of each state of counter-revolutionary groups who are waging both active and passive activity against the interests of the RSFSR and also against the international revolutionary movement.” vol. 7, ch. 1.

49. Mitrokhin’s handwritten note (k-9,87) makes it difficult to determine whether the date was June 16 or 26. Since Zavarny crossed into Romania on June 15 to negotiate details of Tutyunnik’s return with him, it seems highly unlikely, particularly in view of earlier delays, that this could have taken place as early as June 16. Because CASE 39 was run by the internal departments of the OGPU, the file was kept in the special archival collections of the Second Chief Directorate, to which Mitrokhin did not have access. He was, however, able to note a classified history of the operation which was based on, and quoted, the CASE 39 file.

50. k-9,87. During the 1930s an illegal residency in Germany, headed by I. M. Kaminsky (codenamed MOREZ and MOND), specialized in operations against Ukrainian émigrés (vol. 7, ch. 9, paras. 1-2; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1). The Administration for Special Tasks also carried out the assassination of several leading Ukrainian nationalists (Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, chs. 1, 2).

51. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.

52. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 1. Though Mitrokhin read a number of classified studies of the TREST and SINDIKAT operations, he did not have access to the files on them. Since the operations were run by the internal departments of the OGPU, their files—like that for CASE 39—were kept in the special archival collections ( spetsfondi ) of the Second Chief Directorate.

53. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 111-12. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 33-4.

54. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1. On the previous careers of Syroyezhkin and Fyodorov, see Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 138-40, 147-9.

55. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 112-13.

56. k-4,199.

57. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 35.

58. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 114.

59. The complex use of multiple aliases for the same individual in the 37-volume TREST file, together with the baffling mixture of fact and invention recorded in it, confused a number of the KGB officers and historians who studied it over the years.

60. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 115-17.

61. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 35-41 (based on partial access to the KGB TREST file); and photograph (following p. 258) of Reilly’s corpse on display in the Lubyanka sickbay. Cf. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 2, pp. 121ff. The brief SVR biography of Syroyezhkin identifies him as “especially prominent in the arrests of the subversive White Guard organization of B. Savinkov” and “an active participant in operation TREST during which the British agent S. Reilly was detained and arrested in September 1925.” Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 139.

62. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 118-21; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 40-2.

63. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 1. Italian-Soviet diplomatic relations, broken after the Revolution, were not resumed until 1924, when the first legal residency was founded within the newly established Soviet diplomatic mission. The residency officer credited by KGB files with Constantini’s recruitment was Sheftel, codenamed DOCTOR. Mitrokhin’s notes give no further details on him. In 1997-8 the SVR gave privileged access to selected parts of Constantini’s file to the authors of two histories of Soviet intelligence operations: Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, ch. 13; and West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, ch. 5. Primakov et al. do not reveal Constantini’s real name; West and Tsarev mistakenly refer to him as Costantini.