Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

The “euphoria” occasioned by the results of the negotiations in Čierná nad Tisou and Bratislava disappeared as quickly as it had surfaced. Despite the promises that had been made by the Czechoslovak side, hardly any changes became noticeable in the political life of the ČSSR. Not only did anti-Soviet materials not disappear from the Czechoslovak mass media, they became even more aggressive in tone. Nor did the changes in the party cadres materialize. In the run-up to two sessions of the presidium of the CC KSČ, Dubček told Soviet representatives that he was going to solve this issue; when the sessions began, it was not even on the agenda. The KSČ leadership reacted to all Soviet protests and notes with the same nervousness and agitation and with the repetition of the assurance that everything that was possible was, in fact, being done. 83

The straw that finally broke the camel’s back for Moscow was Brezhnev’s telephone conversation with Dubček on 13 August. 84When the Soviet leader peremptorily insisted on the enforcement of the agreements made at Čierná nad Tisou, Dubček gave evasive answers and kept on claiming that the situation within the country had changed and that it was impossible to come up with instantaneous answers to all the important questions. What he had promised to accomplish within a matter of days was now adjourned to a relatively distant future (“September,” “the end of October”). Even more worrying for the Soviet leaders than the time delays was above all the fact that, as opposed to his assurances at Čierná nad Tisou, Dubček was no longer prepared to guarantee that the promised resolutions were going to materialize at all (“pending the decision of the presidium”). What clinched matters for Brezhnev was the fact that Dubček, who was already confused and a complete wreck owing to the pressure from all sides, mentioned during the telephone conversation his readiness to concur with his own dismissal. 85This amounted to an admission that he was unable or unwilling (or possibly both) to lead the presidium of the CC KSČ. In this case, all his commitments proved to be no more than “idle talk” since the Kremlin knew only too well what kind of forces would gain power within the KSČ leadership if Dubček were to resign either of his own free will or under pressure. Dubček, who when all is said turns out to have been a very weak political leader, notably in the difficult transition phase the country was experiencing, contributed a great deal to those forces in the “fraternal countries” who had pleaded for a military solution of the “Czechoslovak question” from the beginning finally gaining the upper hand. The Czechoslovak leader kept on repeating either thoughtlessly or dispiritedly the phrase: “Take whatever measures the Politburo of the CC deems necessary.” De facto Dubček was asking for himself and his country to be handed down the “sentence” on 13 August. 86

It is obvious that Soviet leadership, the majority of whom were on holiday in the Crimea, came to the final conclusions two days after the telephone conversation outlined above that it was now time to embark on the military phase of the solution. This marks the beginning of the fourth and last phase. 87Until 15 August, all the documents and Politburo materials remained within the bounds of the agreements that had been reached in the negotiations with the KSČ. The Politburo, for instance, passed a relatively moderate conclusion on 13 August informing the fraternal parties on the results of the negotiations in Čierná nad Tisou and Bratislava, 88which underscored both the success of the meetings and the problems, whose solution now depended solely on the Czechoslovak leadership. 89The text was prepared on 10 August; Brezhnev signed it on the twelfth, Kosygin on 13 August. On the same day, the Politburo of the CC CPSU approved the guidelines for the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Chervonenko, regarding his conversation with Dubček and Černik on the antisocialist and anti-Soviet campaign in the Czechoslovak press—the tone was tough, but not threatening. 90The ambassador was also told to meet President Svoboda, to thank him, and to ask him for his continued assistance in the struggle against rightist forces. 91

Up to the middle of August, the Politburo’s Commission on Czechoslovakia, which had been put together in May, was busy preparing documents and motions for the session of the Politburo on 15 August. The material included a “Summary of the Material on the Situation in Czechoslovakia of 13 August” 92as well as the draft of an official memorandum of the Politburo to the Presidium of the CC KSČ, which was rendered more aggressive on 15 August by the insertion of several new demands and an assessment of the latest telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček. It was this very memorandum that subsequently became one of the most important propaganda tools regarding the military intervention.

The fact that the situation changed decisively on 15 August is also vindicated by other clues and documents. After the situation in the ČSSR had been discussed by the inner circle of Politburo members in the Crimea, where most of them were on holiday anyway, a telegram in cipher arrived on the same day from Yalta in Moscow signed by Brezhnev that was to be relayed by Ambassador Chervonenko in Prague to Dubček. 93However, the cipher telegram contained the directive: “Do not relay to Prague before receiving explicit orders to do so.” It was, therefore, held back in Moscow until further notice. The telegram was addressed to Andrei Kirilenko, who was not only “responsible” for the Commission on Czechoslovakia but had also stayed in Moscow during the summer holiday season as the highest ranking Politburo member to do so. On the following day, 16 August, another variant of the document contained in the cipher telegram which was virtually identical with the first one but had now obviously been put to the vote was sent from Yalta to Moscow, this time addressed to Konstantin Chernenko. 94At the same time, an edited version of the above mentioned Politburo memorandum to the Presidium of the CC KSČ of 15 August arrived from Yalta, which was kept in Moscow. Brezhnev’s letter to Dubček was rubberstamped regarding the text and relayed to Prague without further delay.

Brezhnev’s letter contained an informative note to the Soviet ambassador which requested him to inform as many members of the CC KSČ as possible who were still considered “healthy forces” by Moscow of the letter and its contents. Because the letter repeated virtually everything that had been said in the telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček on 13 August and because it contained reproaches to Dubček for not keeping his promises, we may assume that it was a move in the political game, namely the opening gambit in a solution of the ČSSR crisis involving the use of force. The “healthy forces” were supposed to inform the KSČ leaders, on the one hand, that Dubček was conducting negotiations with Moscow behind their back—it was obvious that the KSČ leader did not nearly inform even his close collaborators about everything. On the other hand, this was a clear signal to the “healthy forces” that the moment which many of them had been dreaming about and whose advent some had urged the Soviet leadership to move toward was drawing near. 95

For the world at large, the impending intervention became obvious at the latest when Moscow requested UN Secretary-General U Thant on 16 August to postpone his visit to Prague; the visit was designed to calm the situation down and at least cause a delay of whatever action Moscow was planning. The reasoning behind the secretary-general’s trip to Prague, which had been arranged on a short-term basis as an excursion during his stay in Vienna, where he took part in a conference, was that it was extremely unlikely for a serious confrontation to erupt during U Thant’s presence in Prague. The hint from Moscow, which was delivered by UN Ambassador Leonid Kutakov, was outspoken enough; U Thant was asked to rethink once more “all aspects of this question” lest he should “find himself in a difficult situation against his will.” 96U Thant saw the light.