Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

This promise, however, did not impede the buildup of preparations for the military operation. On 19 July, the Politburo began the planning of the “extreme measures,” which took a week to complete. On 20 July, the government of the USSR sent a note to the government of the ČSSR to protest against the criticism that had been voiced in Czechoslovakia with reference to the “Warsaw Letter” as well as against negligent security at Czechoslovakia’s border with Austria. This was a threat to the security of the entire Socialist camp. 64On 22 July, Defense Minister Andrei Grechko was given the permission, apropos developments in Czechoslovakia, “to take measures in accordance with planning dates and the exchange of opinions in the session of the Politburo.” It goes without saying what “measures” were meant; after all, at the same time documents were being prepared in Moscow that were later claimed to have been authored by the future ČSSR leadership, which was to replace the one presently in power according to Soviet planning. On 20 July, a first version of a Declaration of the Presidium of the CC KSČ and the Revolutionary Government of the ČSSR on the country’s domestic and foreign politics was prepared, which was followed by the second version and a speech to the Czechoslovak people on 26 July. 65On the following day, 27 July, the Politburo rubberstamped the speeches to the Soviet people and to the Czechoslovak People’s Army. 66All these documents had to be published once the invasion of Czechoslovakia began.

At this stage, the world at large, both foes and friends, had to be prepared for what lay ahead. Dealing with the foes was the easier task, as is frequently the case. The United States was tied down in Vietnam and was hoping the USSR would act as an intermediary between the parties. On 22 July, Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed to the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatolii Dobrynin, the U.S. government’s concern with “the increasingly serious Soviet accusations that the U.S. was meddling in Czechoslovak affairs.” On the very next day, the CC CPSU confirmed it was drafting a resolution to acknowledge Rusk’s statement “that developments in Czechoslovakia concerned solely the Czechs and the other Warsaw Pact countries”; 67this statement was of the greatest importance for the Soviets, as it virtually gave them the green light for their planned moves in Czechoslovakia.

Moscow found dealing with its own allies much more difficult. The publication in Pravda of the letter the five parties had addressed from Warsaw to the CC KSČ on 18 July was the CPSU party leaders’ attempt to mobilize “the Communist community in all countries to support this important document.” 68Not only did Romania and Yugoslavia express open sympathies, but there were also Communist parties in capitalist countries that warned of a potential interference in the affairs of the ČSSR and/or that exhibited “no awareness of how critical the situation was and what consequences might arise from it,” 69as the Soviet leadership put it. The Communist parties of Italy and France proved particularly recalcitrant. Italian Communist Party (PCI) leader Luigi Longo opined that the KSČ must be left to follow “the road of the purges” to the end and then had to start “from scratch.” Without consulting the CPSU, the French wanted to convene a conference of the European Communist and workers’ parties on developments in Czechoslovakia. 70Such a conference was, of course, impossible to reconcile with USSR planning, which was already in the middle of the preparations for the military operation. The Soviet leadership had to expend a great deal of time and energy in order to get the leaders of the CPI 71and the representatives of the other “procrastinating” Communist parties to “understand” their view of the developments in Czechoslovakia. 72

There is one more important detail in this phase that must not go unmentioned. In the second half of July, the resolutions that were passed by the CC CPSU in connection with Czechoslovakia came to acquire an increasingly laconic tone. It was not just words or phrases that were deleted in the original drafts, but whole sentences, entire paragraphs. Such strict editing can certainly not be accounted for merely on the grounds that these documents were written under great pressure. Because it was a foregone conclusion that the situation would lead to military intervention, Moscow began to doctor the documents and to remove passages that could either be interpreted as proof of the USSR’s readiness to use military force or, conversely, as proof of the USSR committing itself to exclusively using peaceful means for the solution of the crisis. 73

On 19 July, when the Politburo briefed the ambassadors of the USSR to inform the leaderships of thirty-three Communist parties on events in Czechoslovakia and the results of the conference in Warsaw, the following phrase was removed from the document at the very last moment: “Make sure you leave no doubt that if the situation exacerbates any further, the CC CPSU will be prepared alongside the other fraternal parties, who took part in the meeting in Warsaw, to take the most drastic measures to defend the position of Socialism in the ČSSR.” 74Despite the fact that the USSR had lost all belief in Dubček and the entire KSČ leadership’s capacity to take any constructive course of action, preparations were underway in Moscow for another meeting. Almost the entire leadership of the CPSU traveled to Čierná nad Tisou at the Czechoslovak side’s request, but not without laying down a number of conditions for the Czechoslovaks: communiqués for the press would be given after the meeting, not before; the stenographic minutes of the negotiations would be recorded separately by each of the two sides; no audio taping of the negotiations would occur; and no gatherings, demonstrations, or journalists near the conference facilities would be permitted. 75No sooner were the conditions published than the other side violated them. On 26 July, the Soviet leadership learned that Western correspondents accredited in the ČSSR knew where the meeting was going to take place and were preparing to be there. It took an exchange of telegrams and the threat to break off negotiations for the Czechs to regain control of the situation again. 76The Kremlin’s expectations regarding the potential result of the negotiations are most clearly seen in a letter that the Politburo of the CC CPSU dispatched on the eve of the conference, on 27 July, to its four main allies. It stated that the members of the Soviet delegation “were going to aim at ending” the meeting in Čierná nad Tisou no later than 30 July and to issue an invitation for the afternoon of the same day to the participants of the meeting in Warsaw to Moscow to inform them of the results of the negotiations and to discuss with them “the options on how to proceed.” 77It is probable that the Kremlin assumed that the negotiations with the KSČ leadership would end without results as usual and that there was no point in spending time on talks that led nowhere. It is also not difficult to imagine what “options on how to proceed” would have resulted from the discussion with the allies in case the negotiations had ended in an impasse. 78

Yet against all odds, the meeting turned out prima facie to be a success and went on not for a matter of hours, but for three days. Afterward, the participants went to Bratislava, where they were joined by the remaining participants of the Warsaw meeting. In Bratislava, a joint declaration of the six Communist parties was accepted on 3 August that was intended, despite its formulaic phrases, to speak to the unity of the countries in the Socialist camp and the readiness of the Czechoslovak leadership to adhere to the line of the Soviet Bloc. The basis for the successful conclusion of the negotiations had been the unofficial and rested upon unpublished assurances of the KSČ leadership during talks of teams of two and eight in Čierná nad Tisou. 79In these assurances, the KSČ leadership committed themselves to ensuring that the presidium of the CC KSČ would establish strict control in the very near future of the mass media and would prevent anti-Soviet and antisocialist material from being published; that the activities of various clubs and organization, including the Social Democratic preparatory committee, would be suppressed; that the Interior Ministry would be reorganized; and, most important of all, that the representatives of “rightist” forces would be removed from positions of power. 80When Moscow deferred so much to its negotiating partners, it does not seem to have occurred to anyone that Dubček might be making all these promises off the cuff, without the slightest clue about how or when to keep them. 81At this stage, at least part of the Politburo of the CC CPSU considered the problem at least partly, if not wholly, solved. This was why the question of a military intervention moved to the background for the time being. The majority of the Soviet leadership went off on their holiday, and Moscow viewed the 21 and 22 August requests made by U.S. presidential candidate Richard Nixon during his tour of Europe positively. In the end this visit did not occur. 82