It is possible that there was a third high-ranking Japanese victim, Prince Konoe. Bobryonev suspects that he was also subjected to Mairanovsky’s and Eitingon’s “treatment” in Vladimir Prison. 340Probably, “Dr. Mairanovsky’s method” was used by the MGB more frequently than is yet known. On October 15, 1947, Willy Roedel, who had been the only cell mate of Raoul Wallenberg for the previous two years and possibly cooperated with MGB investigators, suddenly died in Lubyanka Prison. 341The same Dr. Semenovsky signed an autopsy report stating that Roedel’s death was caused by “a heart attack.” The Lubyanka Prison commandant, Colonel Aleksandr Mironov, 342asked the head of the Fourth Department of the MGB Third Directorate (Military Counterintelligence), Colonel Sergei Kartashov, for permission “to cremate [Roedel’s] body immediately.” This request could have been looked upon as routine except for the fact that Raoul Wallenberg had died “from a heart attack” on February 17, 1947. 343Roedel was the only person besides a couple of the MGB Fourth Department interrogators, Colonel Kartashov and his superiors, Minister Abakumov and members of the Communist Party Politburo, who knew the details of the Wallenberg case. Currently, these details are still a mystery. Like the two Japanese men mentioned above, Roedel had heart problems before his death. 344But it is quite possible that these heart problems and, indeed, the deaths of all three were caused by poisoning. Pavel Sudoplatov and his son Andrei created a version of the story (without any documentary proof) that Raoul Wallenberg was poisoned by Mairanovsky. 345
It seems that in the late 1940s, there were other foreigners who were subjected to Mairanovsky’s treatment in Moscow. Mairanovsky himself described the mechanism of “special tasks” carried out in his testimony on August 27, 1953, during Beria’s investigation:
I cannot say who these people were since their names were not given to me, but it was explained that these were enemies that had to be destroyed. I received these orders from L. P. Beria and V. N. Merkulov and Sudoplatov. This relates to the period beginning in 1938 until 1950. During the period that Abakumov was Minister of State Security I was given these orders through Sudoplatov.
When I was given orders to put a certain person to death, it was discussed in the office of L. P. Beria or Merkulov or Sudoplatov, but in all instances with Sudoplatov’s participation, and sometimes with the participation of the [Fourth] Department Head, Mikhail Petrovich Filimonov and with M. A. Eitingon, but only as to the question of where the deaths should be arranged, what poison to use and when.
I was never told why a certain person had to be put to death and their names were never mentioned.
After receiving the order, Sudoplatov or Eitingon or Filimonov would schedule a meeting for me in safe houses 346with the person who was to be put to death and while he was eating or drinking, I would mix poisons into his drink or food. I cannot say how many people were put to death by me but there were several dozen. I do not know their names and I do not know the charges against them. For me the orders from Beria or Merkulov were sufficient. I did not enter into discussion of these orders and obeyed them unconditionally. 347
One of the main “safe apartments” that belonged to the secret services was in the center of Moscow, in the apartment buildings on Gorky (now Tverskaya) Street. This apartment was where Sudoplatov and Eitingon met with the MGB agents. 348Possibly, the same apartment was used by Sudoplatov’s Bureau No. 1 for killings. Later on, Kim Philby, a famous former Soviet spy in England, trained future KGB spies in a huge “safe apartment” (perhaps the same one) on Gorky Street. 349
There is a small discrepancy between this testimony and Sudoplatov’s claim that his squad of killers (Sudoplatov-Eitingon-Mairanovsky) assassinated only four victims from 1946 to 1949. It is no wonder that in his memoirs Sudoplatov furiously tried to deny his and Eitingon’s involvement in executions, confirming at the same time that both were involved in the killing of Romzha, Samet, Shumsky, and Oggins. 350Evidently, the number of victims was higher, and killings in Moscow continued during 1950.
It may be that in the early 1950s the Soviet leaders and heads of the MGB were disappointed in the results of Mairanovsky’s experiments and therefore turned their attention to more promising bacteriological methods. In 1952, one of the most successful international MGB agents, Iosif Grigulevich (Costa Rican ambassador to Italy and Yugoslavia) 351was assigned to kill the Communist leader of Yugoslavia, Marshal Iosif Tito, by using a special instrument to infect Tito with plague. 352In 1940, Grigulevich had already been secretly decorated (along with Sudoplatov and Eitingon) for killing Trotsky. 353During the planned operation, Grigulevich was named “Max,” which was a shortened form of Maximov, the main alias that Grigulevich used, beginning with his cover operations during the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. 354The details of Tito’s assassination plan were submitted by the MGB to Stalin for his approval:
The MGB USSR requests permission to prepare a terrorist act (teract) against Tito, by the illegal agent “Max,” Comrade I. R. Grigulevich, a Soviet citizen and member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1950… “Max” was placed in Italy on a Costa Rican passport, where he was able to gain the confidence and enter the circles of South American diplomats as well as well-known Costa Rican political and trade figures visiting Italy. Using these connections, “Max,” on our orders, obtained an appointment as the special plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of his diplomatic duties, in the second half of 1952, he visited Yugoslavia twice… The following options for a terrorist act against Tito were presented.
To order “Max” to arrange a private audience with Tito, during which a soundless mechanism concealed in his clothes would release a dose of pulmonary plague bacteria that would guarantee death to Tito and all present. “Max” himself would not be informed of the substance’s nature, but with the goal of saving “Max’s” life, he would be given an anti-plague serum in advance.
…The terrorist act could be accomplished [in London] by shooting with a silent mechanism concealed as a personal item while simultaneously releasing tear gas to create panic among the crowd, allowing “Max” to escape and cover up all traces.
…The terrorist act could be implemented in the same way [in Belgrade] as the second option, to be carried out by “Max” who as a diplomat, accredited by the Yugoslav government, would be invited to such a reception.
In addition, to assign “Max” to work out an option whereby one of the Costa Rican representatives will give Tito some jewelry box, which when opened would release an instantaneously effective poisonous substance…
It seems appropriate to use “Max” to implement a terrorist act against Tito. “Max’s” personal qualities and intelligence experience make him suitable for such an assignment. We ask for your approval. 355
Probably, the idea to use plague was based on the data of the Nazi doctors. During the war, Nazi scientists worked on plague intensely, using inmates of concentration camps for experiments. 356The research papers from the Anatomical Institute in Posen may have fallen into Soviet army hands 357and subsequently ended up with MGB experts. Muromtsev, Mairanovsky’s former colleague and to some extent his rival, was one of these experts. It is probable that his secret MGB laboratory was in charge of the method prepared for Grigulevich. Muromtsev was discharged from the MGB “because of bad health” (Chapter 3) at the end of 1951, approximately at the time Mairanovsky was arrested. An alternative method of killing Tito mentioned in the MGB report to Stalin, a jewelry box with a poison, was definitely from Mairanovsky’s arsenal.
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