A real legal battle broke out around the last two candidates, because they were people from the KGB, though they openly struggled against its anti-national activities. This outraged all the powerful chiefs of the Chekists. It was really obvious from the correspondence between different sections of the KGB. [115] Letter of Mayor General S.D. Balashov to E.M. Primakov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, December 10, 1992, N 6/03240. Secret. See Annex 24.
, [116] Letter of the Deputy Director of the SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] of Russian Federation Major General V.M. Rozhkov to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of Russia, December 17 1992, N 153/5-13265. Secret. See Annex 25.
, [117] Letter of Major General S.D. Balashov to Major General Yu. N. Lukonin, Head of the Personnel Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, December 10, 1992, N 6/03238. Secret. See Annex 26.
, [118] Letter of the Deputy Head of the Personnel Department of MB of Russia Colonel E. Soloviev, December 29 1992. Secret. See Annex 27.
, [119] Letter of Major General S.D. Balashov to Major General A.I. Gurov, Head of NII [the Scientific Research Institute] for Problems of Security of the Russian Federation, December 10, 1992, N 6/03239. Secret. See Annex 28.
, [120] Letter of the Head of the Institute Major General A.I. Gurov to Head of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation Major General S.D. Balashov. December 16, 1992, N 5/NII/76. Secret. See Annex 29.
The Investigation Department rejected both of them, but one year later Peter Sergeevich Nikulin became the Deputy Chairman of the Commission for the Reorganization of the KGB, and the lives of those who had dismissed him from the expert commission with a mocking reply came to depend on him greatly. What can you say? Sometimes our fate suddenly takes some very sharp and unexpected turns.
Later I met Peter Sergeevich several times at different press conferences. He made a strong impression on me. It was obvious that he was an intelligent and reasoning person, deeply devoted to democratic ideals. This was extremely rare for someone from the KGB. Apparently that was the reason why he, like Kalugin, became such an embarrassment to the old Chekists. As a member of the working group of the Committee on the Problems of Defense and Security at the RF Supreme Soviet, Nikulin gave an interview to the magazine Novoe Vremya in which he broached the fundamental questions of keeping state secrets. He didn’t leave a stone unturned, when it came to the old outdated system of “keeping” secrets, in which each department prepared its own lists of secrets and included in the lists whatever popped into their minds “from the health of the general secretary to the buttons on the soldier’s overcoat.” [121] Peter Nikulin, “The Secret of the Old Greatcoat”, Novoe Vremya , N 46, 1992, p. 44.
This system proved to be much worse than simply ineffective, incurring serious losses to the state, on the level of something like 60 billion rubles annually. So, the program “Secret” was developed, which stipulated changes in the regime of secrecy and the preparation of a law about state secrets, on the initiative of the NII (scientific research institute) for Problems of Security of the KGB.
In his interview Nikulin reminded his readers, that on November 29, 1989 he had acted as an expert at a session of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision, and after that all unpublished “sub-legal norms” became invalid.
Nikulin openly criticized the decree Yeltsin signed, which reinstated and made these acts valid again, because this document didn’t take into consideration the changes that had taken place in the country. Many of Nikulin’s statements later became the basis of a law about state secrets, which the Supreme Soviet had adopted shortly before it was dissolved in 1993.
Later I also had a chance to meet General Kalugin. I never managed to have a good talk with him, but his statements in the press and on TV made a strong impression on me. I am certain that he is an outstanding individual.
I think that I was resolute and decisive in my struggle against the hypocritical policy of the leaders of the military-chemical complex, because to a great extent I was influenced by the actions of this courageous and resolute man. Actions of such individuals are precious little seeds that later grow in the minds of thoughtful rational people, encouraging them to take resolute actions against the old system that hinders the democratic development of Russia and prevents it from joining the civilized world community. Academician Georgi Arbatov was not accepted as an expert on the pretext that he already expressed his opinion in his publication. [122] Georgi Arbatov, “Whom does our military-industrial complex deceive?” Moscow News , N 47, 22 November 1992.
CHAPTER 18
I am not Alone
Investigator Shkarin faced more and more difficulties, but he recklessly held his line. His objective was to produce the resolution that the Chekists needed from the expert commission. To be honest, I didn’t take it as seriously my lawyer Alexander Asnis did. I didn’t believe that I could be vindicated by the court or the investigation. I felt that only the pressure of public opinion could save me and make the KGB and the authorities retreat.
The press closely followed the progress of my case, and journalists interviewed me practically every day, calling and asking how the investigation was going. This instilled some kind of optimism in me. I still keep a lot of the articles published during that time in my archive. [123] Igor Ermakov, “The Ministry of Security Detained the Author of “Kuranty”, Kuranty , October 24, 1992.
, [124] Dmitri Frolov, “Chemical Armament is Continuing!” Nezavisimaya Gazetta , October 23, 1992.
, [125] Dmitri Frolov, “The MB RF is Seriously Worried about Chemical Secrets”, Nezavisimaya Gazetta , October 24, 1992.
, [126] Natalya Gevorkyan, “It is the Privilege of the Author to be Imprisoned According to a Law that Doesn’t Exist”, MN , November 1, 1992.
, [127] Igor Tsarev, “The Case about the Disclosure of a State Secret”, Trud , October 28, 1992.
, [128] Oleg Utitsyn, “The Case of the Chemist”, Kommersant , N 39, October 26-November 1, 1992.
, [129] P.A. Kochkin, “Moscow has Turned into a Prison”, Ekonomika I mui , November 1992.
, [130] Sjifra Hershberg, Hella Rotenberg, Ruslland produceert nieuw en giftiger zenuwgas, De Volksrant , N 20749, October 24, 1992.
, [131] Fred Hiatt, “Russia Jails Scientist over State Secrets”, Washington Post , October 27, 1992.
, [132] Will Englund, “Russian Whistle-Blower Denied Visit With Lawyer He Unmasked Plan For Chemical Arms”, Baltimore Sun , October 29, 1992.
, [133] Amy Smithson, “Russian Nerve Gas”, Baltimore Sun , October 30, 1992.
, [134] Will Englund, “Russian Who Exposed Chemical Arms Is Freed From Jail Pending Trial”, Baltimore Sun , November 3, 1992.
, [135] “Wachen umstellen “Izwestija”, Suddeutsche Zeitung nr. 249, October 28, 1992.
, [136] “Eine neue Kaltperiode?”, Seuddeutsche Zeitung , 249, October 28, 1992.
, [137] Lawrence Uzzel, “The Scientist and the Security Forces”, Crossroads , November 15, 1992. According to Mr. Lawrence Uzzell, Director of Jamestown’s Moscow office, “On November 4, Crossroads called the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to ask if the State Department had issued any statement of protest about this case. The answer: No.”
, [138] Ravil Karamov, “Gafu it, Vil Mirzayanov (Frogive us, Vil Mirzayanov)”, Vakyt (Bashkortstan), N 10, 1992.
, [139] Favziya Khairutdinova, “Vilne kotkarik (Let’s Save Vil)”, Vatanym Tatarstan , December 6, 1992.
, [140] Nanette van der Laan, “Scientist: Russia Won’t Come Clean”, The Moscow Times , December 12, 1992.
, [141] “Scientist’s Lawyer Gets Case File”, The Moscow Times , November 19, 1992.
, [142] Betsy McKay, “Scientist to Be Put on Trial”, The Moscow Times , November 2, 1992.
, [143] Serge Schmemann, “K.G.B.’s Successor Charges Scientist,” New York Times , 1 November 1992.
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