Вил Мирзаянов - State Secrets - An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

Such serious protection was required after we found out that information could be read on foreign computers with the help of the specially implanted “bugs”, which were practically impossible to detect. According to the rumors, some specialists who were repairing a minor breakdown in the 1980s accidentally found a “bug” in a powerful computer that was made in Japan and installed at Gosplan (State Planning agency of the U.S.S.R.) This “bug” had been transferring information to foreign intelligence agencies for a few years, and according to a certain schedule, it “shot” the accumulated information to a spy satellite.

In principal, it was possible to spy without using a “bug”. It was enough just to record the electromagnetic computer radiation from a certain distance with the right equipment. That is why so much attention was paid to protection. Nobody wanted to be counted among the negligent workers.

For protection, we could use “jammers”, noise generators which were supposed to make it impossible to use electromagnetic radiation for obtaining computer information. Our industry manufactured such “jammers”, but the “noise” they created made the operation of foreign computers impossible. Primitive computers like the “Robotron” made in East Germany could tolerate the noise of a “jammer” and you could work on them with secret information in any specially equipped room.

By a twist of fate, after my arrest in 1992, I saw a “Robotron” computer on the desk of Victor Shkarin, a KGB investigator, when I was brought to his office. It had no “jammer” and I noticed that his office had no special protection. Moreover, from time to time, the investigator opened the window to air out the cigarette smoke from his cramped office. I teased him, saying that he was violating the PD ITR instructions for handling top-secret matters, but the captain was very serious. I got the impression he didn’t appreciate my sense of humor.

The question of protecting computers at GOSNIIOKhT was very important, because a number of imported instruments couldn’t go through the entire cycle of processing the information they received by themselves. This was the case, for example, at the Physical Chemistry Department, where they couldn’t use the computers with the NMR and chromatomass-spectrometer, devices for identifying chemical compounds made in the USA. This was beyond all common sense and I immediately settled this problem. There was a good excuse. The instructions stated that no special protection was required if secret information did not exceed 15% of the total volume of the processed information. But who could check the percentage of secret information, which was processed at facilities with, for example, chromatomass-spectrometers?

It wasn’t so easy to settle the question about tapping telephone conversations, because this work was done at the request of the Deputy Director of the Department for the Security Regime, and as I soon discovered, the job was performed with great enthusiasm. This is not surprising, since it allowed the operator to report every day to the KGB major himself, and to keep him well informed about the private lives of the institute employees!

I hurried to Martynov to discuss the fate of the concealed listening unit in the PD ITR Department. I gave him the reasons why this unit shouldn’t be my responsibility and asked the major to transfer it to the Department for the Security Regime, where the former blacksmith from the Analytical Department, Boris Churkov, could handle this work very well. I suggested that we provide technical support, making sure that the equipment was maintained at the necessary level and even purchase a more automated recording system, if necessary.

Martynov’s face turned red with anger and he said, “So, you start your work by making a mess of ours?!”

He had already become used to almost completely controlling the PD ITR Department, although formally it answered directly to First Deputy Director Guskov. However, before we had our conversation, I had learned that the operator of the concealed listening unit was also intercepting Guskov’s conversations. If necessary he could intercept the Director himself, except during his high frequency communications, of course. Several times I noticed Guskov sitting near his office and talking with people who had come to see him. So he understood that not only were the telephones being intercepted, but talks in his office were subject to eavesdropping as well. It was very easy for Martynov’s people, who were nominally members of my department, to install the “bugs”. They provided protection of information in the offices, and from time to time they checked the telephones and doors. This was funny and a little bit sad, because the people who were supposed to protect the bosses in these offices actually worked against them. Unfortunately, these were the KGB’s rules of the game. And I decided to go against the grain!

I explained to Martynov, who could hardly contain his rage, that additional work not stipulated by the provisions for organizing the PD ITR Department, might cost a lot in terms of energy and productivity, not just for me but also for him as Deputy Director in charge of the Department for the Security Regime. “Bugging” distracts us from our main work, which had increased sharply in its significance, on the threshold of finalizing the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Nobody at GOSNIIOKhT doubted that the negotiations for finalizing the CWC had nothing to do with the work of the military-chemical complex.

We had to hide our new developments at any cost. The KGB major certainly understood that my arguments were pure demagoguery. However, he couldn’t openly object to my logic, especially since I referred to the opinion of people from the Third Department of Ministry of Chemical Industry, of the USSR. As a result, Martynov promised to think it over.

The struggle for transferring the concealed listening unit succeeded only in 1988, when I handed over all the keys for the room and its equipment to Boris Churkov from the Department of the Security Regime, on receipt. However, these facts didn’t prevent the Director of GOSNIIOKhT, Victor Petrunin, from stressing in interviews to different correspondents that my responsibilities included tapping the telephones of the institute employees, as well as looking through their papers.

Concerning this “looking through the papers” business, I can firmly state that from my first days in my position as head of the PD ITR Department at GOSNIIOKhT and of the branch, I prohibited this occupation as useless and offensive to people’s dignity. In my opinion, the objectives of the department were different, and I did my best to run the department professionally.

There was also the matter of protecting the secrets involving the production of chemical agents. Part of the work of some Finnish specialists, which addressed the problems connected with technical control issues raised by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), appeared at GOSNIIOKhT. There was nothing there that could possibly surprise me, but the information contained in those reports allowed me to understand to some extent, the Western countries’ level of knowledge and experience in identification of chemical agents. And I believed this corresponded to their capabilities of technical intelligence. [62] Identification of Potential Organophosphorous Warfare Agents: An Approach for the Standardization of the Techniques and Reference Data (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1970). , [63] Identification of Degradation Products of Potential Organophosphorous Warfare Agent. An Approach for the Standardization of Techniques and Reference Data (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1980). , [64] Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament. C.2. Development and Evaluation of Basic Techniques, Part I (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1985). , [65] Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament. C.3. Field tests, Part II (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1986). , [66] Air Monitoring as a Means for Verification of Chemical Disarmament. C.4. Further Development and Testing of Method, Part III (Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1987). , [67] International Inter-Laboratory Comparison (Round-Robin) Test for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament. F.1. Testing of Existing Procedures ( Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1990).