Вил Мирзаянов - State Secrets - An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

Q: In connection with the petition by the indicted, V.S. Mirzayanov, I would ask you what will be included in “the goal-oriented program of scientific research work”, and is it possible to state that Mirzayanov revealed the results achieved by some concrete program of scientific research work?

A: It is necessary to understand that under the title of the goal-oriented program of scientific research would include work including the list of scientific research works confirmed by the decision of the government over the last 10 years, and the list of scientific research works each to be performed during 3-5 year periods of time. The timeframe for the completion of the concrete work doesn’t have any significance. Otherwise the common goal-oriented program of scientific research work is subdivided into several separate concrete programs of scientific research work concerning the direction and problems with definition of concrete goals to be achieved as a result of fulfilling each of these programs.

It’s difficult for me to answer the question as to whether Mirzayanov revealed the results of some kind of concrete program of scientific research work, because the materials presented to the Expertise don’t contain any information about a concrete program of scientific research and its elements. It is mentioned that they created “a new chemical agent and on its basis a binary weapon was developed” in GOSNIIOKhT. On the basis of this, it is possible to suppose that scientific research work was performed in this institute which probably had the goal of creating new chemical agents, and on their basis developing binary systems.

Mirzayanov’s reference in publications to the creation of a new chemical agent and the development of a binary system on its basis is evidence that he gave information about the generally achieved results of a program of scientific research work.

Interrogated and performed transcript:

Senior investigator of Investigation Department

Of MB RF captain of justice

V.A. Shkarin

Top secret

Moscow

March 17, 1993

The expert Vadim Vasilievich Smirnitsky, the chief representative of the Defense Ministry RF to the Committee of Industrial Policy of the Government of Russian Federation, according to a resolution dated January 11, 1993, prepared by Captain of Justice Victor A. Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the MB RF, conducted an expertise to determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information in criminal case N 62, according to Article 191 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code and came to this conclusion.

According to the instructions in carbon copy the following materials were at the disposal of the expert:

- The article “Inversion” published in “Kuranty” October 10, 1991;

- The taped manuscript of “Inversion”;

- The article “Poisoned Policy” published in “Moscow News” September 20, 1992;

There altogether were listed 13 carbon copies of manuscripts and articles.

Further listed were the questions to clarify by the expert:

The decision of the experts was established based on the following questions:

i) What specific information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons did Mirzayanov disclose in his publications and interviews?

j) Does the information about the development of chemical weapons that can be found in the publications [all my manuscripts and articles are enumerated – V.M.] correspond to reality by volume and nature?

k) Is the information about the research and works in the area of the development of chemical weapons included by Mirzayanov in his articles, interviews, and manuscripts, factual? If the answer is affirmative, what is the degree of secrecy of this information? Does it constitute a state or a work-related secret?

l) Did Mirzayanov’s actions have any negative consequences? If so, specifically what consequences?

- The Expert conducted the investigation and established there is information about the research work in the field of development of chemical weapons.

- Further, fragments from articles and manuscripts are listed containing information about chemical weapons development.

1. I can not determine if it truly does constitute information that is a state secret about research work in the area of the development of chemical weapons listed in items 1-6, because I haven’t had any connection with scientific research works in the area of chemical weapons since 1980.

2. Divulging the information mentioned didn’t cause any damage to the defense capabilities of the Russian Army because:

a. the information about a newly synthesized chemical agent doesn’t reveal:

• the chemical or conventional name of the newly synthesized chemical agent;

• its physical or chemical properties, which are indispensable characteristics of any synthesized product;

• the name and quantitative ratio of the components of the binary system;

• information about what types of ammunition the new chemical agent was intended for; or,

• information about whether the Army adopted the chemical agent as a weapon.

b. Information doesn’t clarify the evaluation of toxicity in comparison with the chemical agent VX-gas (inhalation or resorption toxicity, reaction time, stability on the ground, sensitivity of indication, insured time of storage etc.).

c. The mention of the Polygon at Shikhany and in the Ustjurt Plateau isn’t new information because at an early time these places were revealed in the mass-media, including in the article by Birjukov and Karpov “To beat swords into ploughshares” in Trud, N64 April 15, 1992.

Expert

V.V. Smirnitsky

Top secret

Moscow

March 22, 1993

Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in accordance with the requirements of Article 192 UPK RSFSR questioned the expert Vadim Vasilievich Smirnitsky in his office ….. who showed his identification card N … of retired Major General.

Interrogation started at 10:25 PM

Q: In the process of the Expertise examination of the credibility and degree of secrecy of the information set forth in Case N 62, you came to different conclusions than those from the majority of experts and on March 18 1993 you executed a separate conclusion in which you pointed out that you couldn’t determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information of materials in area of chemical weapons, represented to the Expertise. Clarify, why did you come to this conclusion?

A: I couldn’t determine the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information, i.e. whether it constitutes a state secret or a work-related secret, because I don’t have any information about work conducted in GOSNIIOKhT after 1980 in the area of chemical weapons.

Q: Without determining the authenticity and degree of secrecy of the information, you did nevertheless reach the conclusion that its revelation didn’t cause any damage to the defense capabilities of Russian Army. How it is possible to speak out about causing damage through the revelation of information without determining its authenticity?

A: I’ve evaluated the damage from the perspective of causing damage to the defense capabilities of the Army.

Q: Judging by your experience, you don’t assume that this information can not be authenticated?

A: No, I can not suppose so because I have no idea about it since 1980, as I pointed out.