Вил Мирзаянов - State Secrets - An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program

The remaining information revealed in the article by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov does not contain state secrets.

Top Secret

Copy 1

Ministry of Security

of the Russian Federation

Department for Economic Security

To Major General S.D. Balashov,

Head of the Investigation Department

at the RF Ministry of Security

The Department for Economic Security at the MB RF received materials from the State Russian Science Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), which said that the article “Poisoned Policies” published in issue N 38 of September 16, 1992 of the newspaper “Moscow News”, disclosed state secrets.

The article indicated is signed by Lev A. Fedorov and Vil S. Mirzayanov, Doctors of Chemical Science. The latter worked at GRNIIOKhT until January 1992 and therefore was granted access to information presented in the article, from the publication “Moscow News.”

The materials were checked and the information received from GRNIIOKhT was confirmed. At the same time, it was established that the article “Inversion” by Vil S. Mirzayanov, published on October 10, 1991, by the newspaper “Kuranty” also disclosed classified information.

Additionally, as a result of technical operating measures, sanctioned by the RF Attorney General’s Office, reliable information was received showing that Vil S. Mirzayanov and Lev A. Fedorov collected additional confidential information about the military-chemical potential of Russia, in order to pass it along to correspondents of the American newspaper “Baltimore Sun” and to prepare another publication in the mass media.

Mirzayanov and Fedorov also tried to persuade former and current employees of GRNIIOKhT to follow suit and to leak classified information to foreign journalists.

It was established that Edward Lyudvigovich Sarkisyan, born in 1945 in Tbilisi, a senior research scientist at GRNIIOKhT, and the former Head Physician of City Hospital 55 (permanent address: Moscow, Rossoshanky Proezd, 4, korp. 1, kv. 111), gave an interview on September 29, 1992 to the correspondent of the newspaper the “Baltimore Sun” and confirmed information published in the article “Poisoned Policies.”

Taking into account everything mentioned above, that the actions of Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov indicate a criminal offense under Clause 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, as well as the fact that it is necessary to prevent even greater damage to the interests of Russia, we send GRNIIOKhT’s materials and results of the check on Mirzayanov for a decision on the question of instituting criminal proceedings on charges of disclosing state secrets.

Appendix:

1. The letter from GRNIIOKhT regarding the publication n/vkh N 6045 dated October 2, 1992, Top Secret, on 7 pages.

2. Non-disclosure agreement signed by Vil S. Mirzayanov n/vkh N 12290 dated January 28, 1992, open, 1 page. [ This is a shameless lie! I refused to sign it and because of this it wasn’t included in my case. V.M.]

Top Secret

Moscow

October 22, 1992

Captain of Jusice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, with the participation of Leonid Grigorievich Belomestnykh, lawyer from Legal Advice Office N 150, who produced Order N 771 dated October 22, 1992, observing requirements stipulated in Articles 123, 150-152 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, interrogated the suspect, Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov, born in 1935 in the Stary Kangysh village, Djirtjuli region, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, citizen of the Russian Federation, higher education, married, working as head of the Research Department of the joint-stock company Region-Tsentr-Vozrozhdenie, no previous convictions. Permanent address:

Moscow, Stalevarov Ulitsa, 4, korp. 4, kv. 586,

Passport presented XI-MYu N 563326

Issued on November 9, 1977

Before the interrogation began, it was explained to Vil S. Mirzayanov that, according to Articles 52, 64, 66, 70, 76, 141-1, 151, and 152 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code, the suspect has the right to defend himself; to know what he is suspected of; to give explanations; to get acquainted with transcripts of the investigation carried out with his participation, as well as the materials submitted to the court in order to confirm that he was preemptively taken into custody legally; to reject and complain about the actions and decisions of the interrogator, investigator, and prosecutor; to participate when judges are considering complaints following the procedure stipulated by Article 220-2 of the RSFSR Criminal and Procedural Code; to write testimony, ask that interrogations be recorded, to require additions and amendments be made to the transcript. It was also explained that, according to Article 47 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, the defender is allowed to participate in the case from the moment preemptive arrest was applied to me.

The interrogation started at 12.20 P.M.

The interrogation finished at 3.30 P.M.

Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov was notified that he was suspected of disclosing state secrets, that is of committing a crime stipulated by Article 75, Part 1, of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

Question: What language would you prefer to give your testimony in?

Answer: I speak Russian fluently and don’t require the services of an interpreter. I would prefer to give testimony in the Russian language.

Question: I am in charge of the preliminary investigation, according to instructions given to me, Captain of Justice Shkarin, Senior Investigator of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Do you reject the investigator who accepted the case?

Answer: I don’t reject Investigator Shkarin who accepted the case. I have no basis for rejection.

Question: Were you told which crime you are suspected of, and were you informed about the suspect’s rights?

Answer: I understand what crime I am suspected of and the rights of a suspect. At the same time, I claim that I request the presence of a defender at today’s interrogation. I don’t have any defender, so I request any lawyer be invited.

Question: To defend your interests at the preliminary investigation, you are offered the services of Leonid Grigorievich Belomestnykh, lawyer of Legal Advice Office N 150, who has been presented with order N 771 dated October 22, 1992.

Answer: I do not object to having Leonid Grigorievich Belomestnykh defend my interests at today’s interrogation.

Question: What explanations can you give regarding suspicions against you?

Answer: I prepared the article “Poisoned Policies” published in issue N 38 of September 20, 1992 of the weekly “Moscow News” with a co-author Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, Doctor of Chemical Sciences. In this article I stated the facts, known to me from my work at the State Russian Science Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GRNIIOKhT), that new kinds of chemical agents continued to be developed, produced, and tested, and that binary weapons were developed based on them. I worked at this institute from 1965 until January of 1992, and I was directly involved in the development of the new kinds of chemical agents that the article is talking about. I carried out analyses on them and looked through documentation necessary for conducting this analysis. This means that for the article I used trustworthy information that I knew from my work. In publishing this article, my goal was to expose the hypocrisy of the leaders of the military-chemical complex, who were violating an agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. governments in the field of chemical weapons, and their deception at the Geneva negotiations on concluding the convention on chemical disarmament, because they concealed components of the new weapons by not including them on the list of controlled substances. Additionally, I wanted to draw public attention to this problem. I realized that the Soviet, and later the Russian party, was trying to conceal the facts on the development, production, and testing of new chemical agents from the negotiators in Geneva, as well as the fact that binary weapons were being produced based on them. I knew for a fact that at the institute there was the “Foliant” program on the development of new chemical agents and that the creation of binary weapons based on them was secret; that is, information that I revealed in my article was not to be disclosed. However, I came to the conclusion that in these times concealing the facts of the development of new chemical agents and creation of binary weapons damaged the state interests of Russia, and benefited only the leaders of the military-chemical complex, since it served their narrowly selfish and extremely profitable interests.