Olaf Kirch - Linux Network Administrator Guide, Second Edition

Initially, the async map is set to 0xffffffff - that is, all control characters will be escaped. This is a safe default, but is usually much more than you need. Each character that appears in the async map results in two characters being transmitted across the link, so escaping comes at the cost of increased link utilization and a corresponding performance reduction.

In most circumstances, an async map of 0x0 works fine. No escaping is performed.

The Maximum Receive Unit (MRU), signals to the peer the maximum size of HDLC frames we want to receive. Although this may remind you of the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) value, these two have little in common. The MTU is a parameter of the kernel networking device and describes the maximum frame size the interface is able to transmit. The MRU is more of an advice to the remote end not to generate frames larger than the MRU; the interface must nevertheless be able to receive frames of up to 1,500 bytes.

Choosing an MRU is therefore not so much a question of what the link is capable of transferring, but of what gives you the best throughput. If you intend to run interactive applications over the link, setting the MRU to values as low as 296 is a good idea, so that an occasional larger packet (say, from an FTP session) doesn't make your cursor "jump." To tell pppd to request an MRU of 296, you give it the option mru 296. Small MRUs, however, make sense only if you have VJ header compression (it is enabled by default), because otherwise you'd waste a large amount of your bandwidth just carrying the IP header for each datagram.

pppd also understands a couple of LCP options that configure the overall behavior of the negotiation process, such as the maximum number of configuration requests that may be exchanged before the link is terminated. Unless you know exactly what you are doing, you should leave these options alone.

Finally, there are two options that apply to LCP echo messages. PPP defines two messages, Echo Request and Echo Response . pppd uses this feature to check if a link is still operating. You can enable this by using the lcp-echo-interval option together with a time in seconds. If no frames are received from the remote host within this interval, pppd generates an Echo Request and expects the peer to return an Echo Response. If the peer does not produce a response, the link is terminated after a certain number of requests are sent. This number can be set using the lcp-echo-failure option. By default, this feature is disabled altogether.

A misconfigured PPP daemon can be a devastating security breach. It can be as bad as letting anyone plug their machine into your Ethernet (and that can be very bad). In this section, we discuss a few measures that should make your PPP configuration safe.

NOTE:Root privilege is required to configure the network device and routing table. You will usually solve this by running pppd setuid root . However, pppd allows users to set various security-relevant options.

To protect against any attacks a user may launch by manipulating pppd options, you should set a couple of default values in the global /etc/ppp/options file, like those shown in the sample file in "Using Options Files", earlier in this chapter. Some of them, such as the authentication options, cannot be overridden by the user, and thus provide reasonable protection against manipulations. An important option to protect is the connect option. If you intend to allow non-root users to invoke pppd to connect to the Internet, you should always add the connect and noauth options to the global options file /etc/ppp/options . If you fail to do this, users will be able to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges by specifying the command as their connect command on the pppd line or in their personal options file.

Another good idea is to restrict which users may execute pppd by creating a group in /etc/group and adding only those users who you wish to have the ability to execute the PPP daemon. You should then change group ownership of the pppd daemon to that group and remove the world execute privileges. To do this, assuming you've called your group dialout , you could use something like:

# chown root /usr/sbin/pppd

# chgrp dialout /usr/sbin/pppd

# chmod 4750 /usr/sbin/pppd

Of course, you have to protect yourself from the systems you speak PPP with, too. To fend off hosts posing as someone else, you should always require some sort of authentication from your peer. Additionally, you should not allow foreign hosts to use any IP address they choose, but restrict them to at most a few. The following section will deal with these topics in detail.

With PPP, each system may require its peer to authenticate itself using one of two authentication protocols: the Password Authentication Protocol (PAP), and the Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP). When a connection is established, each end can request the other to authenticate itself, regardless of whether it is the caller or the callee. In the description that follows, we will loosely talk of "client" and "server" when we want to distinguish between the system sending authentication requests and the system responding to them. A PPP daemon can ask its peer for authentication by sending yet another LCP configuration request identifying the desired authentication protocol.

PAP, which is offered by many Internet Service Providers, works basically the same way as the normal login procedure. The client authenticates itself by sending a username and a (optionally encrypted) password to the server, which the server compares to its secrets database. [55] "Secret" is just the PPP name for passwords. PPP secrets don't have the same length limitation as Linux login passwords. This technique is vulnerable to eavesdroppers, who may try to obtain the password by listening in on the serial line, and to repeated trial and error attacks.

CHAP does not have these deficiencies. With CHAP, the server sends a randomly generated "challenge" string to the client, along with its hostname. The client uses the hostname to look up the appropriate secret, combines it with the challenge, and encrypts the string using a one-way hashing function. The result is returned to the server along with the client's hostname. The server now performs the same computation, and acknowledges the client if it arrives at the same result.

CHAP also doesn't require the client to authenticate itself only at startup time, but sends challenges at regular intervals to make sure the client hasn't been replaced by an intruder, for instance by switching phone lines, or because of a modem configuration error that causes the PPP daemon not to notice that the original phone call has dropped out and someone else has dialed in.

pppd keeps the secret keys for PAP and CHAP in two separate files called /etc/ppp/pap-secrets and /etc/ppp/chap-secrets . By entering a remote host in one or the other file, you have fine control over whether PAP or CHAP is used to authenticate yourself with your peer, and vice versa.

By default, pppd doesn't require authentication from the remote host, but it will agree to authenticate itself when requested by the remote host. Since CHAP is so much stronger than PAP, pppd tries to use the former whenever possible. If the peer does not support it, or if pppd can't find a CHAP secret for the remote system in its chap-secrets file, it reverts to PAP. If it doesn't have a PAP secret for its peer either, it refuses to authenticate altogether. As a consequence, the connection is shut down.