Brian Williams - Predators

There was no doubt about who the remote-control killer’s first target would be. In a display of its future intentions, a Predator was subsequently used to fire a Hellfire missile at a mockup clay compound in Nevada built to resemble a typical house in Afghanistan. 15As the Washington Post put it, “The Bush administration now had in its hands what one participant called ‘the holy grail’ of a three-year quest by the U.S. government—a tool that could kill bin Laden within minutes of finding him.” 16

The $4.5 million Predator could fly 420 miles, then circle over a target for up to thirty hours, and feed real-time video through ten simultaneous streams to controllers in ten different locations. This, of course, made it ideal for finding bin Laden. The Predator also carried sensors that intercepted electronic signals and listened in on phone conversations. It was more than just a weapon; it was an eye and ear in the sky.

Richard Clarke, who continued as the White House’s chief counterterrorism adviser under the new president, George Bush, advised the new national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, to focus on Afghanistan, where bin Laden was hiding, and not on Iraq and Saddam Hussein. He also stressed the importance of using the newly armed Predator drone to track down bin Laden and assassinate him. 17

But CIA head George Tenet had serious qualms about the new killing technology and the ethics and legality behind its use. The consensus in the CIA was that “aircraft firing weapons was the province of the military.” 18According to one former intelligence officer, “There was also a lot of reluctance at Langley to get into a lethal program like this.” 19

The branch of the military that would be asked to fly the drones, the Air Force, was similarly disinclined to take charge of them. Steve Coll writes, “The Air Force was not interested in commanding such an awkward, unproven weapon. Air Force doctrine and experience argued for the use of fully tested bombers and cruise missiles, even when the targets were lone terrorists. The Air Force was not yet ready to begin flying or commanding remote control planes.” 20

According to Coll, “James Pavitt as the Director of Operations at CIA was also worried about the unintended consequences should the CIA suddenly move back into the business of running lethal operations against targeted individuals—assassination in the common usage.” 21For all its potential, neither the Air Force nor the CIA was inclined to embrace the new remote-control technology or its potential role as a terrorist killer on the eve of 9/11. Far from being trigger happy, Tenet wanted the government to have its “eyes wide open” to the ramifications of using the drones to assassinate terrorists. 22He was said to have been “appalled” at the question as to who should “pull the trigger” on bin Laden or other terrorists and did not seem to feel that he had the jurisdiction to do so. 23In his autobiography he asked, “How would the government explain it if Arab terrorists in Afghanistan suddenly started being blown up?” 24

The American government had previously been critical of the Israeli policy of assassinating its Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist enemies. Ironically, as recently as July 2001 the U.S. ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, had stated, “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations…. They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.” 25

Now the CIA was potentially being tasked to do the same thing as the Israelis, only it would be done via an unexplored new technological device whose ethics and morality were not fully understood. Capturing the CIA’s unease, Tenet stated, “This was new ground.” He asked, What would be the chain of command should the Predator be used, who would take the shots, and were America’s leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this killing outside the military’s normal command and control? 26

As a result of jurisdictional squabbles over who would pay for and fly the drones and moral qualms about their use, discussion on deploying the Predator to kill bin Laden was shelved in a September 4, 2001, meeting involving key government officials. 27Just days before 9/11, “terrorism was not at the top of the priority list of the new Bush administration.” 28With no real sense of urgency in the air, talk of what to do with the Predator was put off to a later date.

War is the mother of invention, and the unexpected destruction of 9/11 led to a global war that was to see tremendous developments in America’s killing technology. Although the Bush administration had been obsessed with Baathist Iraq since it had come to power in 2000, the death of almost three thousand people on 9/11 abruptly diverted the White House’s attention to Central Asia. The White House was now focused on the clear danger to American lives emanating from the previously ignored Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Clearly the president had to respond to the unprecedented destruction and move to defend his people. But how?

For his part, bin Laden was confident that the United States would react to the 9/11 attacks as it had after the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, that is, by launching punitive cruise missile strikes. But it was clear to the White House and Pentagon that something more drastic was necessary. Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan needed to be totally destroyed if America was to be made safe again. This meant convincing the Taliban host regime to arrest the hundreds, if not thousands, of Arab jihadists in their country.

But the Taliban reacted to the stunning news from distant North America by panicking and denying their Arab guests’ guilt. When confronted with the news of the Taliban’s intransigence, the Bush administration had no recourse but to move against the country. Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state, summed up America’s position as follows: “We told the Taliban in no uncertain terms that if this happened, it’s their ass. No difference between the Taliban and Al Qaeda now. They both go down.” 1

Infuriated by Mullah Omar’s decision to stand by al Qaeda, President Bush ordered his top general to “rain holy hell” on the Taliban. 2As for bin Laden, Cofer Black, the head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center who had been active in pushing for the arming of the Predator drone, was more blunt. Black ordered his Special Activities operatives to “capture Bin Laden, kill him, and bring me his head back in a box on dry ice.” 3

President Bush showed his newfound resolve to tackle al Qaeda, a group his administration had not been overly interested in prior to 9/11, with his vow to capture bin Laden “dead or alive.” National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice subsequently hinted at what was to come when she said, “We’re in a new kind of war, and we’ve made it very clear that this new kind of war will be fought on different battlefields.” 4Bush himself added, “Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents.” 5A senior U.S. official further demonstrated how far the administration had come from criticizing Israel for targeted assassinations when he stated, “The gloves are off. Lethal operations that were unthinkable pre–September 11 are now underway.” 6And another U.S. official advocated using “all the weapons at our disposal” to target bin Laden and his followers. 7Thus the foundations were laid for a veritable revolution in counterterrorism (and ultimately counterinsurgency) even before the rubble from the World Trade Centers had begun to be cleared.