Brian Williams - Predators

Israel’s experience shows that a sustained campaign of targeted killings can disrupt a militant group tremendously, as slain leaders are replaced by less experienced and less skilled colleagues. This can lead the group to make operational and strategic mistakes, and over time, pose less of a danger. Moreover, constant killings can create command rivalries and confusion. Most important, the attacks force an enemy to concentrate on defense rather than offense. To avoid becoming targets, group leaders must minimize communications, avoid large groups, constantly change their locations, disperse their cells, and take other steps that make it far harder for them to do the sustained, systematic planning required to build large organizations and carry out sophisticated attacks. 14

Did the drone strikes have this effect on the Taliban and al Qaeda in the FATA? The answer seems to be a resounding yes. Whereas the Taliban previously gathered in large numbers to demonstrate their power, hold rallies, plot, train, equip, administer harsh shariah justice, and publicly enforce their writ in the FATA, they can no longer do so thanks to the threat of drones. One FATA resident said, “The Taliban will never gather in large number in broad daylight to be targeted by the drones.” 15David Rohde, the American journalist held captive by the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan, provided the following eyewitness account of the drones’ disruptive effect on terrorist operations:

During my time in the tribal areas, it was clear that drone strikes disrupted militant operations. Taliban commanders frequently changed vehicles and moved with few bodyguards to mask their identities. Afghan, Pakistani, and foreign Taliban avoided gathering in large numbers. The training of suicide bombers and roadside bomb makers was carried out in small groups to avoid detection….

The drones were terrifying. From the ground, it is impossible to determine who or what they are tracking as they circle overhead. The buzz of a distant propeller is a constant reminder of imminent death. Drones fire missiles that travel faster than the speed of sound. A drone’s victim never hears the missile that kills him. 16

The drones’ potential targets have to operate under the assumption that the unseen killers are watching them at all times with an unblinking eye. A writer for Esquire magazine who was embedded with a drone crew in Afghanistan reported,

The insurgents and terrorists hate the drones; that is certainly true. U.S. soldiers drive around Iraq and Afghanistan always waiting, wondering if this will be the moment they blow up. So it is for insurgents. Missiles launched from UAVs are America’s version of the roadside bomb, infecting insurgents with the same paranoia and fear. “He knows we’re there. And when we’re not there, he thinks we might be there,” Colonel Theodore Osowski, who commanded the unit in Kandahar, told me. “It’s kind of like having God overhead. And lightning comes down in the form of a Hellfire.” 17

The mere possibility of a strike helps disrupt or prevent terrorist and insurgent activities. The Taliban and al Qaeda cannot, for example, do simple tasks such as drive in SUV convoys or communicate on cell phones, much less transport weapons and openly train without fear of being tracked and killed by unseen killers in the sky. One Taliban commander provided insight into the considerable lengths the militants in the FATA go to just to avoid being detected and killed by the hovering drones:

■ If a drone is heard, fighters must disperse into small groups of no more than four people.

■ Satellite or SMS [short message service, a form of text messaging on mobile phones] forms of communication are no longer used. All communications are done orally or by code.

■ Meetings are announced only at the last minute, with nothing planned in advance in order to avoid leaks. Even senior commanders do not know the precise location of regional commanders.

■ Taliban leaders have reduced the size of their security escorts to one or two men “in whom they have complete confidence.” 18

Such security precautions certainly curtailed the Taliban and al Qaeda’s ability to function. Maintaining security precautions in and of itself becomes a time-consuming distraction. A Washington Post article based on interviews in the FATA provides further insight into how the drones have terrorized the terrorists: “Militants who once freely roamed markets and helped settle disputes, tribesmen said, have now receded to compounds. Fighters shun funerals and trackable technology. They rely on motorbikes or their feet to move, pro-Taliban tribesmen said. Insurgent leaders, the highest-value drone targets, move ‘three times in a night,’ said Malik, the Pakistan army commander. ‘The militants are desperate,’ said a Miranshah teacher, 38, adding that residents pray that drones hit their targets.” 19

One local official said of the Taliban, “Their freedom of movement has been curtailed to a great extent. This has caused demoralization. There is no discrimination while taking out targets, be they Pakistani Taliban or Al Qaeda and their foreign affiliates.” 20A Pashtun tribal elder reported, “I know that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are very much in trouble because of these attacks. These drone attacks really strike fear in them.” 21The Guardian similarly reported, “In Wana, the capital of south Waziristan, foreign fighters are shunning the bazaars and shops, and locals are shunning the fighters. ‘Before, the common people used to sit with the militants,’ said Wazir. ‘Now they are also afraid.’” 22

As reports like this indicate, foreign al Qaeda fighters in particular—but also rank-and-file Taliban members—have become magnets for drone strikes, and the locals are less willing to protect them or give them sanctuary in their homes. It is difficult for the Taliban and al Qaeda to plot new terrorist outrages against Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the West when, as former CIA chief Michael Hayden put it, their sanctuary in the FATA is “neither safe nor a haven.” 23An article in the New York Times vividly captured the disruptive impact the drones have had on the militants’ former safe haven:

Tactics used just a year ago to avoid the drones could not be relied on, [a member of the Taliban] said. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to sleep under the trees as a way of avoiding the drones. “We can’t lead a jungle existence for 24 hours every day,” he said.

Militants now sneak into villages two at a time to sleep, he said. Some homeowners were refusing to rent space to Arabs, who are associated with Al Qaeda, for fear of their families’ being killed by the drones, he said. The militants have abandoned all-terrain vehicles in favor of humdrum public transportation, one of the government supporters said.

The Arabs, who have always preferred to keep at a distance from the locals, have now gone further underground, resorting to hide-outs in tunnels dug into the mountainside in the Datta Khel area adjacent to Miram Shah, he said.

“Definitely Haqqani is under a lot of pressure,” the militant said. “He has lost commanders, a brother and other family members.” 24

According to one source, Haqqani and his followers, the most active terrorists in eastern Afghanistan, can no longer communicate with al Qaeda by cell phone owing to the threat of drone strikes. 25The terrorists, especially the foreign al Qaeda element, also bemoan the local Pashtun unwillingness to associate with militants who have become lightning rods for drone strikes. Local Pashtun tribesmen also stay away from Taliban militants, who are known to be targets for drone strikes, and this has made the Taliban’s sanctuary less secure. A militant claimed that the Taliban were constantly on the alert for the sound of approaching drones and said, “We now often sleep in the river beds or under the eucalyptus trees.” 26