Henrik Lunde - Finland's War of Choice

Mannerheim raised the issue with President Ryti. 13We don’t know what recommendation Mannerheim made but he had expressed an interest to Veltjens in obtaining matériel for the armed forces. Mannerheim was told to give an affirmative reply to Veltjens and it therefore appears that the ultimate responsibility for this action lies with Ryti. Finnish civilian leaders who later claimed ignorance of this exceedingly important issue for Finland’s future are less than sincere.

The German ambassador to Finland was very surprised when Veltjens told him that Hitler had made this decisive policy change 14and “that he [Veltjens] had come to explain to the Finns that all their weapon needs would be met.” 15Blücher sent his military attaché, Colonel (later Major General) Horst Rössing, to Berlin to verify the information given by Veltjens. Colonel Rössing called the ambassador from Germany and stated “The things that were reported on the day of my departure are confirmed with minor deviation.” 16

General Rudolf Walden, the Finnish minister of defense, also sent officers to Berlin to clarify the German position. Further negotiations continued in Helsinki and a secret informal military agreement was reached in early September 1940. It provided for the transit of Luftwaffe personnel and equipment through Finland to Kirkenes in Norway. Notes on the subject were exchanged between the two governments two months later.

The stated purpose of these agreements sounded innocent enough but we are entitled to ask why Germany felt it necessary to make this arrangement with Finland. Sweden had allowed transit of German supplies and personnel since April 1940 and continuation of that transit would not have aroused the ire of the Soviets. The unstated purposes become obvious in Blücher’s writings about what the transit agreements actually involved:

During these weeks [April and first half of May 1941], the German military in Finland were very active. German military transports arrived in increasing numbers. Lines of communications were built throughout the country, food and ammunition depots established, and west–east roads and bridges improved. It was not possible to conceal these actions and they became the subject of discussion among the Finnish people. It was generally viewed within the framework of a German-Russian war. 17

While Hjalmar J. Procopé observes that it remains a mystery which military officials supported the decision to let the Germans into the country, I believe we can draw some rather logical conclusions after we review the various known contacts between the military in the two countries. Procope’s observation that the democratic institutions in Finland were not functioning as they should is not accurate. 18The president/prime minister and probably other cabinet members were involved. Based on the fact that he immediately sent a team to Germany, we know that the minister of defense was informed. It would have been inconceivable to keep Foreign Minister Witting in the dark.

The implementation of some parts of the agreement not pertaining to the movement of military personnel had already begun as negotiations were taking place and this indicates that Veltjens’ visit may not have been much of a surprise. We have already noted that I. G. Farben obtained a concession for the nickel ore in late July and shipments of military equipment and supplies for the Finnish armed forces began in August. 19

All this must be viewed in relation to the position in which Finland found itself after the Winter War and particularly after the German victories in Norway and the west. The country was isolated and threatened by its powerful neighbor and no help could be expected from the Western democracies. For the Finns, the transit agreements and the delivery of weapons and supplies for their armed forces essentially broke the isolation in which they had found themselves. These agreements may have put a brake on Soviet plans. Marshal Mannerheim writes that Finland would have fallen victim to the Soviet Union in late 1940 had it not been for the agreements reached with Germany. 20Nevertheless, it was a high-stakes gamble for the Finns to invite German forces into their country, irrevocably tying their future to that of Germany. Closer relations with Germany also damaged their relations with Great Britain and the US. The improvement in relations from the German side must also be viewed in relation to the events of the summer of 1940. These included the Soviet moves into the Baltic States and their demands on Finland, particularly as related to raw materials in the far north. Finally, Hitler’s decision in late July 1940 to mount an attack on the Soviet Union gave the final impetus and urgency to improving relations with Finland. Reports from the German military attaché in Helsinki gave the Finnish armed forces high praise. 21

There were many spies in Finland, and the Germans realized that they needed to inform the Soviets about some of the arrangements they had made with the Finns. Schulenburg, the German ambassador in Moscow, was told to bring the matter up with the Soviets in a casual manner, but not before the afternoon of September 21. 22The Finns were also informed about German explanations to the Soviets through Ambassador Blücher in a separate message. 23The explanation the Soviets were given focused on antiaircraft reinforcements (one battalion) for north Norway to counter British air attacks. Schulenburg was instructed to tell the Soviets the following:

Investigation of the transport facilities revealed that for this purpose the route by way of Finland would present the least difficulty. This antiaircraft battery will presumably be landed near Haparanda on September 22 and transported to Norway, part way by rail, and the rest by road. The Finnish Government appreciating the special circumstances has granted the German request to permit this transport to take place.

It appears that Schulenburg left for Berlin on September 21 without carrying out his instructions. In Schulenburg’s absence the Soviet foreign minister queried the German chargé Werner von Tippelskirch about reports, including in the Finnish press, of German troops landing in a number of Finnish ports. Molotov requested a copy of the German–Finnish agreement, including any secret protocols. The chargé, who may not have been privy to Schulenburg’s instructions, answered that he would communicate Molotov’s request to the German government. 24

Ribbentrop delayed his answer until October 2. 25He instructed the Embassy in Moscow to inform the Soviets that the German–Finnish agreement involved a purely technical matter without political implications, similar to that reached with Sweden about transport through Swedish territory to Oslo, Trondheim, and Narvik. The one with Finland involved only the area of Kirkenes, which could be best reached through Finnish territory. Because of the technical nature of the agreement the Germans had seen no need to notify the Soviets. The agreement resulted from an exchange of notes between the Finns and Germans and the embassy was instructed to give the Soviets, in the form of a memorandum, verbatim the four points in the agreement. These four points were spelled out in Ribbentrop’s message.

While the Soviets requested additional and more detailed information (number of troops involved, whether it involved only a single operation or a series, and whether the destination only involved Kirkenes) they did not press the matter. However, their suspicions lingered and it was only a matter of time before it surfaced at the highest levels.

The Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, made his much-written-about visit to Berlin in the middle of November 1940. The discussions are fully reported by participants and in documents. 26Molotov was a survivor of the many purges in the Soviet Union and the Germans found him to be the toughest negotiator they had encountered. He was known for his no-nonsense approach and an unyielding preference for directness and explicit details that sometimes surprised and dismayed the people with whom he negotiated. They were used to politeness, subtlety, and vagueness—qualities completely missing from Molotov’s lexicon.