Michael Pearson - Red Sky in the Morning

14 Stange, Kapitan zur See , Lützow War Diary , Bundesarchiv. Translated from the original German.

15 Ibid.

16 Kummetz, op. cit.

17 PRO. ADM 234/369.

18 Ibid.

19 PRO. ADM 199/73.

20 PRO. ADM 234/492.

21 Memoir of Commander L.E. Peyton-Jones, supplied to the author.

22 Ibid.

23 According to Obedient ’s report, although according to the Commodore’s report (ADM 199/73), the convoy altered course at 10.20.

24 Kummetz, op. cit.

25 PRO. ADM 199/73.

26 PRO. ADM 1/14217.

27 PRO. ADM 234/369. The primitive nature of radar in 1942 should be kept in mind. In Sheffield , bearings and ranges would be passed by voice pipe, and the operators would be using new equipment with necessarily very little experience of using it on active duty.

28 It was in fact Vizalma and Chester Valley , who had altered course to the east having also seen the gunfire.

29 While Vice-Admiral Kummetz was in overall command, much of the actual fighting of the German flagship would have been handled by Kapitän zur See Hartmann (much the same relationship would have existed between Rear-Admiral Burnett and Captain Storey aboard Sheffield ). Hartmann for one seems to have favoured a more aggressive approach than the one inflicted on them by the high command, Kummetz reporting that he had to ‘hold him back’ during the course of the battle.

1 PRO. ADM 234/492. Observers on the destroyers reported up to three hits on Hipper during this exchange, but there are no reports of hits at this time in the German records.

2 Ibid.

3 From a transcript of an interview taped by Lieutenant-Commander Marchant for the 17th Destroyer Flotilla Association, and used with the kind permission of Mrs Pamela Marchant.

4 PRO. ADM 234/492.

5 Leading Stoker Walter Watkin, in correspondence with the author.

6 Ibid.

7 Lieutenant-Commander Donovan in conversation with the author.

8 Hyderabad , stationed on the starboard side of the convoy, had previously noticed two destroyers and a large ship crossing ahead from west to east, but again made no report.

9 Marchant interview, op. cit.

10 Stange, Kapitän zur See Lützow War Diary , Bundesarchiv.

11 PRO. ADM 199/73.

12 Stange, op. cit.

13 PRO. ADM 234/492.

14 Kummetz, Vice-Admiral Oskar Diary of Operation Regenbrogen, Bundesarchiv.

15 From the Memoir of Commander Loftus Peyton-Jones supplied to the author.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

1 Stange, Kapitän zur See Lützow War Diary , Bundesarchiv. Translated from the original German.

2 Kummetz, Vice-Admiral Oskar Diary of Operation Regenbogen, Bundesarchiv. Translated from the original German.

3 PRO. ADM 234/369.

4 PRO. ADM 1/14217.

5 There is some disagreement as to the range at which Sheffield opened fire, as neither she or Jamaica were using RDF spotting observations (such was the delicacy of the equipment at this time that Jamaica ’s forward RDF was put out of action by vibration from her own first salvo). Admiral Tovey later stated that he thought the range might more likely have been about 13,000 yards (11,887 m). Distinguishing the fall of shot from the two cruisers presented no difficulty as Jamaica fired eight tracer per salvo, and Sheffield two, subsequently amended to four.

6 Captain Michael Hutton, in correspondence with the author.

eThe commercial name for a tetrachlorine carbon chemical. See also Chapter 8.

7 Brennecke, Jochen Eismeer, Atlantik, Ostee (Arctic Ocean, Atlantic, Baltic Sea). A history of the wartime career of Admiral Hipper , published in Germany, which draws upon German reports and the experiences of German veterans. Made available to the author by Herr Josef Schmitz, control telephone officer for heavy artillery aboard Admiral Hipper during the battle.

8 Josef Schmitz, in correspondence with the author.

9 Kummetz, op. cit.

10 Ibid. Several German accounts of the battle state that at this critical time Vice-Admiral Kummetz received a morse code message from Admiral Kluber stating baldly ‘no unnecessary risk’. Admiral Kluber apparently intended only to underline the Führer ’s overall strategy, not actions when in contact with the enemy. However even if this was Kluber’s intention, Kummetz could hardly be expected to grasp such subtle nuances from a three-word message while under fire. Vice-Admiral Kummetz makes no direct reference to this message in his report of the battle but see p. 104 and note, 10 p. 111.

11 Ibid.

12 PRO. ADM 1/14217

13 Lieutenant-Commander Albert Twiddy, in correspondence with the author.

14 Kummetz, op. cit.

15 Stange, op. cit.

fTo reconcile this with Kapitän zur See Stange’s assertion that visibility was extremely poor, it should be remembered that the convoy, and the weather front covering it, was at this time on the western or ‘dark’ side of the Lützow squadron as they headed north-westwards.

16 Johann Hengel, in correspondence with the author.

17 Smith Belford, in conversation with the author.

18 PRO. ADM 1/14217.

19 Kummetz, op. cit.

1 Memoir of Commander Loftus Peyton-Jones, as supplied to the author.

2 PRO. ADM 234/492.

3 Peyton-Jones, op. cit.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 PRO. ADM 234/369.

8 PRO. ADM 234/492.

9 Ibid.

10 Peyton-Jones, op. cit.