Wesley Gray - Embedded

In conclusion Cooling said, “Gentlemen, we are ahead of these guys with the Chameleons coming into theater. This is going to stop the radio-controlled IEDs for the time being. I figure we have a one-to two-month edge on these guys. But standby, I will bet my paycheck they will figure out a work-around soon enough. Good luck, and get those Iraqis to work.” We all left the meeting motivated but feeling as though we indeed had a microscope jammed up our asses.

The mythical Colonel Abass, whom we had heard so much about from the outgoing advisers, soon returned to Camp Ali. The guy was a sight to see. He tipped the scale at 270 pounds and packed his weight in a frame that stood about five feet seven inches tall. Abass’s trademark was his handlebar mustache. When he opened his mouth, it looked as if he had a small squirrel sleeping on his upper lip.

What was most amazing about Colonel Abass was his intellect and wit. He redefined what it means to be “street smart.” At the time I met him, Abass had twenty-four years of service in the old IA, a fundamental understanding of the political situation in Iraq, and a deceptive ability to influence Americans. The only reason he was not at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) or in a higher position of power is that he was a Sunni, a former regime supporter, and could not speak a lick of English.

With Abass back at camp we redid the mission-planning brief. This time around a different feel was in the air. When Abass entered the COC conference room, everyone snapped out of their seats and jumped to attention. He spoke to the crowd, welcomed our new MiTT, thanked God for our safe arrival, and told Captain Muhanned to begin the brief. The brief was similar to Lieutenant Colonel Lovejoy’s brief, except with more formalities and more questions from Abass to his staff. Abass brought up many of the same points Lovejoy had, which was a testament to his ability to notice the same issues and concerns as our top military leaders.

Once the brief was over I had a vague idea of what we were getting ourselves into and a decent level of confidence in the jundi to accomplish the mission. I wouldn’t say the jundi are Marines, or that they could execute half of what they had planned, but I was pleasantly surprised at their ability to give a thorough brief.

But I knew the operation would be intense. Our MiTT was going to be thrown into the steaming cauldron on our first mission. The Iraqi battalion’s mission was to conduct a seventy-two-hour operation to search and clear every home in Bani Dahir and Kaffijiya.

At the time of this writing Bani Dahir is the most violent area in the Haditha Triad and is the buffer zone between Haditha and Haqliniya, the two largest towns in the area. The insurgents attack every patrol that goes through the area. Staff Sergeant Wear, the outbound MiTT’s intelligence adviser, claimed he would give us his next paycheck if we were not attacked during our mission. On the upside, though, the town has about two hundred homes, so we knew the search would take less than a day.

Kaffijiya is almost the opposite of Bani Dahir. Currently it is one of the least violent areas in the Triad, and many of the residents provide timely intelligence to the Marines and IA. In addition Kaffijiya has about a hundred homes, so we knew that searching this area would take only half a day to complete.

The day ended with an Iraqi confirmation brief at 2100, an odd hour for a meeting. It soon became apparent why Iraqis have meetings either early in the morning or late at night, and why they sleep during the day. Originally I thought it was because they were lazy, but I now realize it is because they are smart: it is far too hot to do anything during the day.

The evening meeting was exhilarating. Lieutenant Adams and I learned we would be the first guys on our team to get a piece of the action. Adams was assigned to 1st Iraqi Company with 1st Lt. Jesse Cope (the outgoing adviser), and I would be embedded with 4th Iraqi Company and Capt. Rodd Chin (also an outgoing adviser). The rest of our MiTT would be stationed with the mobile Iraqi COC on the outskirts of Bani Dahir. From there they would listen in on the action and direct support and logistics to the fight, if needed.

During the mission 4th Iraqi Company would be the cordon element during the Bani Dahir search and 1st Iraqi Company would be the search element. During the Kaffijiyah cordon and search, the roles would be reversed. We would be living, fighting, and bleeding with the Iraqi army. Excitement was on the horizon.

Lieutenant Adams and I were set for our mission to clear Bani Dahir and Kaffijiyah. The intelligence brief claimed we should brace for gunfights. Don’t gunfights only happen in the movies? I wondered. In any other scenario I would have been nervous, but I would be accompanied by flesh-and-blood Iraqi soldiers who had lived amid war and chaos their entire lives. These guys were willing to send every 7.62-mm round from their AK-47s into the hearts of the enemy. What could be more comforting than knowing I would be surrounded by thirty of these guys at any moment?

Captain Chin, thirty-five motivated Iraqis, and I set up perimeter security around the town of Bani Dahir. I spent the day moving from one Iraqi defensive position to the next, witnessing the glaring differences in how the Marines did things and how the Iraqis did things. The first position we visited consisted of five Iraqi soldiers, some breakfast chow, a full set of tea cups with a tea pot, and an Iraqi Humvee with a PKC 7.62-mm machine gun pointing down the southern road leading into town. The Iraqis’ priorities in their defensive blocking position were not what I expected.

When it comes to prioritizing efforts during defensive operations, the Marines follow a commonsense acronym: SAFE. It stands for security, avenues of approach, fields of fire, and entrenchment:

• Security:Check surrounding buildings, check for IEDs underneath the Humvee, look for nearby booby traps, and so forth.

• Avenues of approach:Make sure the machine gun is pointing in the direction from which the enemy will be approaching.

• Fields of fire:Everyone needs to have a general idea of where to point their weapons to ensure the entire area is covered.

• Entrenchment:In our scenario entrenchment meant setting out road blocks or posting signs a couple hundred meters in front of the defensive positions.

The Iraqis also follow a commonsense acronym when it comes to prioritizing efforts during defensive operations: REST. It stands for relax, eat, sleep, and tea:

• Relax:Make sure everyone has a comfortable position in the Humvee or finds a nice shady spot under a building because of the extreme heat.

• Eat:Always bring homemade chow from the camp—fresh khubbis , oranges, and perhaps some rice and beans.

• Sleep:As long as someone in the turret is partially awake, everyone else can sleep.

• Tea:When everyone needs a pick-me-up, break out the tea set, complete with sugar bowl, teakettle, and teacups, and have a tea party in the middle of a combat operation.

From an Iraqi perspective, SAFE is for dimwits and REST is the way to go. Security? Why check for IEDs and booby traps in the middle of the street? Any IEDs or booby traps insurgents had placed would have ignited when we initially drove on the position. Avenues of approach? Why waste energy pointing the machine gun in the direction of the enemy’s likely approach when it means you have to stand in 130-degree heat? Fields of fire? What a complete waste of time. AK-47s make a loud cracking sound when fired so you know exactly where the insurgents are the minute they start shooting. Entrenchment? Okay, so the Marines want us to put signs two hundred meters ahead of our position? That makes a ton of sense; now if someone is approaching us, we’ll give away our position so we can’t surprise them. Great idea, Marines (see photo 4). I’m afraid Iraqis and Americans will never see eye to eye on this.