Charles McCarry - The Miernik Dossier

1. On 11 July I proceeded west to the Wadi Abu Hamira to rendezvous with Firecracker. He did not appear, but I found his written report [reproduced in 73] buried in the roots of the acacia tree designated as a deaddrop. I left a message instructing him to report at this spot at 0200 on any day through 15 July. At 0200 on 12 July I found him awaiting me. Firecracker was in a highly nervous state and immediately asked me for one thousand pounds. He explained that he believed he might have to flee the country on short notice and he wanted to be well supplied with cash. I explained that his pay was being deposited regularly in Barclay’s Bank at Kampala in accordance with our agreement. I gave him fifty pounds (sterling) in five-pound notes and secured his thumb print on the receipt (attached).

2. Firecracker was asked to identify “Richard.” He was unable to supply details. He assumes “Richard” is a Soviet officer who will provide advice and support to the ALF during the remainder of “Golgotha” and thereafter. Soviet control in Dar es Salaam has provided no details as to the means of transportation to be used by “Richard.” Firecracker is convinced that “Richard” will arrive by parachute, but that is, of course, pure speculation. I instructed Firecracker to obtain a photograph and full description of “Richard” immediately on his arrival.

3. Firecracker stated that he fears for the safety of “Richard.” The execution of Ahmed, on what other members of the ALF believe were Soviet orders, has produced great anger in some of the men. So far this has been directed toward the Soviets, and not primarily against Firecracker, who was Abmed’s executioner. Firecracker concedes that he has not been able to assume full control of the ALF headquarters since Abmed’s death. The latter was, it would appear, a more popular and powerful figure than Firecracker led us to believe. Firecracker now thinks it possible that some members of the ALF will kill “Richard” on his arrival in revenge for the death of Ahmed. Firecracker states that he has argued against this course of action, pointing out that it would mean the loss of the ALF’s only source of money and arms. He believes that he will be able to restore his authority if given time, and stated his intention to radio Dar es Salaam recommending that “Richard’s” arrival be postponed. I advised against this action, stating that any such radio message would have the effect of arousing the suspicions of Firecracker’s putative Soviet superiors.

4. Because all ALF assault teams have been recalled on Soviet instructions, virtually the entire strength of the organization is now encamped at its headquarters. Although all six members of the team that attacked Christopher’s camp are missing, only four bodies were found at the scene by ALF scouts. Firecracker claims to have had no prior knowledge of this operation. He does not know its purpose, or what orders were giver to the assault team by Ahmed. Firecracker passed our information concerning Miernik to Ahmed on 7 July; the attack took place on 9 July. Firecracker states that he has not been able to discover whether Ahmed passed this information to Dar es Salaam by radio. [9]

5. ALF lookouts this date reported the landing of a police helicopter at the palace of the Amir of Khatar. It is assumed by them that this has some connection with the attack on the Christopher party. Firecracker seems unaware that Qasim himself was present in the Amir’s palace.

COMMENT: If Firecracker has not yet lost his nerve, he is on the point of doing so. He is obviously in the toils of the double-agent syndrome. I believe that if his personal danger increases appreciably (or if he simply believes that it is increasing) he will attempt to escape to Uganda, probably with no prior notice to us. The presence of virtually the entire strength of the ALF in one place, and the apparent breakdown of discipline attendant on the execution of Abmed, provides an obvious opportunity for the Sudanese. They may wish to move in at once, and there are persuasive reasons why they should do so while we are still able to assist through our control of Firecracker.

1. Two companies of parachute troops equipped with automatic weapons and mortars will depart Khartoum by air during night 15 July. Destination El Fasher for quote routine maneuvers unquote.

2. Disperse all ALF personnel immediately. Abandon your headquarters.

3. Cancel rendezvous with Richard. Richard will contact Qemal 15 July at time and place of Richard’s choosing.

4. Suspend all operations until consultation with Richard. Hide all arms and ammunition. Destroy all documents.

(Note: This message was not acknowledged by the ALF transmitter. The Soviet transmitter rebroadcast the message at hourly intervals on 14-15 July. It was not unusual for the ALF transmitter to fail to acknowledge messages. Only Ahmed and Firecracker were trained to operate the radios. On date of message Ahmed was already dead. Therefore only Firecracker would have been able to receive the Morse signal, decode it, and understand the Russian in which it was written. At 0732 and again at 1932 on 16 July, the Soviet transmitter repeated this message in clear, in the Arabic language. This final attempt to contact ALF headquarters evidently failed. There was no acknowledgment.)

Acting on my orders, Constable Mirghani rejoined the main force of the Anointed Liberation Front and delivered a letter from me to Qemal. Mirghani had been lightly wounded in the action at Kashgil and he was unable to travel until the night of 13th July. He told Qemal, again on my instructions, that he had been captured by the police, questioned by me, and given his freedom on condition that he deliver the letter. Qemal may or may not have accepted this story, but he took no action against Mirghani. Instead, he sent Mirghani back to me with a verbal message that he would meet Prince Kalash on the morning of 15th July at a place west of Mellit, about fifty miles west-northwest of El Fasher. He guaranteed that he would come alone and unarmed.

I informed Prince Kalash of these arrangements. He was provided with an escort from the Amir’s household: two men armed with Sten guns and revolvers. On 14th July I requested the commander of the army troops to station a squad of picked men on the high ground surrounding the meeting place as additional protection for Prince Kalash. In the event of any untoward event, these men were to intervene at once. They took up their positions the night before. They were armed with machine guns, a mortar, and grenades in addition to their rifies. They were equipped with a radio transmitter. Other troops were positioned to intercept any persons attempting to escape the meeting place.

Prince Kalash took the man Miernik with him to the rendezvous. I had no foreknowledge of this incredible action. After the fact, I learned that the Amir believed he was doing me a service in delivering Miernik into the hands of the ALF. On 14th July, the day before Prince Kalash’s meeting with his half brother Qemal, I had confided to the Amir my suspicion that Miernik might be a Soviet agent sent to take command of the ALF. The Amir decided to test my theory. “One assumed that Qemal was waiting for this foreigner,” the Amir told me. “If Miernik joined him, then his guilt was established.”

It was useless to point out to the Amir that Miernik’s disappearance proved nothing. We can never be certain that the man was not abducted by Qemal and his thugs. By putting Miernik out of our reach, the Amir put him beyond proof of my suspicions. He also put in hazard all the carefully laid plans that depended on a successful meeting between Prince Kalash and his half brother. I feared that Qemal, seeing Miernik in Prince Kalash’s company, would smell betrayal.