54. See GAO, Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD’s and Interior’s Orders to Support Military Operations , United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-05–201, April 2005, p. 2, http://www.gao.gov/htext/d05201.html. See also: http://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/documents/Chapter3.pdf, especially p. 243.
55. Ibid., pp. 3, 14.
56. For documentation that IDIQ contracts are the primary form of interagency contracts, see R eport of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress , January 2007, p. 247, http://acquisition.gov/comp/aap/24102_GSA.pdf.
For documentation that GAP brought the case forward, see Sylvia Hsieh, “Attorneys Create Niche in Representing Nuclear Weapons Workers,” Lawyers USA , October 23, 2006, http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/administration-economic-programs/4092301-1.html. Regarding hearings after Miller brought the case to light: On March 30, 2004, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources concluded three hearings on the implementation of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEIOCPA), http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=5f9b1f9d-cd1e-4c11-a107-23a85836298a. On October 8, 2004, an amendment to the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Act removed most responsibility for EEIOCPA from the Department of Energy and gave it to the Department of Labor. Government Accountability Project, “GAP – EEOICPA,” January 9, 2007, http://www.whistleblower.org/program/domestic.cfm. See Charles Pope, “Sick DOE Worker’s Claims Languish,” Seattle Post Intelligencer , March 29, 2004, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/166744_doecomp29.html. For details and documentation of the case, see General Accountability Office, GAO-06–547, Department of Energy, Office of Worker Advocacy, Deficient Controls Led to Millions of Dollars in Improper and Questionable Payments to Contractors , Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, May 2006, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06547.pdf.
For risk in interagency contracting, see: GAO, High Risk Series: An Update , Washington, DC: GAO, GAO-07–310, January 2007, p. 6, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf.
57. For CACI retaining lobbyists, see David Isenberg, “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq,” Research Report 2004.4, London: British American Security Information Council, September 2004, p. 40, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.pdf; for CACI being cleared, see Ellen McCarthy, “Government Clears CACI for Contracts,” Washington Post , July 8, 2004, p. E01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35432-2004Jul7.html; and for CACI’s award of an interrogation contract: Ellen McCarthy, “CACI Gets New Interrogation Contract,” Washington Post , August 5, 2004, p. E05, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41215-2004Aug4.html. CACI has subsequently received additional government intelligence and national security contracts. See, for instance, Robert O’Harrow Jr., “Intelligence Spending: CACI Gets More,” washingtonpost.com, January 28, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/government-inc/2009/01/intelligence_spending_caci_get.html.
58. Acquisition Advisory Panel, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress , January 2007, pp. 405–406, http://acquisition.gov/comp/aap/24102_GSA.pdf.
59. With regard to Defense companies linked to senior members of the Bush administration’s inner circles as the beneficiaries of awards, see, for example, Walter F. Roche Jr., “Nominee’s Business Ties Raise Concerns: Defense chief appointee Robert Gates has some watchdogs worried about a revolving door between the private sector and government,” Los Angeles Times , December 2, 2006, p. A10.
With respect to FEMA’s noncompetitive procedures, see Robert O’Harrow Jr. and Scott Higham, “Interior, Pentagon Faulted In Audits: Effort to Speed Defense Contracts Wasted Millions,” Washington Post , December 25, 2006, p. A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/24/AR2006122400916.html; and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Hurricane Katrina: Ineffective FEMA Oversight of Housing Maintenance Contracts in Mississippi Resulted in Millions of Dollars of Waste and Potential Fraud , November 2007, GAO-08–106, p. 2, www.gao.gov/new.items/d08106.pdf.
With regard to government contracting officials not getting good deals for their agencies, see Project on Government Oversight, Pick Pocketing The Taxpayer: The Insidious Effects of Acquisition Reform , rev. ed., Washington, DC: POGO, March 11, 2002, http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/contract-oversight/pickpocketing-the-taxpayer/co-rcv-20020311.html.
With respect to insourcing motivated by cost savings, see Elise Castelli, “The Case for Insourcing,” FederalTimes.com, September 21, 2008, http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3733576. The article states that insourcing has been done on a limited basis in the Navy, the Army, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Homeland Security. With regard to money (not) saved through competitive sourcing, see GAO, Department of Labor: Better Cost Assessments and Departmentwide Performance Tracing Are Needed to Effectively Manage Competitive Sourcing Program , GAO-09–14, November 2008, Executive Summary, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0914.pdf. See also Elise Castelli, “GAO: Agencies Overstate Savings of Competitive Sourcing,” FederalTimes.com, November 24, 2008, http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=3834852.
60. The Justice Department’s deliberations were in response to a lawsuit under the False Claims Act brought by two former associates of Custer Battles, a Virginia-based contractor. They alleged that the company had defrauded the U.S. government by overcharging the CPA and billing it for work never done, among other abuses. (Matt Kelley, “Lawsuit Says Iraq Security Contractor Defrauded U.S.,” Associated Press, October 8, 2004; and Shane Harris, “Ethics Office Launches Inquiry into Procurement Practices,” GovExec.com, September 26, 2002. See also National Public Radio, Morning Edition, “Analysis: First Contractor Fraud Case from Iraq to be Unsealed,” November 19, 2004, National Public Radio transcripts.) The quote from the federal judge can be found at: Case No. 1:04cv199, United States of America ex rel. DRC, Inc., v. Custer Battles, LLC, et al ., August 08, 2006, p. 17. See also Dana Hedgpeth, “Judge Clears Contractor of Fraud in Iraq,” Washington Post , February 9, 2007, p. D1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020801871.html.
In the April 2009 ruling, a panel of 4th Circuit judges allowed the plaintiffs to seek a new trial for additional damages. See Ellen Nakashima, “Court Revives Suit Over Iraq Work,” Washington Post , April 11, 2009, A09.
61. The Center for Public Integrity quote is from Center for Public Integrity, “Federal Advisory Bodies Wield Unseen Power,” March 29, 2007, http://www.publicintegrity.org/news/entry/217/.
The Bureau of Land Management has issued a brochure explaining what operations are subject to the FACA. Bureau of Land Management, “Federal Advisory Committee Act: Summary of What BLM Staff Need to Know When Working With ADR-Based Collaborative Community Working Groups,” http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Directorate/general_publications/faca.Par.59707.File.dat/ADR-FACA_Brochure.pdf.
62. With regard to members of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board, see “The Politics of Contracting,” Project on Government Oversight , Washington, DC, June 29, 2004, pp. 17–21. With regard to Richard Perle and the Defense Policy Board, see Seymour Hersh, “Lunch with the Chairman,” New Yorker , March 17, 2003, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/03/17/030317fa_fact. See also Tim Shorrock, “Richard Perle’s Corporate Adventures,” The Nation , April 3, 2003, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030421/shorrock.
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