Janine Wedel - Shadow Elite - How the World's New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government, and the Free Market

38. For documentation about the legislation that expanded opportunities for private players and entities, see Antoni Kamiński, “Corruption under the Post-Communist Transformation: The Case of Poland,” Polish Sociological Review 2, no. 118 (1997), pp. 91–117; and “The New Polish Regime and the Specter of Economic Corruption,” summary of paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Princeton, April 3, 1996.

The figure “as much as a quarter of the state budget” is from author’s interview with NIK official Andrzej Łodyga, July 24, 2002. On losses to the state budget as recently as 2006, see NIK, Analiza Wykonania Budżetu Państwa I Zaĺożen Polityki Pieniężnej w 2006 Roku (Warsaw, Poland: Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, June 2007), pp. 109–125. On the same topic regarding conclusions that pertain to several years earlier, see Report of the Activities of the Supreme Chamber of Control in the Year 2002 (Sprawozdanie z Dziaĺalności Najwyższej Izby Kontroli w 2002 Roku ) (Warsaw, Poland: Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, June 2003), p. 127. The NIK report of June 2008 reports that both agencies and targeted funds, unusually, achieved positive financial results (NIK report: Analiza Wykonania Budżetu Panstwa I Zalozen Polityki Pienieznej w 2007 Roku (Warsaw, Poland: Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli, June 2008), p. 115 and p. 123.

39. The quote from Kaczyński is from author’s interview with Lech Kaczyński, July 14, 1999. Information on growth of the entities during the 1990s is from: author’s interviews with Jan Stefanowicz, legal analyst and expert on these bodies, July 14 and 15, 1999. See also Jan Stefanowicz and Antoni Z. Kamiński, “Jak Się Buduję Instytucje III Rzeczpospolitej: Ułomne Reguły Gry,” Polska Niezakonczona Transformacja , Jan Winicki, ed. (Warsaw, Poland: Centrum im. Adama Smitha, 1996).

40. With regard to NIK characterizing fundusze celowe as “corruption-causing” and the examples in this paragraph, see NIK, Zagrożenie Korupcja w Swietle Badań Kontrolnych (Warsaw, Poland: Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Departament Strategii Kontrolnej, March 2000), pp. 45, 46. With respect to NIK’s anticorruption activities, NIK employee Alina Hussein has been a pioneer not only in introducing anticorruption efforts into the work of NIK, but also in devising innovative anticorruption methods.

41. The legal analyst and expert on the bodies cited is Jan Stefanowicz, author’s interviews with Jan Stefanowicz, July 14 and 15, 1999. Information on the coal sector is from Kaja Gadowska, Zjawisko Klientelizmu Polityczno-Ekonomicznego: Systemowa Analiza Powiazań Sieciowych Na Przykladzie Przeksztatcen Sektora Gorniczego w Polsce (Kraków, Poland: Uniwersytet Jagielonski, Wydział Filozoficzny, Instytut Socjologii, Rozprawa Doktorska , 2000).

Information from Kownacki is from author’s interview with Piotr Kownacki, Deputy Director of NIK, July 26, 1999.

42. Quotation from Kownacki is from author’s interview with Piotr Kownacki, Deputy Director of NIK, July 26, 1999.

43. The quotation from Kamiński is from: Antoni Kamiński, “The New Polish Regime and the Specter of Economic Corruption,” Summary of paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Princeton, April 3, 1996, p. 4.

44. Since 2005, when a new law on public finance was ushered in, these bodies have been subject to greater financial discipline.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget, “The President’s Management Agenda,” Fiscal Year 2002, p. 17, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf.

2. The quote is contained in information on the President’s Management Agenda and the agency’s “scorecard” in achieving its goals appeared on HHS’s Web site, http://archive.hhs.gov/pma/.

3. The quote is from the 1999 version of the circular, Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76, Revised 1999 , Washington, D.C., August 4, 1983, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a076.html. The 2003 version can be found as follows: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (Revised) to the Heads of Executive Departments and Establishments on the “Performance of Commercial Activities,” May 29, 2003, http://www.white-house.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_rev2003.pdf, or http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.pdf.

4. For discussion of the companies that constitute “Blackwater,” see http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2008/07/blackwater-more.html.

5. For Halliburton split, see KBR, “Halliburton Announces Commencement of KBR Exchange Offer,” March 2, 2007, http://www.kbr.com/news/2007/corpnews_070302.aspx.

6. On the ratio of contractors to government officials, see later statistics in this chapter. See also Elizabeth Newell, “Federal officials strategize on boosting acquisition workforce,” Government Executive , February 14, 2008, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0208/021408e1.htm.

On “performing for the public” see John Clarke, “Performing for the Public: Doubt, Desire, and the Evaluation of Public Services,” The Values of Bureaucracy , Paul Du Gay, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 211–229.

Although some of the analysis in this paragraph (and chapter) may also apply to state and local government, I limit my examination to the federal level.

7. With regard to defining who the government is being more difficult in the United States, the United Kingdom is a possible exception. While the United States reportedly expends more on outsourced services, the United Kingdom extends a larger portion of its GDP on such services. Nicholas Timmins, “Outsourcing Covers a Third of Services,” Financial Times , July 9, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e4b000da-4dea-11dd-820e-000077b07658.

8. The reference to Lowi’s book is Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969).

Political scientist Catherine Rudder disputes the common assumption that only the government enacts public policy and shows that private governance and independently formed policy are common in the American political system. See Catherine E. Rudder, “Private Governance as Public Policy: A Paradigmatic Shift,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 899–913.

9. The legal scholar here cited is Jody Freeman, “The Private Role in Public Governance,” New York University Law Review 75, issue 3 (June 2000), p. 548.

The three-quarters figure is from government scholar Paul C. Light. In 2008 he calculated that the contract workforce consisted of upwards of 7.6 million employees, or “three contractors for every federal employee.” Paul C. Light, “Open Letter to the Presidential Candidates,” Huffington Post , June 25, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-c-light/open-letter-to-the-presid_b_109276.html. See also: Paul C. Light, A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and How to Reverse It , Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008.

10. The CRS report here cited is Kevin R. Kosar, The Quasi Government: Hybrid Organizations with Both Government and Private Sector Legal Characteristics , CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated January 31, 2008, Summary, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30533.pdf. See this resource also for a taxonomy of “quasi-government” entities.

With regard to quasi-government organizations, RAND, created by the Air Force in 1947, was the first Federally Funded Research and Development Corporation (FFRDC). FFRDCs are a type of contracting organization that has a special relationship with a federal government agency. FFRDCs range from longstanding research and development facilities (the majority of FFRDCs are affiliated with the Departments of Defense and Energy) to two much newer entities created by the Department of Homeland Security (Kosar, The Quasi Government , pp. CRS-17–19). For a list of FFRDCs, see http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf09300/content.cfm?pub_id=3898&id=6.