Carroll Quigley - Tragedy and Hope - A History of the World in Our Time

In spite of these concessions Hitler was thirsting for war, and replied to every concession with a new bombshell which disturbed British public opinion once more. In November 1938 the Germans engaged in several days of sustained atrocities against the Jews, destroying their property, razing their temples, assaulting their persons, and concluded by imposing on the Jews of Germany a collective fine or assessment of one billion reichsmarks. This was followed by a series of laws excluding the Jews from the economic life of Germany.

Public outrage at these actions was still high when, in December, 1938, the Germans announced that they were increasing their submarine fleet from 45 percent to 100 percent of Britain’s, as provided in the Treaty of 1935, and were remodeling two cruisers under construction from 6-inch-gun to 8-inch-gun vessels. Every effort by Britain to persuade Germany not to do so or even to word their announcement in a way which would allay public opinion was rebuffed by Germany. Finally, in March came the complete destruction of Czechoslovakia. At the same time pressure began to be applied to Poland.

Germany opened its negotiations with Poland in a fairly friendly way on October 24, 1938. It asked for Danzig and a strip a kilometer wide across the Polish Corridor to provide a highway and four-track railroad under German sovereignty. Poland’s economic and harbor rights in Danzig were to be guaranteed and the “corridor across the Corridor” was to be isolated from Polish communication facilities by bridging or tunneling. Germany also wanted Poland to join an anti-Russian bloc. If these three things were granted, Germany was prepared to make certain concessions to Poland, to guarantee the country’s existing frontiers, to extend the Nonaggression Pact of 1934 for twenty-five years, to guarantee the independence of Slovakia, and to dispose of Ruthenia as Poland wished. These suggestions were generally rejected by Poland. They were repeated by Germany with increased emphasis on March 21st. About the same time, the Germans were using pressure on Romania to obtain an economic agreement, which was signed on March 23rd.

On March 17th London received a false report of a German ultimatum to Romania. Lord Halifax lost his head and, without checking his information, sent telegrams to Greece, Turkey, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union asking what each country was prepared to do in the event of a German aggression against Romania. Four replied by asking London what it was prepared to do, but Moscow suggested an immediate conference in Bucharest of France, Britain, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union to try to form a united front against aggression (March 18, 1939). This was rebuffed by Lord Halifax, who wanted nothing more than an agreement among these states to consult in a crisis, as if they would not do so anyway. Poland was reluctant to sign any agreement involving Russia. However, when news reached London of Hitler’s demands on Poland, Britain suddenly issued a unilateral guarantee of the latter state (March 31st). This was extended to Romania and Greece after Italy’s attack on Albania (April 13th).

The text of Chamberlain’s guarantee to Poland is of extreme importance. He said: “Certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty’s Government in the meantime, before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House [of Commons] that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.”

This was an extraordinary assurance. The British government since 1918 had resolutely refused any bilateral agreement guaranteeing any state in western Europe. Now they were making a unilateral declaration in which they obtained nothing but in which they guaranteed a state in eastern Europe, and they were giving that state the responsibility of deciding when that guarantee would take effect, something quite unprecedented. A little thought will show that all these strange features really stultify the guarantee, and the net result was to leave the situation exactly where it had been before, except that a very severe warning had been conveyed in this fashion to Germany to use negotiation and not force. If Germany used force against Poland, public opinion in Britain would force Britain to declare war whether there was a guarantee or not.

The fact that Chamberlain’s guarantee was temporary and unilateral left the British free to cancel it when necessary. The fact that it guaranteed Poland’s “independence” and not its territorial integrity left the way open for Germany to get Danzig or the Corridor by negotiation, and the fact that it came into effect when Poland wished made it impossible for Britain or British public opinion to refuse to accept any change which Poland worked out in negotiation with Hitler. Most of these points were recognized by the German government. They were pointed out in The Times of April 1st and accepted by Chamberlain.

The guarantee was accepted by Bonnet, who, as long ago as November, had said that he wanted to get rid of both the Franco-Polish and the Franco-Soviet alliances.

If the chief purpose of the unilateral guarantee to Poland was to frighten Germany, it had precisely the opposite effect. On hearing of it, Hitler made his decision: to attack Poland by September 1. Orders to this effect were issued to the German Army on April 3, and the plans for Operation White, as it was called, were ready on April 11. On April 28, in a public speech to the Reichstag, Hitler denounced the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 and the German-Polish Nonaggression Pact of 1934. He also announced the terms he had offered Poland which had been rejected. As a result, negotiations broke off between the two Powers and were never really resumed. Instead, the crisis was intensified by provocative acts on both sides.

On May 22 a German-Italian alliance was signed, the “Pact of Steel,” as Mussolini called it. Here, again, the wording was important. It was a clearly aggressive alliance, since the parties promised to support each other, not against “unprovoked attack,” as was customary, but in all cases. At the signing, Germany was told flatly that Italy could not make war before 1943 and that the approaching war would be a “war of exhaustion.” The very next day, A4ay 23, 1939, Hitler held a secret conference with his generals. In the course of a lengthy speech he said:

“Danzig is not the subject of this dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, and the settlement of the Baltic problems. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will increase production enormously. There is no other possibility in Europe. Beware of gifts of colonial territory. These do not solve the food problem. Remember— blockade. If fate brings us into conflict with the West, possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to expect excellent harvests even less in wartime than in time of peace. The population of these non-German areas will perform no military service and will be available as a source of labor. The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.… Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West and will attempt to rob us of a victory there. There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our job is to isolate Poland. The success of this isolation will be the decisive factor. Therefore, the Führer must reserve the decision to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers [France and England].... If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia, I would have to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. I doubt the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.”