Bruce Mesquita - Principles of International Politics

Crisis Selection in Democracies and Autocracies

Diversionary War

The Resurrection Hypothesis

Pacific Dove Hypothesis

Selectorate Theory and the Conduct of War

Selectorate Reasons for War

War-Selection Calculations

Selectorate Theory and War Effort

War Effort Logic

Evidence for the War Effort Logic

War Effort, War Loss, and Leader Deposition

Summary

SECTION III. PEACE

7. How International Organizations Work or Don’t Work

The Purpose of International Rules and Institutions

The Problems of Rivalry and Nonexcludability

The Collective Action Problem

Organizational Solutions to Collective Action

Cooperation through Repeated Bilateral Interaction

Flexibility Can Be a Virtue

Information, Reputation, and the Value Added by Institutions

Multilateral Organizations and Cooperation

Inclusiveness: Trade-Offs between Regime Efficiency and Effectiveness

Alternative Views of Inclusiveness

The United Nations: Shallow Decisions or Inaction

Summary

8. Global Warming: Designing a Solution

Global Warming: A Problem of Collective Action

Collective Action and Free Riding

Seeking Agreement: Allocating Abatement Costs

Shallow Agreements = Compliance; Deep Global Agreements = Failure

Monitoring and Punishing Noncompliance with Kyoto

Flexibility

Were Kyoto’s Lessons Learned?

An Illustrative Strategy for Reduced Global Warming

Summary

9. Human Rights, International Law, and Norms

What Is International Law?

International Regimes: The Idea of Ideas and Norms

What Rights Are Recognized as Human Rights?

Is Poverty a Credible Argument against the Enjoyment of Human Rights?

Why Promote Freedom Rights? Some Useful Facts

Does International Law or Norms Improve Human Rights?

Human Rights: The Constructivist Case

The Strategic Case

Sovereignty: The Case against Human Rights

International Borders as Institutions

Breaking Down the Unitary Actor View Can Improve Human Rights

Summary

10. Free Trade or Fair: The Domestic Politics of Tariffs

Government’s Minimalist Role in Trade

Trade in Historical Perspective

An Economics Primer

Comparative Advantage

Supply and Demand

Politics of Trade: Adding Tariffs to the Mix

Trade as a Public or Private Good

Trade and Domestic Winners and Losers

The Consequence of Free Trade: Some Evidence

Summary

11. Globalization: International Winners and Losers

Globalization’s Goals

Currency Mobility

Factors of Production

Mobility of Factors of Production

Interindustry Factor Mobility

No Interindustry Factor Mobility

Specific Factor Mobility

Some Evidence

Summary

SECTION IV. WORLD ORDER

12. Foreign Aid, Poverty, and Revolution

Foreign Aid: The Problem

The Marshall Plan: A Model for Foreign Aid?

Aid Outside Europe: Not a Pretty Picture

The Aid Debate

A Third Explanation for Aid

Giving and Getting Aid

Evidence for the Aid Hypotheses

Aid, Revolution, and Democratization

Summary

13. Can Terrorism Be Rational?

Beliefs about Terrorism

Terrorism, Credible Commitments, and Strategic Dilemmas

The Government’s Credibility Problem

Solving the Credible Commitment Problem

Why Violence Might Increase after Successful Negotiations

Land for Peace: A Credible Commitment Problem

Summary

14. A Democratic World Order: Peace Without Democratization

The Democratic Peace

Some Evidence

Explanations of the Democratic Peace

Pacifying Benefits from Trying Hard

Enforcing the Postwar Peace

Democracy: A Hindrance to Democratization

Democracies and Nation Building

Autocracies and Nation Building

The United Nations and Nation Building

What Do We Expect, and What Does the Evidence Show?

Germany and Japan: Seemingly Hard Cases

The Usual Suspects: Iran, Congo, and Other Failed Cases

Summary

Appendix. Modern Political Economic History and International Politics

The Fifteenth Century

The Sixteenth Century

The Seventeenth Century

The Eighteenth Century

The Nineteenth Century

The Twentieth Century

The World through the First World War

The Interregnum between World Wars

The World War II Years

The Cold War Years

The Post–Cold War World

Summary

Bibliography

Glossary of Key Terms

Photo Credits

Citations of Key Authors

Index

Maps, Tables, and Figures

MAPS

A.1 Holy Roman, Ottoman, and Russian Empires, 1400s–1500s

A.2 Europe in

A.3 US, British, and Japanese Colonialism, Circa 1900

A.4 Divided Germany

TABLES

1.1 Regime and Cooperation: Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition

1.2 Regime and Cooperation: Sufficient but Not Necessary Condition

1.3 Regime and Cooperation: Necessary and Sufficient Condition

1.4 Regime and Cooperation: Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition

2.1 Chicken: A Stylized Depiction of the Palestinian-Israeli Conundrum

4.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma

4.2 The Battle of the Sexes

4.3 The US and North Korean Governments: Game of Chicken

5.1 The Major Powers’ Balance of Power in 1896

5.2 Empirical Evidence for the Power Transition Theory, 1815–1980

6.1 Why Fight? Domestic Institutions and the Reasons for Conflict

6.2 Winning Coalition Size and Likelihood of War Given a Dispute

7.1 Conditions in Search of International Solutions

8.1 Global Warming National Threats

8.2 Top Ten Greenhouse Gas Emitters

8.3 Bilateral Brazilian-US Emission Reduction Game

9.1 Human Rights Treaties

9.2 Poverty and Human Rights: A Statistical Scorecard

10.1 Labor Productivity in Making Wine and Cloth

11.1 Valuing Money

12.1 Foreign Aid: Who Gives, Who Gets, and How Much?

13.1 Preference Orderings for a Terrorism Game

14.1 Change in Democracy Ten Years after a Military Intervention Compared to Cases without an Intervention (%)

FIGURES

I.1 What Is in the National Interest?

2.1 The Risk of Ouster, Time in Office, and Type of Regime 76

2.2 Governance Institutions

2.3 Standard Regime Types and Coalition and Selectorate Size

2.4 Ten Countries in 2006: W and S

2.5 Selectorate View of Policy Choices

3.1 What Changes in North Korean Nuclear Policy Can We Expect in the Next Five Years if Kim Jung-Un Retains Power in North Korea?

3.2 Selected Policy Preferences

3.3a Examples of Preferences That Are Single-Peaked

3.3b Examples of Preferences That Are Not Single-Peaked

3.4 Power Distribution by Nuclear Policy Preference

3.5 Cumulative Power: Finding the Median Voter

3.6 Preferences of a Few Key Players about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Nuclear Policy and Foreign Aid

3.7 Russia’s Preferred-To Set: Policies Russian Leaders Like Better Than the Status Quo

3.8 Win Sets for Aid Policy Versus Nuclear Policy

3.9 Compromises Acceptable or Unacceptable to the United States

4.1 Spin the Dial: Green or Not Green

4.2 Chicken in Extensive Form: United States Moves First

4.3 Solving Chicken in Extensive Form: United States Moves First

4.4a The United States Versus the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the United States Is Prepared to Fight

4.4b The United States Versus the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the United States Lacks Will to Fight

5.1 A Hypothetical Palestinian-Israeli Compromise over Land

5.2 European Great Power Alliance Commitments, 1914