Anthony Summers - The Eleventh Day

127 O’Neill:Miller & Stone, 222–.

128 “I think”/“popped”:Richard Clarke, 214. U.S. intelligence worried not only about December 31 as the date of a possible attack, but also about January 3 and 6. The 3rd is considered a night of destiny in Islam, while January 6, 2000, coincided with the end of Ramadan. As discovered later, an attack was indeed planned for the 3rd—a bombing of the U.S. destroyer Sullivans , which was visiting the Yemeni port of Aden. The explosives-loaded boat, however, sank in the surf before the operation could be carried out. This botched effort preceded by nine months the successful attack on the USS Cole , also in Aden, which is covered in Ch. 25. Walid bin Attash, one of the Yemenis bin Laden initially selected for the 9/11 operation, reportedly played a role in planning both bombings (Jan. 3/6: FBI IG; Sullivans /Attash: Staff Statement 2, CO).

129 “They said”:Benjamin & Simon, 313.

130 “All Islamic”:Staff Report, “Monograph on the Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF;

131 1998 exercise:Kean & Hamilton, 109, CR, 345;

132 “bin Laden and his”:CR, 128;

133 “unconventional”: Sunday Times (London), 6/9/02;

134 “America”:“New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century,” Commission on National Security, 9/15/99, www.fas.org. The commission was chaired by former U.S. senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman;

135 Library of Congress report:Rex Hudson, “The Sociology & Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 9/99, 7, NYT , 5/18/02.

136 America West/“walked into”/door locked/​alerted/​handcuffs/​interrogation:Judgment, Muhammad Al-Qudhai’een et al. v. America West Airlines et al. , Case No. C-2-00-1380, US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, 4/30/03 Manager, Chicago Civil Aviation Security Office to Director, undated FAA Memo, “Other Flights 9/11, FAA Memo re America West 90,” B7, T7, CF, Report, JI, 6;

137 “casing”:MFR 04017521, 1/7/04, MFR 04019354, 7/22/03;

138 “tied”:MFR 04019354, 7/22/03;

139 poster:Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/24/02 (as supplemented 10/17/02), JI;

140 “explosive”:ibid.

141 arrested with Zubaydah:CR, 521n60. The man who tried the cockpit door was Muhammad al-Qudhai’een and his companion Hamdan al-Shalawi. Both insisted that Qudhai’een had merely wished to find the airplane lavatory. They subsequently sued America West, alleging racial stereotyping, but the suit was dismissed. Qudhai’een, interviewed in Saudi Arabia by 9/11 Commission staff, said he thought the perpetrators of 9/11 were “ignorant” people. In his interview, Shalawi said he recalled having encountered future pilot hijacker Hani Hanjour before the incident on the airplane. He acknowledged having done “charity work” in Afghanistan back in 1987, but denied ever having been there since. Three officers of the Mabahith, Saudi Arabia’s internal security service, were present during the commission’s interviews of both Shalawi and Qudhai’een. The associate with a bin Laden poster on his wall was Zacaria Soubra, then a student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Arizona (Qudhai’een, Shalawi sued: Judgment, Muhammad Al-Qudhai’een et al. v. America West Airlines et al. , No. C-2–00–1380, US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 4/30/03; “ignorant”/“charity work”/Mabahith: MFR int. Muhammad al-Qudhai’een, 10/26/03 & MFR int. Hamdan bin al-Shalawi, 10/23/03, “Staff Delegation International Trip,” T1A, CF; Soubra: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/24/02 [as supplemented 10/17/02], JI, FBI IG).

142 exploratory trips:Fouda & Fielding, 158, Bergen, OBL I Know , 302;

143 1999 reports:Report, JI, 334, Statements of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, 9/24/02 (as supplemented 10/17/02), JI, FBI IG;

144 “The purpose”/found no indication/INS:ibid., Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/24/02, (as supplemented 10/17/02), JI;

145 “very frustrating”;MFR 04018415, 12/16/03, CF.

CHAPTER 25

1

training camp/​combat/​magazines/​games/​movies:

CR, 157, 493n50, 54;

2

phone directories/English/two Yemenis:

KSM SUBST, CR, 157–.

3

Mihdhar left early:

Detainees’ accounts varied as to whether Mihdhar completed the physical training course. KSM said Mihdhar was not present for the familiarization-with-U.S.-life sessions that Hazmi attended—he had supposedly had similar instruction earlier (CR, 493n50 & 53);

4

on choosing optimal:

ibid., 158, 493n54;

5

Attash dry run/no visas/he learned:

ibid., 158–, KSM SUBST;

6

box cutter/knife:

CR, 159, “Charge Sheet, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” 4/15/08,

www.findlaw.com

;

7

toothpaste/art supplies:

CR, 493n59;

8

ploy worked:

ibid., 159.

9

condominium in K.L.:

ibid. It remains unclear who exactly may have been with the trio at the condominium, which belonged to a former Malaysian army captain named Yazid Sufaat. Their comrade from the training period, Abu Bara al Tai’zi (see notes for Ch. 24), was there. So, too, reportedly, was Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian terrorist leader known as “Hambali.” In his insightful book

The Looming Tower

, Lawrence Wright wrote that a dozen terrorist associates came and went from the condominium. There have also been unconfirmed reports that KSM and Ramzi Binalshibh joined the group. The claim that KSM was present is unsupported by any available evidence. A senior German police official has referred to evidence, apparently credit card receipts, indicating that Binalshibh was there (Tai’zi/Sufaat: CR, 156–; Isamuddin:

New Straits Times

[Malaysia] 2/10/02,

Time Asia

, 4/1/02 CR, 158; dozen: Wright, 311; KSM: e.g.

Newsweek

, 7/9/03; Binalshibh:

LAT

, 9/1/02,

NYT

, 8/24/020).

10 boarded UA flight/“tourists”:Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” CO, 13–, Timeline, “Hijackers Primary Docs, AA77, 2 of 2,” & FBI 302 of Special Agent [redacted], 9/12/01, “Hijackers Primary Docs, AA77, 1 of 2,” B50, T5, CF. After 9/11 it would emerge that U.S. intelligence had been aware, even before it began, that suspected terrorists were to meet in Kuala Lumpur. The men were surveilled while they were there and an attempt was made to follow them afterward, when they left for Thailand. Most stunning of all, the CIA knew even before Mihdhar reached Kuala Lumpur that he had a current visa to enter the United States. Within months, moreover, it learned the equally alarming fact that Hazmi had entered the United States. Agency spokesmen have claimed that, even so, the CIA took no action until just before 9/11. Why not? The issue is of enormous significance and will be covered in Ch. 31 (e.g., Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 353–, FBI IG).

11 no “facilitator”:KSM SUBST;

12 Commission not believe:CR, 215;

13 no trace:CR, 514n8, Staff Statement 16, CO, MFR 040204580, 6/23–24/04, CF.

14 chauffeur/“two Saudis”/“an apartment”/tour:int. of Qualid Benomrane, FBI 302, 265A-LA-228901, 4/6/02, INTELWIRE. The statements of the driver, a Tunisian named Qualid Benomrane, contain unresolved issues. He did not, for example, have an official taxi driver’s license until several months after Hazmi and Mihdhar’s arrival. Benomrane said it was Fahad al-Thumairy, an imam at the King Fahd mosque, who asked him to drive the two Saudis around—at the request, in turn, of someone at the Saudi consulate. At one point, however, he said the “two Saudis” were sons of a sick father seeking treatment in Los Angeles—which would not fit Hamzi and Mihdhar. Thumairy, for his part, denied knowing Benomrane but said he did know a “son and sick father.” Commission staff who interviewed Thumairy in Saudi Arabia, however, judged him “deceptive.”