Nigel Tranter - The Price of the King's Peace

Not even all the Irish princes were on Edward’s side.

O’Hanlon’MacMahon, Maguire and MacGoffey were known to be cooperating

with the English meantime, as well as many lesser chieftains.

Some would change sides at the first sign of success, no doubt; but the reverse might well apply with others presently accepted as loyal.

However, all the news was not of this calibre. The English leadership seemed to be having its own troubles. Nobody was very sure who was in command. Sir Edmund Butler, the Justiciar, over whom Edward and Moray had won a victory earlier, had been thereafter replaced, on orders from London, by Roger, Lord Moe timer. But at the same time, a tough and militant cleric, John de Hotham, Bishop of Ely, had been sent over as Chancellor of Ireland, and political overlord, and there was bad blood between him and Mortimer. The de Lacy brothers, important Anglo-Irish Lords of Meath, appeared to be offended at both of these appointments, and with their friends and allies were not exactly in revolt but were refusing to cooperate. Most uncertain of all was Richard de Burgh’s position. As Earl of Ulster he was the greatest of the Anglo-Irish nobles-indeed the native Irish referred to the Anglo Irish as the Race of Richard Burke-as well as the foremost commander in age as in seniority and in rank, of any in Ireland; and had more than once acted as commander-in-chief of Irish forces.

But he was apparently now only to command in the north-although admittedly that was where the main fighting would be apt to be-and presumably under the authority of both the Bishop and Mortimer. The reason for this was difficult to fathom-although some suggested that it was because de Burgh had been Edward the First’s great crony and comrade-in-arms, and Edward the Second, hating his late father and all his works, might not trust him, might even wish to humiliate him.

Whatever was behind it all, it seemed to Robert Bruce a situation which should be exploited, and swiftly. But it quickly became apparent that such was not his brother’s opinion, nor that of most of those around him. Let the English squabble amongst themselves, was the reaction. Why interfere, when that would most probably just unite them? Let them grow weaker, while they themselves garnered their strength. Besides, here was no time for campaigning, before the Yuletide festivals were over. Ireland was a notably Christian, not to say, holy, country, the most pious in the western world. They must not offend religious feeling.

Bruce, aware of how much religious feeling his brother possessed, did

not take this seriously at first. But as time wore on, he realised

that it was no laughing matter. Edward was himself quite ruthless

about religious susceptibilities, strong though they were;

but he was using them as excuse for delay. He was not ready to move, and he found the peculiar Irish preoccupation with religious form, observance and display convenient to his purpose.

Certainly that of 1316—17 was the busiest, fullest Yuletide Bruce had ever experienced. Every day for weeks seemed to be a saint’s day-the names of most of which the Scots had never so much as heard. Not that the consequent celebrations were in the main tiresomely sanctimonious, or even very recognisably sacredotal.

Parades, pageantry, contests, feasting, singing and dancing, even horse-racing, were seemingly all part of the programme of worship, the clerics foremost in promoting all. The rain, which tended to fall daily, did nothing to damp down at least local pious spirits.

Bruce fretted but conformed. He could, of course, have taken matters into his own hands, and led his Scots force southwards independently. But that would have much offended the Irish, and involved lack of cooperation if not actual hostility on the part of the local populations through which they must pass, a serious matter. Irish politics being what they were, and the Church being so all-pervasive and influential, such a move would have been rash indeed.

Not that the period of waiting was wholly wasted. It gave time for Scots captains to get to know their Irish forces, as well as for more men to flood in from various parts of Ulster and the North.

Time also for the integration of the army, and a certain amount of training-though this was scarcely popular. Bruce quickly realised that there was little that he could do to make a more unified force out of the Irish legions, neither themselves nor Edward being prepared to tolerate any such interference. He contented himself with picking out men for a light cavalry force-for which, since he was providing the horses and squadron commanders, they could hardly object. This he prevailed on MacCarthy of Desmond to captain, with Angus Og as liaison, who knew the Irish best from his many mercenary campaigns here. These made a dashing, swift-moving force-if only they could be relied upon to do as they were commanded.

Working with the Scots, they would form the spearhead of the

campaign.

In the end, it was not until the beginning of February, with rumours of de Burgh massing troops at Drogheda, that at long last a start was made from Carrickfergus -inevitably on the Day of the Blessed Brigit, Abbess of Kildare. There were, in fact, two distinct armies-Bruce’s light cavalry host of Scots and selected Irish, to the number of about 9,000; and the great composite mass of Irish gallowglasses, kerns and clansmen, stiffened with Scots veteran captains and some heavy chivalry, unnumbered but probably totalling some 40,000. One was fast, to conduct hard-hitting, swift striking warfare of the sort Bruce had perfected; the other slow, cumbersome, to come along behind, consolidating, occupying, supplying.

Edward, of course, should have commanded the second and main army-as he did in name; but he was a cavalry commander above all, and he insisted on riding with the first force. In fact, much of the time he was out in front with the advance guard, however unsuitable in a monarch. He had been reluctant to start-for he had wanted the Scots strength to stabilise his hold on his kingdom and defeat his internal enemies-but once committed, typically, he was all fire and energy.

As much to keep up with Edward as anything else, the cavalry army, after rounding the head of Belfast Lough, dashed the twenty-odd miles south to the limits of their occupied territory on the very first day. Bruce was uneasy at already leaving the main host so far behind-but was more uneasy still when he discovered that Edward’s advance party, finding their welcome insufficiently enthusiastic, had burned the church at Bright, and already sacked the monastery of the walled cathedral town of Downpatrick, where they had proposed to spend the night. This in allegedly friendly country. Admittedly there had been some opposition at Green castle, which had an Anglo-Irish de Courcy lord, and which Edward took with a flourish-but, after all the religious observance, this seemed to be an odd way to start a campaign. Edward had Irish backing, however, for his assertion that this was how wars were conducted in Ireland.

There being insufficient forage for the thousands of horses at Downpatrick, allegedly St. Patrick’s burial-place, they moved two miles eastwards to the wide abbey-lands of Saul, flanking Strangford Lough, where St. Malachy had built the abbey on the site of the barn wherein St. Patrick held his first Christian service in Ireland, and where there was grass in plenty. There was no getting away from saints and sanctity in this country. Even the grass, it was alleged, would be the better for the horses, in these holy pastures -although this did not prevent Edward’s men from treating the abbot and his monks less than gently. Bruce forbore criticism thus early. Assuming that Edward would remain with his main infantry army, he had underestimated the difficulties of a divided command, and this was his brother’s country.