Ragnar Benson - Ragnar's Urban Survival

Close, violent combat with light auto and semiauto weapons, flamethrowers, hand grenades, mines, and light antitank weapons (taking the place of artillery), is common in urban warfare. Obviously, many traditionally civilian weapons likely to be in the hands of urban survivors will work nicely in these situations. Defenders will not have to rely on standard military equipment to make an adequate showing. Knowing that the reliable, scope-sighted semiauto .22-caliber rifle could be used at the short ranges in cities to trump well-armed attackers is certainly a source of comfort.

Urban conflict is notorious for the vast, virtually disproportionate amount of munitions it chews up. Internal defenders without regular lines of resupply are at an advantage if they have enough prepositioned supplies. Theft of war materiel is a great concern for attacking forces, but since capturing enemy supplies is risky, experienced city fighters report that most of their stuff came from preexisting, internal stockpiles. Again, city survivors should only get involved if their most immediate area is compromised.

The rule of thumb in this case is that, again, city survivors should not get involved in battles. If they do, their precious private supplies will be quickly exhausted. Replacement by capture does not work and should not be part of a survival plan, experts claim.

This advice proved accurate in the reduction of Berlin and Beirut, but not so accurate in the Warsaw Ghetto. Certainly it’s a matter of how badly either side wants to continue to fight and what sorts of skilled manpower are available.

City combat is different from combat in the countryside in some deadly regards. A veteran of World War II city fighting recalls that whenever a city had to be taken, he and his fellow soldiers never, never allowed themselves to be channeled down existing streets and roads when entering the city. Instead they used satchel charges, tank guns, and tanks as bulldozers to punch holes through lines of houses and through factories. By moving through the insides of existing structures they kept out of the enemy’s sight and out of his ambushes, he said.

But predictions are tough. Houses along main thoroughfares were often targeted, while those behind were frequently spared. Attacking soldiers also avoided remote neighborhoods where no obvious resistance was organized, especially if barriers and minefields were in place. Another lesson for city survivors.

Fortunes of war are indeed fickle. Absolutely no one can really know ahead if they will end up in harm’s way. I think of the Englishman so disgusted by World War I he moved to a remote coaling station in the Pacific. Vessels had then begun to burn Bunker-C fuel, not coal, so “nobody will ever bother me here,” he reasoned. But, of course, Midway Island became a major battleground in World War II.

As long as they are tall, buildings that are not strategic and less than dominant can successfully be turned into protected fortress-type structures for use by city survivors. Beirut provides several excellent examples. Survivors there often occupied apartments of high-rise buildings whose top two or three floors had been reduced to rubble, either intentionally or by enemy artillery fire. Layers of ruin above provided excellent protection from artillery or mortar fire, while both giving the impression of being a dead building and giving defenders high ground among protective rubble. But there were other considerations.

Was the building dam aged to the point of near-collapse? Some residents lived in great danger in this type of rubble. Additionally, past six or eight floors, walking up to an apartment on a daily basis becomes a real chore (obviously no elevators ran). Survivors argue both ways. While hauling in food and water was difficult, these buildings offered high-rise inaccessibility in uncontested neighborhoods and provided great security.

Some movement out of the retreat will be unavoidable. Know ahead that leaving the retreat is accompanied by great danger and that this must be planned for. Sending a boy or girl out for essential food, water, or medicine often presents an unacceptable risk, because torture is a common and, many claim, necessary element of urban warfare. I have spoken with German women who lived in Berlin at the time of the Soviet occupation, who recalled that if they were caught out on the street they were raped often six or eight times before escaping and hiding again.

Rubble produced by enemy artillery and air strikes can hinder the movement of attacking infantry while simultaneously providing cover for defenders. Attacking commanders often attempt to minimize this problem by ordering their troops to torch cities. The success of this device depends entirely on the type of construction and nature of building contents. Under the wrong circumstances there is little to be done to save one’s city, urban survivors claim. Some survivors report having been able to remove combustibles while simultaneously putting out fires as they started. Others took shelter in fire-resistant buildings.

With the battle past, some even re-established living quarters in fire-gutted buildings. This doesn’t sound terribly practical, but many of these folks reported living through what seemed like horrible, large, citywide fires.

Sandbagged emplacements are recommended to control fire and to afford some protection from small-arms fire. These can be quite clever, including sandbagged overhead racks, frontal barriers, and floors. Often these structures take on the character of gun emplacements. While those who intend to fight with the urban guerrillas need to know the theory behind these, they are mostly unnecessary for city survivors and will not be covered here, except in passing.

Those interested can secure U.S. Army training manuals on urban warfare as reprints from Paladin Press or in their original form from military manual suppliers. Most military manuals are available in local university libraries where they can be freely copied. Look for anything on combat in built-up places.

Not only is warfare likely in cities where we live, it is also like ly that this warfare will be bitterly fought. Modern commanders know from past experience that a well-prepared and mutually supported position in a city can usually be defended by a small force. Attackers are likely to suffer heavy losses and perhaps even temporary defeat against a smaller defending force.

At one time wise commanders bypassed builtup areas, allowing defenders be gradually starved out. East of the Mississippi and in Europe, urban development is so extensive that this tactic is no longer considered practical.

In this and most other cases, survival has proven possible if we limit our defense to our own immediate area. Personal defense in cities, especially when the distinction between the military and police is blurred, is complex. More about this in subsequent chapters.