Bensalem Himmich - The Polymath

“So why have I let myself to be distracted by these details? What, for heaven’s sake, have we established? What I’ve wanted to demonstrate is that, when a state follows the various stages on the downward path toward outright despotism, it reveals its flaws for all to see; in fact, with its untutored infant rulers it becomes a genuine laughingstock. Here’s what Lisan al-Din Ibn al-Khatib has to say about being a guest of the infant, Sultan al-Sa‘id ibn Abi ‘Inan: Ί hear a voice but see no one. All I know about him is that he toddles his way from the minister’s presence to the congregational prayer mosque. During parades he sits there like a stuffed chicken, all daubed, tail tucked under, clasping a handkerchief or knife for all he’s worth; the turban encircles a moonlike visage. And there he stays, sitting atop his throne and glowing like the wicks in his own lamps, a model of brittle nobility.’

“By my life, Hammu, that quotation reveals for us just a minute segment of the dire consequences of rapacious rulership.”

With that Ibn Khaldun stopped deliberately with the intention of giving his amanuensis a bit of a breather. He yelled out to Sha‘ban to bring in some fresh coffee, then adjusted his sitting position. Sometimes he stared at the floor, at others the ceiling. For his part, al-Hihi was doing what he normally did during breaks in dictation, namely tapping his fingers by way of apology and checking on his pens and ink.

“Fine, Hammu,” said ‘Abd al-Rahman, “let’s go back to where we were. .”

“You mean, finding a way out of the genie’s magic time-lamp which is constantly working against us?”

“That’s a fine way of putting it. I’ve no doubt that some rulers have tried to escape from the bottleneck or to break the cycle of history with its inverted impact. One may have developed a sensible system of taxation and put in place some principles of justice and civil society. Another may have tackled the profit sectors and utilized their revenues to boost the exchequer. Still another may have tried to suppress feelings of tribal solidarity by creating a professionalized and multiracial army as a substitute. All these constitute different options, and, in spite of any number of obstacles and roadblocks on the way, other rulers will come along and try their hand at giving greater weight to the factors involved. Among such rulers, highly principled reformers will adopt the loftiest principles of the Islamic caliphate to effect such transformations. But what I envisage is a powerful ruler in the Maghrib, someone who can appreciate that the way ahead is blocked to the north and east and who can then order the army to march southward into the lands of the Africans, all out of a desire for the good things they can provide. I can also imagine another ruler who thinks that the best solution for controlling his entire country and all its people is to create a slave army that will only respond to his commands, and no one else’s.

“All that said, the moral is always to be found in results and consequences. When it comes to the question of reform, what history tells us is that at the start of a particular reign it may last for a short period but it remains fragmentary. Before long, however, the winds of tyranny and personal whim sweep it all aside.

“What history tells us about eras of expansion and campaigns beyond borders is that every such extension of power and influence is followed in the vast majority of cases by an era of waning power, the disruptive effects of which may have a negative impact on the functions of the power center itself.

“What we learn from history about the creation of a tightly organized slave-army with all its concomitant force is that such soldiers rapidly become part of the gentry themselves, members of the ruling elite, and occupiers of the regal throne. I am firm in my conviction that the fault in this process does not lie in the fact that manumitted slaves become rulers of mankind, but rather that their reliance on esprit de corps is no less erratic and capricious than that of any other group. Just consider the situation with the Burji Mamluks of our generation and with their predecessors, the Bahri Mamluks; the problem is there for all to see. Their paranoia regarding the intentions of other Muslim communities leads them to give prominent positions in the chancery and treasury to Jews and Christians. Every dispute that breaks out within their coterie is settled with the sword, and as a result, many of their rulers and senior officials are murdered. Then consider how often the lives of judges and teachers are disrupted when they keep being appointed and then dismissed, something that will soon happen to me, no doubt. That’s because the Mamluks prefer to deal with legal scholars who thrive on conspiracy theories and an atmosphere of gloom and doom, the kind of people who were directly responsible for the trial of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiya.

“So then, the vague glimmerings of explanations for it all do exist, but the question still remains with us as to how to escape from the bottleneck of history as it continues to operate against us. I can recall, for example, that Ibn ‘Arafa, someone utterly loathed and detested, once sent a messenger to convey some advice to me face to face: ‘You’re looking for a solution all over the place, when it’s closer than your own nose.’ What this Tunisian sage implied by the word ‘solution’ was a look into the past, the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. At this point, I have to pause so that I can point out some of the errors committed by extremists and lay to rest other remarks made by people who have only succeeded in confusing the issue. I broached this topic in the Introduction to History , but no one read it carefully enough or took sufficient notice.

“The course of history demands of us that we make a clear distinction between the pure form of Islam, the foundational model on the one hand, and the current and normal sectarian Islam on the other. The former was a full-scale historical whirlwind, one that shattered the laws of nature and the rules of empirical history. Its power was derived essentially from the doctrine of the truth and the inimitable qualities of the Qur’an. However, that kind of Islam did not last for more than four decades. It was followed by the Umawi dynasty, and with that, the restraining factor of religion disappeared to be replaced by another kind of Islam, one divided and fragmented, with its own firmly established practices, dominated by conflicts between sects, parties, and separate community interests. Didn’t the Prophet himself (upon him be peace) state: ‘After me the caliphate will last for thirty years. Then it will turn into a rapacious monarchy’?

“While noting this dire split within the fabric of Islam, I will nevertheless refrain from laying the blame on the people responsible. Instead of dreaming about a return of the impossible — a pure, early form of Islam — I will endeavor to come to grips with a reality that can hardly be denied, and to comprehend a process of change dictated by the logic of historical methodology. Thus, when I am confronted by the knotty and sensitive issue of the caliphate, I prefer to adopt a more legalistic tack, examining each choice from the viewpoint of the degree of truth it contains. Behind it all, I see emotion and desire as being two vital forces operating in the clash of politics and history.

“In brief, and as I suggested earlier, ‘The incipient religion of Islam dissipated once its miracles had disappeared and the Companions of the Prophet who had witnessed them had all died. That special quality that the early religion possessed changed bit by bit. As the miracles vanished, the system of governance reverted to its former status.’

“In making such a statement I am relying purely on the realities of the situation. To remove any ambiguity on the matter, I will clarify things by noting that on questions of belief, the religion of the Islamic community is still the orthodox version of Islam. On questions of personal status, inheritance, and endowments, the law is also based on the same religious foundation. However, in these spheres and others it is individual interpretation that controls the decision-making process. That is in accord with the principles of necessity and the public interest of the times, operating along the lines laid out for us by the pioneer figure in Islamic jurisprudence, Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man, my own personal imam. This is what he has to say about our predecessors: ‘They are men and so are we. They made their own decisions, and so we should act in exactly the same way.’ A fine statement indeed, and the essence of wisdom and good sense!