Noah Webster - A Collection of Essays and Fugitiv Writings

But the danger is, that as an evil of this kind increases, so will the lethargy of the people, and their habits of vice and negligence. Thus the disease acquires force, for want of an early remedy, and a dissolution ensues. But a Legislature, which is always watching the public safety, will more early discover the approaches of disorders, and more speedily apply a remedy. This is not precisely the case with the British constitution; for it was not committed at once to parchment and ratified by the people. It consists rather of practice, or common law, with some statutes of Parliament. But the English have been too jealous of changing their practice, even for the better. All the writers on the English constitution agree, that any Parliament can change or amend every part of it; yet in practice, the idea of an unalterable constitution has had too much influence in preventing a reform in their representation.

But we have an example nearer home directly in point. The charter of Connecticut declares that each town shall have liberty to send one or two deputies to the General Court; and the constant practice has been to send two . While the towns were few, the number of Representativs was not inconvenient; but since the complete settlement of the State, and the multiplication of the towns, the number has swelled the Legislature to an unwieldly and expensive size. The house of Representativs consists of about 170 members: An attempt has been made, at several sessions, to lessen the representation, by limiting each town to one Deputy. A question arises, have the Assembly a right to lessen the representation? In most States, it would be decided in the negativ. Yet in that State it is no question at all; for there is a standing law expressly delegating the whole power of all the freemen to the Legislature. But I bring this instance to prove the possibility of changes in any system of government, which will require material alterations in its fundamental principles; and the Legislature should always be competent to make the necessary amendments, or they have not an unlimited power to do right. 21 21 In Pensylvania, after the late choice of Delegates to Congress by the people, one of the Gentlemen sent his resignation to the President and Council, who refered it to the Legislature then sitting. This body, compozed of the servants of the people, I suppoze, solemnly resolved, that there was no power in the State which could accept the resignation. The resolv was grounded on the idea that the power of the people is paramount to that of the Legislature; whereas the people hav no power at all, except in choosing representativs. All Legislativ and Executiv powers are vested in their Representativs, in Councilor Assembly, and the Council should have accepted the resignation and issued a precept for another choice. Their compelling the man to serve was an act of tyranny.

The distinction between the Legislature and a Convention is, for the first time, introduced into Connecticut, by the recommendation of the late convention of States, in order to adopt the new constitution. The Legislature of the State, without adverting to laws or practice, immediately recommended a convention for that purpose. Yet a distinction between a Convention and a Legislature is, in that State, a palpable absurdity, even by their own laws; for there is no constitution in the State, except its laws, which are always repealable by an ordinary Legislature; and the laws and uniform practice, from the first organization of the government, declare that the Legislature has all the power of all the people . A convention therefore can have no more power, and differs no more from an ordinary Legislature, than one Legislature does from another. Or rather it is no more than a Legislature chosen for one particular purpose of supremacy; whereas an ordinary Legislature is competent to all purposes of supremacy. But had the Legislature of that State ratified or rejected the new constitution, without consulting their constituents, their act would have been valid and binding. This is the excellence of the constitution of Connecticut, that the Legislature is considered as the body of the people ; and the people have not been taught to make a distinction which should never exist, and consider themselves as masters of their rulers , and their power as paramount to the laws. To this excellence in her frame of government, that State is indebted for uniformity and stability in public measures, during a period of one hundred and fifty years; a period of unparalleled tranquillity, never once disturbed by a violent obstruction of justice, or any popular commotion or rebellion. Wretched indeed would be the people of that State, should they adopt the vulgar maxim, that their rulers are their servants . We then may expect that the laws of those servants will be treated with the same contempt, as they are in some other States. 22 22 This pernicious error subverts the whole foundation of government. It resembles the practice of some Gentlemen in the country, who hire a poor strolling vagabond to keep a school, and then let the children know that he is a mere servant . The consequence is, the children despise him and his rules, and a constant war is maintained between the master and his pupils. The boys think themselves more respectable than the master, and the master has the rod in his hand, which he never fails to exercise. A proper degree of respect for the man and his laws, would prevent a thousand hard knocks. This is government in miniature . Men are taught to believe that their rulers are their servants , and then are rewarded with a prison and a gallows for despising their laws.

But from the manner in which government is constituted, it is evident that there is no power residing in the State at large, which does not reside in the legislature. I know it is said that government originates in compact ; but I am very confident, that if this is true, the compact is different from any other kind of compact that is known among men. In all other compacts , agreements or covenants , the assent of every person concerned, or who is to be bound by the compact, is requisite to render it valid and obligatory upon such person. But I very much question whether this ever takes place in any constitution of government.

Perhaps so far there is an implied compact in government, that every man consents to be bound by the opinion of a majority; but this is all a supposition ; for the consent of a hundredth part of a society is never obtained.

The truth is, government originates in necessity and utility ; and whether there is an implied compact or not, the opinions of the few must be overruled, and submit to the opinions of the many . But the opinions of a majority cannot be known, but in an Assembly of the whole society; and no part of the society has a right to decide upon a measure which equally affects the whole , without a consultation with the whole, to hear their arguments and objections. It is said that all power resides in the people ; but it must be remembered, that let the supreme power be where it will, it can be exercised only in an Assembly of the whole State , or in an Assembly of the Representativs of the whole State .

Suppose the power to reside in the people, yet they cannot, and they have no right to exercise it in their scattered districts, and the reason is very obvious; it is impossible that the propriety of a measure can be ascertained, without the best general information, and a full knowlege of the opinions of the men on whom it is to operate.