Авнер Грейф - Институты и путь к современной экономике. Уроки средневековой торговли

Carus-Wilson E.M. Medieval Merchant Venturers. L.: Butler and Tanner, 1967.

Casella A., Rauch J.E. Anonymous Market and Group Ties in International Trade // Journal of International Economics. 2002. Vol. 58. No. 1. P 19–47.

Catoni G. La Brutta Avventura di un Mercante Senese nel 1309 e una Guestione di Rappresaglia // Archivo Storico Italiano. 1976. Vol. 479. P 65–77.

Cavalli-Sforza L.L., Feldman M.W. Cultural Transmission and Evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Chamley C.P. Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Charness G., Grosskopf B. Relative Payoffs and Happiness: An Experimental Study // Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2001. Vol. 45. P 301–328.

Charness G., Rabin M. Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2002. Vol. 117. No. 3. P 817–869.

Christiani E. Nobilta’ e popolo nel Comune di Pisa. Instituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, 13. Milan: Casa Editrice Einaudi, 1962.

Chwe M.S.Y. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Cipolla C.M. Before the Industrial Revolution. 3rd ed. N.Y.: Norton, 1993.

Qizakga M. A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996.

Clark A. Economic Reason: The Interplay of Individual Learning and External Structure / Drobak, J. Nye (eds). The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1997a. P 269–290.

Clark A. Being There: Putting the Brain, Body, and World Togther Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997b.

Clark G. Yields per Acre in English Agriculture, 1250–1860: Evidence from Labour Inputs // Economic History Review. 1991. Vol. 44. No. 3. P 445–460.

Clay K. Trade, Institutions, and Credit // Explorations in Economic History. 1997. Vol. 34. No. 4. P 495–521.

Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III. 1227–1272. 14 vols. L.: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1902–1938.

Coase R.H. The Nature of the Firm // Economica, n.s. 1937. Vol. 4. P 386–405.

Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova dal MCLXIIII [sic] al MCL XXXX [sic] / ed. by Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo. Vols. I–III. Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1936, 1938, 1942/

Cole H.L., Mailath G.J., Postlewaite A. Social Norms, Saving Behavior and Growth // Journal of Political Economy. 1992. Vol. 100. No. 6. P 1092–1125.

Coleman J.S. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.

Collier D., Collier R. Shaping the Political Arena. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Collins K. The Logic of Clan Politics – Evidence from Central Asian Trajectories // World Politics. 2004. Vol. 56. No. 2. P. 224–261.

Colvin I.D. The Germans in England. L.: Kennikat Press, 1971. P. 1066–1598. Commons J.R. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1924.

Conlisk J. Why Bounded Rationality? // Journal of Economic Literature. 1996. Vol. 34. No. 2. P 669–700.

Constable R.O. Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Cook M. Forbidding Wrong in Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Coulton G.G. (eds) Social Life in Britain from the Conquest to the Reformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1918.

Crawford S., Ostrom E. A Grammar of Institutions // American Political Review. 1995. Vol. 89. No. 3. P 582–600.

Cremer J. Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1986. Vol. 101. No. 1. P 33–49.

Crone P. Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Crone P. Slaves on Horses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Crone P. God’s Rule: Government and Islam. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2004.

DAndrade R.G. 1984. Cultural Meaning Systems / R.A. Shweder, R.A. LeVine (eds). Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P 88-122.

Dasgupta P. 2000. Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital / P Dasgupta, I. Serageldin (eds). Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Washington, DC: World Bank. P. 325–424.

Dasgupta P., Serageldin I. (eds) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000.

David P.A. Clio and the Economics of Qwerty // American Economic Review. 1985. Vol. 75. No. 2. P 332–337.

David PA. Why Are Institutions the “Carriers of History”?: Path-Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions // Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 1994. Vol. 5. No. 2. P 205–220.

Davis D.D., Holt C.A. Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Davis K. Human Society. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1949.

Dawes R.M., Thaler R.H. Anomalies: Cooperation // Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1988. Vol. 2. No. 3. P 187–197.

Day J. Les douanes de genes. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1963. P 1376–1377.

Day G.W. The Impact of the Third Crusade upon Trade with the Levant // International History Review. 1984. Vol. 3 (Apr.). P. 159–168.

Day G.W. Genoa’s Response to Byzantium. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988.P 1154–1204.

De Figueiredo R., Rakove J., Weingast B.R. Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-Confirming Equilibrium: A New Understanding of the American Revolution: Memo. Stanford University, 2001.

Dekel E., Fudenberg D., Levine D.K. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium // Journal of Economic Theory. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 2. P 165–185.

De Negri, Ossian T. Storia di Genova. Florence: G. Martello, 1986.

Denzau A., North D.C. Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions // Kyklos. 1994. Vol. 47. P 3-30.

De Roover R. Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges. Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948.

De Roover R. The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397–1494. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.

De Roover R. The Organization of Trade / M.M. Postan, E.E. Rick, M. Miltey (eds). Cambridge Economic History of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1965. Vol. 3. P 42-118.

Diamond J. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. N.Y.: Norton, 1997.

DiMaggio P. Culture and Economy / N. Smelser, R. Swedberg (eds). The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation. 1994. P 27–57.

DiMaggio P. The New Institutionalism: Avenues of Collaboration // Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 1997. Vol. 154. P 1-10.

DiMaggio P, Powell W. Introduction / W Powell, P DiMaggio (eds). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991a. P 1-40.

DiMaggio P., Powell W. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields / W. Powell, P. DiMaggio (eds). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991b. P 63–82.

Dixit A. Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Dixit A., Nalebuff B. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics and Everyday Life. N.Y.: Norton, 1991.