At the outset of the twentieth century the advent of the submarine, the torpedo and the mine upset the supremacy of the line-of-battle fleet that had persisted from the age of sail well into the age of steam. Naval commanders in this collection were therefore confronted with unprecedented challenges in their conduct of maritime operations. Nuclear powered attack and ballistic missile submarines, for the first time true submersibles – as they do not have to ‘come up for air’ – have now added a new dimension to naval warfare.
The two most significant additions to the established disciplines of war on land and sea are those of air power and the means of acquiring intelligence. In the First World War, air power was a welcome ‘add-on’ for observation, supporting fire and keeping the enemy air force from interfering with surface operations. In the course of a mere twenty years it had developed into a battle-winning or losing factor, as demonstrated in the 1940 German blitzkrieg in France, the extraordinary success of the Japanese expansionist campaign after Pearl Harbour and the critical advantage of the virtually complete Allied air-superiority over northern France in 1944.
In the field of intelligence acquisition, air reconnaissance allowed surface commanders to see the other side of the hill and over the horizon in a time scale within which they could react with profit. The targeting of aerial reconnaissance and subsequent assault onto an enemy’s dispositions, deployments, industrial capacity and surface communications has been enhanced by being able to intercept and decode his strategic and tactical signal traffic. ‘We had an ally,’ crowed Ludendorff’s Deputy Chief of Operations after victory at Tannenberg, ‘The enemy. We knew all the enemy’s plans.’ He had had the daily intercepts of the Russian wireless messages decoded by a German professor of mathematics. The most quantum leap of all is being able to overhear an enemy’s political and strategic discussions and plans, lifting intelligence to a level remote from travellers’ tales and dependence on reports from agents, who could see or hear only one fragment of the plot and who might be working for the enemy.
After the two World Wars, revulsion of the prospect of more carnage and devastation led to ‘limited wars’, limited by geography and objective, such as were fought by the United Nations in Korea and by the United Kingdom against Argentina for the Falkland Islands, yet with the spectre of superpower conflict still hovering ominously in the background, imposing its own constraints on national manoeuvre and aspiration.
Throughout this era of change has lain the menace of ‘undeclared’ war, where there is no formal understanding between adversaries, no acknowledged code for the treatment of prisoners or the wounded and the civilian population is utilized – often ruthlessly – as a place of refuge, a source of support and supply or, worst of all, as hostages upon which atrocities are committed in order to apply restraint or to exact revenge. There is nothing new here and methods vary only with the terrain and the weaponry available to the antagonists. While we might applaud examples like the Spanish guerrilla attacks on the outposts of Napoleon’s armies in the Iberian Peninsula and Tito’s partisans against the Axis occupiers of Yugoslavia, we deplore the murder and mayhem imposed by Kenya’s Mau-Mau or by communist insurgents seeking to overthrow colonial administrations or their perceived proxies in South East Asia. ‘One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter’ loses none of its truth through having become a cliché. A number of the individuals whose obituaries appear here experienced conflict in several of the forms described, maintaining their reputations for success only when they adapted to change.
Change in the manner in which command is exercised has been equally dramatic. At Waterloo, where this book begins, Wellington commanded in the saddle from where he could oversee events only to the limit of visibility, while inspiring his soldiers by his overt presence. During the war for the Falklands, Admiral Fieldhouse commanded from his bunker deep below the London suburb of Northwood, from where he had access to the latest electronic and satellite intelligence, one-to-one communication with commanders at sea and eventually ashore, and with the British War Cabinet through the filter of the Service Chiefs of Staff.
The most significant aspect of the evolution of command is the extent to which political control may be applied to a commander in the field or at sea, affecting his strategic and even tactical decisions. He may jib at such restrictions, but the international nature of today’s world demands he should be kept alert to political intentions and reservations. From Kitchener’s ‘press conference’ after Omdurman (‘Get out of my way, you drunken swabs’) to to-day, the military commander has had to take increasing account of a pervasive, influential and technically proficient media. This raises the issue of whether one individual might any longer be able to make a critical impact on the outcome of a battle or campaign. The answer is ‘probably yes, but to a lesser extent than formerly’.
These obituaries have been selected from those published in The Times that illustrate high command in war, long experience of armed conflict or preparation for such responsibility. Success or failure has played a smaller part than impact or influence on events at the time and in consequence on the course of history. Some who held high command also pioneered or exploited a significant aspect of war – of which Admirals Dönitz and Horton are examples for submarine warfare and Generals Guderian and Patton for fast-moving armoured penetration and encirclement. We have also included Giuseppe Garibaldi as an exponent of irregular warfare and General Walter Walker as an expert on its suppression. Chiefs Cetywayo and Sitting Bull are here for their prowess as leaders of warrior nations, their courage and methods of warfare beset and eventually defeated by technology.
Objections over omissions and even some inclusions are inevitable, but a balance of different aspects of warfare, geography and nationality had to be struck. A few who might have qualified had no obituary in The Times ; otherwise Admiral Thomas Cochrane, Lord Dundonald, (1775–1860) would be here. While a long extract from Wellington’s obituary is included, the death of his great adversary, Napoleon, occurred too early and at a time when The Times had not yet developed its obituary coverage. Lord Kitchener is omitted because his obituary appeared in full in Great Lives , published in 2005. Sadly, no woman could be found to match the criteria for inclusion.
In addition to the conduct of war, its reporting in newspapers and recording in obituaries of the participants have also evolved. News of the victory of Waterloo had to be galloped to and sailed across the Channel while only fifty years later William Russell had his reports on the failings of the staff and administrative services in the Crimea telegraphed to The Times for publication next day – and with little or no censorship imposed upon his copy. Such journalistic freedom, although doubtless available, was seldom exercised in the obituaries of the period. Lord Raglan, who died aged sixty-six while in command of the British Army in the Crimea, whose obituary we include, was unsuited by age and lack of command experience for the responsibilities he held, something recognised by the press and public alike. Yet his obituary concentrates chiefly on his gentlemanly personal qualities, making only the briefest genuflexion towards the awareness of his shortcomings as a field commander at the very end – and without venturing to suggest what they were.
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